

The strong nation-state and violence



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Working Papers on Development and
Global Governance

No. 16

March 2018

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The *UAR Working Papers on Development and Global Governance* publish outstanding papers of students from the Master Programmes of the UA Ruhr Graduate Centre for Development Studies.

Editorial Board:

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Bibliographic Notes:

Tischmeyer, Christian (2018): The strong nation-state and violence, Duisburg/Bochum: UAR Graduate Centre for Development Studies (Working Papers on Development and Global Governance - No. 16).

Abstract

Our world is still massively violent. This is in harsh contrast to Elias' civilisation process, implying ever more peaceful conduct as modernity manifests. The very organisation he designates for pacifying society, the modern state, is itself central cause for ongoing violence. In fact, most of modernity's notorious massacres, genocides, and ethnic cleansings could not have been committed by lesser organisations than strong states. I seek to explicate this connection, using an historical-institutionalist approach, from a perspective critical of established orders. Modern statehood will be conceptualised as ascribed status, depending on external demands from an 'international community'. This ascription is based on existence of five sets of institutions, or dimensions of state activity. A state is considered strong when perceived to perform effectively in the dimensions of monopolising the military draft, direct taxation, bureaucratic organisation, promotion of formal economy, and keeping internal order. As meeting these conditions depends on direct rule, strong modern states are necessarily nations. Using an actor-centred concept of violence, I assess the violence necessary in creating and maintaining such orders. I conclude that nation-states have an institutional disposition towards mass-violence. Thus one has to think beyond this political order when seeking less violence.

Keywords: Modern statehood, strong state, nation-state, violence, ethnic cleansing, historical-institutionalist, critique of domination.

Zusammenfassung

Unsere Welt ist noch immer extrem gewalttätig. Das steht in scharfem Gegensatz zu Elias' Zivilisierungsprozess, einer kontinuierlichen Befriedung der Gesellschaft in der Moderne. Genau diejenige Organisation, welche diese gesellschaftliche Befriedung vorantreiben soll, der moderne Staat, ist selbst zentraler Grund der andauernden Gewalt. Tatsächlich sind die meisten der berüchtigten Massaker, Genozide und ethnischen Säuberungen der Moderne gar nicht denkbar ohne eine so effektive Organisation wie den starken Staat. Ich möchte diesen Zusammenhang verdeutlichen, unter Anwendung eines historisch-institutionalistischen Ansatzes, aus einer gegenüber etablierten Ordnungen kritischen Perspektive. Moderne Staatlichkeit wird als zugeschriebene Eigenschaft verstanden, abhängig von Bedingungen einer 'internationalen Gemeinschaft'. Diese Zuschreibung beruht auf fünf Dimensionen von Staatstätigkeit. Ein Staat gilt als stark, wenn seine Leistung in folgenden Bereichen anerkannt wird: Monopol der Rekrutierung, direkte Besteuerung, bürokratische Organisation, Förderung der formellen Wirtschaft und Aufrechterhaltung der inneren Ordnung. Da die Erfüllung dieser Aufgaben auf direkter Herrschaft beruht, sind starke moderne Staaten zwangsläufig Nationen. Mit Hilfe eines akteurszentrierten Gewaltkonzepts werde ich untersuchen, inwiefern Gewalt für Schaffung und Erhalt dieser Ordnungen notwendig ist. Ich schlussfolgere, dass Nationalstaaten eine institutionelle Neigung zur Ausübung von Massengewalt haben. Um also weniger Gewalt zu erreichen muss jenseits dieser politischen Ordnung gedacht werden.

Schlagwörter: Moderne Staatlichkeit, starker Staat, Nationalstaat, Gewalt, ethnische Säuberung, historisch-institutionalistisch, Herrschaftskritik.

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Table 1: Dimensions of state activity as functions of external demands

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Abbreviations

DA	Development Assistance
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
GB	Great Britain
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WW1	First World War
WW2	Second World War

Acknowledgements

I consider this paper a crucial step in my academic education, so I want to thank those who enabled my studies, and especially this thesis. My Professors Daniel Lambach, and Christof Hartmann impacted my research in innumerable ways, and this research would have been truly impossible without them. As lecturers, employers, and supervisors of this thesis, they encouraged me to pursue my ideas and provided indispensable far-sighted and grounding support for this and prior scientific projects of mine.

My deepest gratitude goes to Valerie Franze who serves as major corrective influence to my often lofty ideas. She not only contributed the often necessary harsh criticism to my slowly developing conceptions, but also pushed me to finish this thesis as long as there were still nation-states around to criticise. I cannot imagine this research without the resort and aspiration of Yanda Tamsanqelega Bango. Her encouragement is invaluable to me. Mohadeseh ZareBidaki gave me insights into perspectives which went far beyond my 'self-incurred immaturity'. I can only hope to do your contributions justice in this paper.

I want to thank Markus Bayer and Eva Johais, first for the willingly provided discussion of my ideas, but more importantly because I could learn from them, how innovative political science should be done. For that, I also thank Dieter Redlich, and Markus Reger. All of you much more than reinstated my sometimes challenged trust in academia.

I thank Elke, Norbert, and Daniel Tischmeyer, and especially Stephanie and Thorsten Bahrfeck, as well as Justus Fokken, Philip Rebelsky, Renuka Rao, Anke Polkowski, and Philip Albrecht, all of whom kept me sane, and intellectually (and somatically) well provided for during my (too) long-lasting studies. All of your contributions had been vital to this research. I couldn't have done it without you!

1. Relevance of a critique of modern statehood

1.1. Introduction: Reconsidering the relation of modern statehood and violence

War is still omnipresent in our world. We are daily reminded through recent and ongoing political violence in i.a. Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen (cf. UCDP 2014¹). Such wars between and inside of states and violent nationalist exclusion, amounting up to expulsion and ethnic cleansing, are not nasty memories of the past, but can and do occur regularly. This clashes head-on with the narrative of the *civilisation process* as coined by Elias (1997 [1937]). With this term Elias denotes the overall societal transformation during modernity towards nonviolent social interaction. Elias is assigning a key role in the process to the monopolisation of violence through the modern nation-state². While the nation-state is indeed *the* political order of today (esp. Eriksen 2011; Giddens 1985; Hobsbawm 2000 [1990]; Migdal 2001; Spruyt 1996) most of the above listed countries are not *strong* nation-states, even by minimal standards. Is the violence in these countries a result of lacking statehood? The overall tendencies of globalised violence after the 'Cold War' seem, at first glance, to suggest that. Much of the violence given to us in the daily news does unfold in regions lacking strong states, featuring non-state warring parties labelled ethnic, terrorist, warlord, or criminal alternatively. Some authors even concluded an epochal change in warfare to 'wars of state disintegration' (*Staatszerfallskriege*; Münkler 2002: 18-22; corresponding arguments under different headings are made by Holsti 1996; Kaplan 1994; and Rotberg 2003).

Against the background of (European) state building however, such ideas are to be rejected. Historical state creation utilised methods of "organised crime" (Tilly 1985). Elias' major mechanism to promote civilised conduct, the monopoly on the use of organised violence, was only established through entrepreneurs of violence, in centuries of intra-state war (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Reinhard 1999; Tilly 1990). In the process state leaders were terrorising the population, employing looting and enslaving as viable strategies. To conceive state-building as a phenomenon opposed to organised crime, warlordism, or terrorism, then seems an ahistorical misinterpretation of recent organised violence. Additional to the acknowledgement that state-creation usually creates intra-societal violence two further significant observations defy Elias' optimistic perception of the state as harbinger of a (more) peaceful society. For one, the exercise of violence through state institutions is not limited to the past. Also in established nation states upholding the monopolist status compels regimes to continuously

1 List of all states which in 2014 suffered from more than 1000 "battle related deaths" on their territory (variable " BdBest").

2 Implying the even more classical proponent of the pacifying influence of the central state, also Thomas Hobbes argued for the state's monopoly of the means of organised violence in a clearly demarcated territory. Hobbes however, is less enthusiastic about the state's role than Elias (cf. Schmitt 2002: 73). Implicitly following a Christian tradition (cf. Burgess-Jackson; Münkler & Llanque 2002: 1220; Reinhard 1999: 103), he argued for the state as necessary evil to keep men's violent nature in check. For another, ahistorical, account of the argument cf. Senghaas (1995).

monitor (Giddens 1985) and suppress perceived challengers of the current order (Benjamin 1971 [1921])³. This is further aggravated by the modern states' wide-ranging claims as supreme societal regulative institution (Reinhard 1999: 466f) – a claim valid even in areas where statehood is only marginally established (Migdal & Schlichte 2005: 24f). Any public behavioural pattern alternative to the officially prescribed ones may be seen as challenge to the regulation monopoly modern states claim (id).

Third, and most severely, the occurrence and sheer possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide is made possible only through modern state organisation, and the political culture thus evoked (Baumann 1992 developed the argument for the Holocaust; Schwartz 2013 and Ther 2011 adopt it to modern ethnic cleansing generally). In this line of argument, the intellectually grounded desire for utopian re-ordering of society, combined with the technologically enhanced reach and depth of modern ruling instruments, are the enabling conditions for modernity's notorious mass-violence (also Giesen 1996). Having achieved the status of supreme regulative authority, and only legitimate violence-wielding institution, statist rulers seem unscrupulous to use these instruments - gaining compliance by broad segments of society. Other authors point out that nationalism provides a common justification for modern atrocities (Carr 1968 [1945]; Mann 2005; Schwartz 2013: 9-15; Snyder 2000; Ther 2011: 51; and Wildt 2006). Contrary to the linear, positive relation between the decline of violence and the rise of modern statehood claimed by Elias' civilisation process, these three analyses suggest that very modern nation-states act very violently (cf. esp. the analyses of Imbusch 2005; Kössler 2008; Reemtsma 2004; 2008). I want to explore that connection. How do the inherent institutional rationales of modern statehood relate to ongoing mass-violence in modernity? Specifically, this thesis shall investigate the research question: *How exactly is violence connected to creation and maintenance of modern nation-states?*

To answer this question, I will undertake an institutional analysis of modern statehood. I seek to identify the aspects of developed, modern statehood which promote, allow, or inhibit the exercise of violence. While the above sketch of the problem indicates that the relation of violence and modern statehood is already discussed, this is done in very different, so far unconnected strains of literature. This disconnection results in the lack of a comprehensive perspective on the modern state along the problem of ongoing violence in modernity. It is my intention to deliver such a comprehensive critical perspective on the modern nation state in this thesis. Mainly, I will do so by following the already introduced aspects of modern occurrences of mass-violence. One of these three, the state's role in enabling modernity's infamous massacres, has already been well researched (esp. Baumann 1992; Schwartz 2013; Ther 2011). I will devote a sub-chapter of the literature review to recapitulate these and more arguments from the relevant scholarly debate. Secondly, the continuous repression of systemic opposition can plausibly be assumed to be more acute in exclusive regimes, like the monarchies of Europe's past. Thus it has to be assessed if pressures for self preservation of regimes change, as these became more inclusive, and whether more inclusive regimes deal with challenges in a more or less (or simp-

³ Historically, this state behaviour is shown by Mann (1993: Chapter 12), and Tilly (1990: 115). Additionally, Davenport (2007: 7) finds state repression of systemic opposition the major commonality in all political orders, including today's democratic states.

ly different) violent matter. A central difference between nation-states and their predecessors is the practise of *direct rule* (esp. Hobsbawm 2000; Giddens 1985; Reinhard 1999; Tilly 1990). So, coming to the third aspect, did the institutional rationales of administrations become less receptive to the exercise of violence, as they massively widened the agenda and depths of central state intrusion into the daily lives of an ever-increasing share of their population? Did the state bureaucracy, originally created to sustain warfare for personalistic regimes, become less of a violent threat to the populations they administered, as soon as it was mainly occupied with civil tasks? Both of these questions will be addressed in Chapter 3.

However, any investigation of institutional rationales of modern statehood must go beyond the state as 'mere' organisation. The cultural effects of state institutions are inevitably part of these rationales (as prominently established by Migdal 2001: 255-63). Concomitant to establishing a relation of direct rule over a mass-population, the state got deeply involved in the constant re-negotiation of the rules that apply inside society, and the question of belonging in the first place (Mann 1993: 410-12; Tilly 1990: 114f; Schwartz 2013: 16; Ther 2011). The violence of modern nation-states, both aspiring and consolidated, specifically targets those whose membership to the nation is conceived questionable, or deviational from hegemonic conceptions of who constitutes the nation⁴ (esp. Ther 2011: 53). State institutions set, modify, and reproduce exclusion on nationalist grounds (esp. Carr 1968; Giesen 1996; Kössler 2008; Mann 2005; Schwartz 2013; Ther 2011). In a nationally confined world, states that fall short to integrate nationalist public discourse into their agenda, present an easy target for counter-elites, rising on the claim to promote national interest (Snyder 2000; Mann 1993). This final aspect, the addition of the *nation* to the workings of modern states, will be analysed in Chapter 4.

To allow investigation of the institutional rationales of nation-states promoting, allowing, or inhibiting the exercise of violence, a concept of violence will be developed in Chapter 2. This will be grounded in a narrow concept of *direct violence*, evolving around the central aspect of pain suffered by the victim (Nedelmann 1997). To account for the embeddedness of directly violent acts in wider institutional frames, I will widen my approach beyond direct violence. Specifically, I will discuss the violent content of threats, which in their political effects are similar to direct violence. Building on this concept, this thesis will investigate state violence against civil populations, in and outside their territory. Not included will be wars between states, as these do not aim to alter the principle domination pattern of state rule. On this basis, I can conclude my thesis with a substantiated discussion of the role modern state institutions play in ongoing mass-violence. Finalising this first chapter, I will make two introductory clarifications. First, I will argue that the modern nation-state still is the prominent political order I am taking it for, against observations of a "decline of the state" (van Crevelde 1999; also against arguments of Herz 1957; 1968; Strange 1996; Zacher 1992; and Zürn 1998). This is not only intended as addition to the relevance of my topic, but will also further illustrate the approach of this thesis. Secondly, I will briefly outline my methodology of an institutional analysis (following esp. Giddens 1985; Migdal 2001; and Reinhard 1999).

⁴ This may be grounded on racial, socio-economic, or generally cultural judgements.

1.2. Literature Review: (Under)studied aspects of modern states' violence

As mentioned before, the relation of violence and modern statehood has already been discussed in different strains of literature. However, these debates are often unconnected - a lack of comprehensiveness very likely to contribute to the omission of a critical view on the state. In this thesis I will combine insights from various discussions. The following will structure the various discourses in relation to this thesis' topic.

1.2.1. Established links of modern statehood and violence

The insight that modernity is not as adverse to violence as the civilisation narrative suggests, I found to be most pronounced in a subfield of sociological literature (Baumann 2000; Burgess-Jackson 2002; Depelchin 2008; Heitmeyer 2004; Imbusch 2005; Kössler 2008; Popitz 1992; Reemtsma 2004; 2008). During a good decade, starting in the mid-1990s, largely German scholars debated a 'sociology of violence'. Massively influenced by, but increasingly critical of Galtung (1969), the promise of non-violence against the reality of ongoing violence during modernity is a constant focus in this debate. But when these scholars frame the relation of violence and modern political institutions as ambiguous, or dialectic (Brieskorn 2005: 87f; Giesen 1996; Heitmeyer 2004: 86f; Kössler 2008; Reemtsma 2008: 60f), they deliver little specific analyses of how exactly modern institutions induce, or prevent violence. I owe one seminal insight to this debate, Nedelmann's (1997) conceptualisation of violence around the subjective feeling of pain by the victim. Following her, attempts to objectively assess violence either lead to its essentialisation, ultimately prohibiting systematic investigation. Or they lead to perceive violence as purely cultural expression, thus ignoring that, albeit subjective, suffering pain is not entirely relativistic. Her subjective concept seems perfectly suited to be employed in my analysis of effects of violence, resulting from complex institutions, established over centuries, and around the globe.

The specific institutional links of modern states to mass-violence are discussed in two fields of political scientific research, both of them historical in perspective. For one, the centrality of violence organisation to the emergence of modern European states, as i.a. analysed by Giddens (1985), Krippendorff (1985), Mann (1993), Tilly (1990), Reinhard (1999), or Zinn (1989) by now gained acceptance as conventional wisdom. Intending to identify the roots of violent modernity, Zinn (1989) finds already in its very beginnings an instrumental logic, valuing material gain and abstract notions of progress higher than human suffering (esp. id: 264-67). Taking a structural, instead of cultural approach, Tilly (1990) suggests a heuristic to grasp a whole millennium of European state formation in a comparative framework. The modern state emerged as common design from mutual competition of organisers of warfare. The specifics of individual states are resulting mainly from variations of dominant societal groups⁵ (id: 102f). Giddens, following a neo-Marxist approach, is not centring his analysis of modern

⁵ Historical experiences vary between the endpoints of his taxonomy, a capital-intense trajectory, driven by "bargaining" processes between (emerging) state and urban merchants, and coercion-intense state formation in areas where emerging central power had to enlarge its domination with and against the rural nobility (id: 224f).

state(-formation) on direct violence. Instead, he focuses on internal ruling mechanisms via hegemony over the public space, sustained by its ever increasing surveillance, as major means in the continuous suppression of the lower classes. Violence is mainly organised to be applied outside the state's borders (e.g. id: 160). Krippendorff (1985) is presenting a clearly interested statement, instead of pretending doing science as (allegedly) objective undertaking. He seeks to denounce the modern state as principal warmonger, which popularised the ideas of gain and glory through military struggle, even among the masses it controls⁶. Mann (1993) delivers a comprehensive historical analysis of four modernising states (GB, France, USA, and Germany). Not completely ignoring societies' responses to state action, his approach still is focussing on top-down mechanisms of state domination (id: 44-54). He thus only approximates the historicist-institutionalist perspective on the modern state as applied in this thesis. Such an approach to European state formation history is applied by Reinhard (1999: 16, 23), who conceives the state in its current form as temporary result of an open-ended, multi-dimensional development. Most of these authors however only problematise the historically unprecedented forces which modern states can mobilise in *external* conflict (esp. Giddens 1985; Krippendorff 1985; Tilly 1990: 225), while reproducing Elias' assumption of a parallel process of "internal pacification of society" (most explicit in this regard Giddens 1985: 120, 244-54). Such broad theoretical perspectives will be qualified by literature discussing violence and political order in specific cases (i.a. Niemann2007; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; Menkhaus 2003; Prkic 2005 and Schlichte 2005B for modern African cases; or Müller 2011; Ohnacker 2011, discussing episodes of pre-modern Europe).

1.2.2. Modern states as enabling condition for genocide

In contrast, Baumann's (1992) seminal argument framed modern statehood as one enabling condition for planned mass-murder of civilians – genocide, or ethnic cleansing more generally (Ther 2011; Schwartz 2013; Wildt 2006). While acknowledging that mass-murder also occurred before modernity (also Zinn 1989; Zolberg 1983), only the processes of bureaucratic rationalisation, and the construction of a national group, lead to attempts of completely exterminating whole groups of the population. These two rationales will be briefly reproduced here. First, by framing bureaucratic organisation as enabling condition for genocide, Baumann (1992; also Ther 2011: 16) is stating that modernist ideas are responsible for mass-violence, instead of preventing it, as the civilisation process would imply. At the same time however, violence is hedged in by regulation; both processes culminate in the "dialectic of modernity". In this view, genocides are an explicitly modern phenomenon; not simply because these massive killings can only be achieved by modern weaponry (thus turning external military strength against civilian populations). It is the bureaucratic logic of hierarchical structures and constrained personal responsibility, internalised by public servants which limits the application of humanist values. Already inherent to Baumann's argument is the idea that modern massacres are driven by progress ideology. The groups perceived as obstacles to the desired political goals have to be assimilated; for their own good, and if need be, violently so (Fattah 2002).

⁶ While this strongly normative position occasionally narrows down his analysis to a linear narrative of top-down manipulation of the masses, it still is more historically comprehensive than the heuristically/structurally arguing authors' above.

The conduct of such organised murders is highly modern in its division of labour; justified by intellectuals, planned by bureaucrats, and executed by the states security forces (Giesen 1996). Instead of resembling the breakdown of political order, ethnic cleansing is an extremely violent form of excessive social planning. Schwartz (2013), Mann (2005), and Ther (2011) show that modern democracies are no less prone to exercise mass-violence than authoritarian regimes.

Secondly, nationalism is considered as cause for genocide by several authors. Ethnic cleansing is thus placed in a framework of attempts to 're-structure a populace into a nation', to paraphrase Gellner (1983: 1; cf. Hobsbawm 2000: 93; Mann 2005: 11-17; Schwartz 2013: 9; Ther 2011: 11f; Wildt 2006: 92f). In this line of argument, excessively violent forms of homogenisation like ethnic cleansing, and benign ones like assimilation, are distinct mainly in the way how to achieve a unified national culture, based upon whether the targeted groups inside the populace are regarded as genuinely and intolerably different (esp. Mann 2005)⁷. But ethnic cleansing does not only target the 'others'. To unify and discipline, the perpetrator group always acts equally violent against deviant, oppositional, or merely unwilling members (Baumann 2000: 39f; Galtung 1969: 184). Extreme cases as such however also imply extreme causes – quantitatively, and qualitatively. Thus, this strain of literature can help identify institutional patterns of violence, but does not allow assessments whether these are also active during the modern administrations' 'business as usual'.

1.2.3. Violence and states: Non-European, national, and democratic

Historical accounts also elaborate the very violent projection of European dominance beyond European populations – both 'on the ground', and ideologically (Migdal 2001; Reinhard 1999: Chapter VI; Schlichte 2005A; Trotha 2000: 255). As a result, nation-states are the proclaimed pattern of political order globally; politicians everywhere on the planet must confront the state. By now, attempting to exercise ultimate (sovereign) authority despite the state seems futile (Herbst 2000: 22; Waldron 1984: 431). But it was often assumed that non-Western states follow a completely different trajectory than their European seniors (Hobsbawm 2000 [1990]: Chapter 6; Tilly 1990: 16, 223-25). However, more recent analyses of non-European ruling practice in modernity (Migdal 2001; Schlichte 2005A), and 'the African State' in particular (Herbst 2000; Mamdani 1996; Niemann 2007) clearly suggest violence in state-building rationales outside Europe. Still, such approaches regularly attribute this violence to autocracy which usually is framed as lack of modern (equalled with democratic) statehood (Herbst 2000; Mann 1993: 59f, 732f; Tilly 1990: 225). Additional to the non-European perspective, such approaches take the state as empirical reality, not juridical ideal, or finalised historical process. Most prominently the mutually constitutive role of societies and states, and their continuous interrelations are stressed (Migdal 2001; Schlichte 2005A; also Reinhard 1999: 482).

Albeit some analyses of genocide do infer nationalism, the triad between nation, state, and violence is not systematically investigated. Some authors do indeed attribute incidences of modern violence to nationalism (only Carr 1968 [1945]

⁷ This development also had an impact on interstate wars, the most destructive of which were now aimed to defeat whole nations, instead of only their rulers (Carr 1968: 26f; Giddens 1985: 261).

suggests a general connection⁸; while Mann 2005; Schwartz 2013; Ther 2011; and Wildt 2006 are concerned with early 20th century ethnic cleansing only, and Snyder 2000 with mass-violence during liberalisation in formerly one-party regimes). But the literature commonly lacks a comprehensive problematisation of national mobilisation. Instead, most authors distinguish between benign forms of nationalism, such as early patriotism, supposedly inclusive and emancipatory, and a latter, exclusive (or ethnic), war-mongering nationalism (Giddens 1985: 267-76; Hobsbawm 2000 [1990]: 18-22; Krippendorff 1985: 186; Mann 1993: 575-82; Smith 1991; Tilly 1990: 116; Wildt 2006: 96). Such a distinction however does not seem feasible. Zolberg (1983) shows that attempts to centrally create a unitary state culture already led to violent mass-repression well before the commonly assumed begin of modern nationalism in the late 18th century⁹. And already the earliest modern nationalisms in revolutionary USA, and France were immediately followed by wide-spread persecution of non-republicans, or aristocrats respectively (Schwartz 2013: 10). Barth (1970) provides a general theoretical foundation of why one should not overemphasise the unifying aspects of nationalism. The nation is principally founded on exclusion along cultural differences, as is any other mass-group of identification and ascription ("imagined communities" to use Anderson's 1991 [1983] famous term). While this brought him a reputation of being "instrumentalist" on the issue (Norval 2012: 307), other authors also suggest such general practise of group formation by violent exclusion (Appadurai 2006: 6f). Exclusion becomes especially conflictual (thus potentially more violent) in contexts of the emancipated nation, as the non-national finds herself in an underprivileged position towards regime, and administration (Noiriel 1994: 83, 306; Torpey 2000: 18f). I attempt to connect these approaches in order to identify the common mindset of the identification pattern directed towards a modern territorial state.

Finally, I will discuss whether democratic institutions set incentives for modern states to refrain from mass-violence against civilians. Three very different authors do defy this argument. For one, Carl Schmitt (1996 [1923]: 14f) argued that all real-existing democracies relied on (if necessary violent) exclusion of groups, perceived as ultimately inhomogeneous, to ensure democratic equality of nationals¹⁰. Secondly, Carr (1968 [1945]) suggests that nations with mass-electories are prone to fight interstate wars, as distributional conflicts internationalise. Third, Snyder (2000) finds a tendency during democratisation towards anti-minority populism, which may lead to mass-violence, even on the scale of genocide (id: 296-300 for Rwanda). While all of these statements have to be

8 But his [1945] analysis builds on a comparison of the recent 30 years of war with the common idealisation of a 'peaceful 19th century'. However, as Krippendorff (1985: 355f) describes, what European interstate wars of the 19th century lacked in frequency, they compensated for in deadliness (cf. Tilly 1990: 72 for the general trend). And at least during the end of that epoch, colonial massacres were so routinely carried out (Krippendorff 1985: 354) that such a label can at best be taken for ignorant Western-centrism.

9 Cf. also Münkler & Llanque (2002: 1222-27); Scott (1998); and (Zinn 1989) for the excessive violence resulting from its 'rational' instrumentalisation by states to engineer their societies according to political motives.

10 Analyses of historic cases support this controversial author's claim that democratic governments had no trouble enforcing severe human rights violations when deemed necessary for political development. Mann (2005) has argued that exclusive settler democracies acted significantly more violent than their authoritarian equivalents against local populations. And the frequent mass-deportations in 20th century Europe since the Balkan Wars had been commonly welcomed by leading politicians of democracies as a means to achieve the desired 'congruence of nation and state' (Carr 1968; Schwartz 2013; Mann 2005; Ther 2011: 51; Wildt 2006).

carefully discussed in context, they indicate that, at least in its constitutive stages, democracy may contribute to mass-violence against civilian populations, instead of offering protection from it¹¹.

The widespread lack of awareness for the historical legacy of state institutions culminates in perspectives which problematise the decline of the modern state. Such approaches revolve around a fear of the rise of a chaotic plethora of organisations with intermingling responsibilities, taking over in state's stead. Being contrasted with an ahistorical image of calm, fixed order, identified in an idealization of (past) sovereign statehood (esp. van Creveld 1999; Strange 1996; Zürn 1998), these prognoses may reach a point of 'Hobbesian fear', imagining anarchy, terror, and warlordism, wherever state rule is absent (Kaplan 1994; Münkler 2002; Rotberg 2003; Tetzlaff 1999). I will discuss these approaches at the end of this chapter.

Through connecting these different strains of literature, a comprehensive view on the modern state shall be gained. The perspective to assess these largely historical accounts will be drawn from social scientific approaches, critical of organised, specifically state rule. Cramer (2006) discusses on empirical grounds what Imbusch (2005), and Reemtsma (2004; 2008) theoretically deducted: violence may well be a function of modern institutions, thus betraying the promise of non-violence at the heart of modern development. As to why that is, Benjamin (1971) offers a Marxist perspective of bourgeoisie repression, while Krippendorff (1985) suggests a historic path-dependency of 'unreason of state' – only ruling regimes benefit from the ideological setup of the modern state. Finally, James C. Scott (1998; 2009) argues for a historicist-functionalist logic of social engineering, necessarily undertaken by any state, successful at dominating a society¹². Summarising, while there are established positions critical of modern (state) domination, as well as discussions of violence in modernity, and literature linking either the modern state, or nationalism to violence, I see a lack of comprehensive analyses of the violence inherent to the strong nation-state, from a perspective thinking beyond the currently established order.

1.3. Institution(alism) and civilisation as human control over the environment

The approach underlying my thesis can be called "historical institutionalist" (following Migdal 2001: 246-55; also Reinhard 1999; and Spruyt 1996 chose such an approach). This perspective is based on the premise that states are shaped by specific histories, which are still present in behavioural patterns of their rep-

11 Of course, a glance at current news suggests a similar conclusion. Be it violent actions prohibiting exercise of political rights (i.a. freedom of assembly, and organisation) due to 'public security concerns', 'anti-insurgency' operations by high-technologically armed forces against foreign civilians, or unlawful detention and targeted killings of 'terrorists' – all such acts are regularly committed by democratic states and blamed wholesale on the victims of these persecutions.

12 His 1998 book analyses how bureaucratic planning does not only require information about society, but actually coerces societies into adopting to such "social engineering" schemes. The 2009 publication describes how already pre-modern state-making created such engineered societal spaces. Thus, instead of being slowly constructed to arch over society, esp. as guarantor of security, taking over more societal tasks, etc. Beyond these two core contributions to the literature on the state, his 1985 publication analyses how (capitalist) modernisation more generally subverts local societal self-organisation, thus violating the "moral economy" of face-to-face communities. But he chooses to discuss neither explicitly violence, nor expropriation patterns specific to the state.

representatives. *Institutions* are the link between historical developments and individual behaviour (Migdal 2001: 246; Reinhard 1999: 125). Institutions are conceived here in a broad understanding as continuous structuring patterns of *routine* behaviour (Giddens 1985: 11f; Reinhard 1999: 125). Already pragmatic decisions of individual actors lead to routinisation of relations (Giddens: id). However, especially organisations purposefully pursue routine interaction (Giddens 1985: 12). This way transaction costs in human relations can be lowered. As expectations are specified, and options narrowed down, behaviour is increasingly predictable; *order* is installed. Thus the processes of institutionalisation are intimately linked to the establishment of continuous power relations (Giddens 1985: 11f). Institutions include formal organisations, the processes they employ in operating, and cultural attitudes, values, etc.; culminating in a complete episteme of how to assess the world (Reinhard 1999: 125). The specific process of passing on such abstract knowledge in multitudes of single experiences is called socialisation (id). This refers to the upbringing of humans in society¹³, their informal and formal education, specific trainings, etc. Specifically, institutions are passed on by setting incentives to desired behaviour, through reward and punishment (generally called sanctions). Even when not directly backed by humans willing to sanction actions in accordance or violation of institutions, they still play a very prominent role in individual action and thought. At the very least they serve as guidelines of how to imagine a *normal* course of action – and what to imagine at all (Migdal 2001: 246; both of which might be subsumed under the term *conventions*). If acting in line with an institution, this shapes further human actions, thus effectively reproducing them. Logically following from being social constructions, institutions have a creator. While individual preferences on how to act are massively shaped by institutions, human actions vice-versa determine institutions (Giddens 1985: 11f; Migdal 2001: 246).

Applied to this thesis' object, the state as a set of institutions, the above means it is not determined by rulers - past, or present – alone (Migdal 2001). Migdal pays special attention to the way roles like 'citizen' or subject are internalised, resulting in the convention of nation-states being *the* ruling institutions of modernity. Besides the state, also violence is conceivable in terms of institutions. Violence is not an urge humans have, but an option (Gat 2006: 39f; Popitz 1992: 48-50; Reemtsma 2008: 54f). It is a possible course of action, but usually a risky one to the actors own well-being (Gat 2006: 38). Thus violence is more often than not a result to social pressure. The 'opportunity structure', of when and how to apply violent behaviour, is embedded in culture – read societal institutions. In contrast, pre-historic and biological approaches to the 'problem of violence' assume that the rationales and modes of its exercise are comprehensible as 'anthropological condition'¹⁴ (Gat 2006; Keeley 1996; Pinker 2011). What these perspectives miss however, are the fundamentally changing circumstances of livelihoods in the history of humanity. While early human societies have been shaped by ecological conditions, during the *process of civilisation* in a general sense (beyond Elias' narrower notion of pacification), the ecological pressures and restraints had been replaced by social ones (in interpretation of

13 Humans are necessarily social beings. Perceptions of an individual existence outside society are not valid (as theoretical construction for few analytical purposes this idea may be helpful. However such will be avoided in this thesis).

14 In effect such an 'objective' approach is essentialising violence, thus making rational investigation into its individual causes irrelevant (Nedelmann 1997).

Schmitt 2002 [1950]: 83; and Scott 1985: 48)¹⁵. Thus, any general statement about violence in 'pre-historic' *and* more recent time must take into account that the ongoing violence is increasingly attributable to human-made conditions, and thus avoidable¹⁶. In contrast to essentialist views on the specific mode of action labelled *violence*, an institutional approach might broaden perspective to the occurrence of violence with investigating which subjective meaning an actor puts into her application of violence. These meanings are subjective, but embedded in inter-subjective institutions. To assess the relation of *state and violence* in light of institutional rationales means to place it into the history of social domination. Before I will pursue the main analysis of the state in Chapters 3 and 4, I will discuss whether the state still is the most prominent political order, as I initially claimed.

1.4. A case against "state decline"

In this thesis, I will criticise a specific system of rule, the strong nation-state. I will do so based on an assessment of the violence which is exercised in its creation and maintenance. Before continuing this main argument, I will briefly show that the target of my critique is still relevant in 21st century politics. This seems necessary, as the sovereign state is sometimes perceived in ultimate decline. An alleged "retreat of the state" (Strange 1996) in both domestic and international regulation has been asserted, especially after the end of the cold war (also van Creveld 1999; Kaplan 1994; Zacher 1992; Zürn 1998)¹⁷. In such visions, the state is said to fade away, providing space for non-state global and local political institutions. If this would be true, my critique would indeed be superfluous. However, reflecting the arguments from this debate will show that the state's dominance in international politics is not at risk. At the same time, I can already introduce the approach later employed to grasp the reality of modern states. So in this sub-chapter I will discuss modern phenomena conceived too elusive for the state's regulative grip, and the organisations claimed to take over their regulation in states' stead. The phenomena are constituted for one by global interdependencies between societies; epidemiological or environmental contexts are prime examples. Secondly, global trade and the international division of labour transcend and hence challenge older regulatory frames. Finally, the end of interstate war, especially the rising importance of non-state actors in the organisation of violence, is questioning the domination of nation-states in world politics.

Four kinds of actors are typically connected to these challenges, assumed to replace the state in regulation. First, states are said to be drained of regulatory

15 While Schmitt is reflecting on totalitarian experiences (himself being imprisoned at the time), Scott delivers an analysis of capitalisation in agriculture. Both thus describe developments more narrow than civilisation, when describing the gradual substitution of ecological by social pressures. I however find that it is a perfect abstraction for the general trend of human society, (at least) since sedentarisation.

16 Similarly Zinn (1989: 147) concludes from the rapid dispersal of firearms in late-medieval Europe: 'inventions and discoveries may for the most part be coincidental, but this does not apply for their utilisation and dispersal'.

17 The timing of these farewell addresses to the state is telling. With the end of block confrontation, the rise of a liberal world order was expected, a globally connected society in which human interactions are not restricted by political hierarchies anymore. Thus, whether problematised or hailed, state demise was assumed inevitable. Such a perspective seems outdated now, in contexts of ubiquitous state surveillance, and states bailing for private financial trading schemes. Such temporary swings in the perception cycle notwithstanding, I will devote this sub-chapter to discuss the issue.

competencies from 'above', through international organisations, most prominently WTO and EU, for states of that region (van Creveld 1999: viii), or IMF and World Bank for poorer countries (Schlichte 2005A: Chapter 6). The second alleged challenge of statehood is from 'below', by civil society (non-governmental) actors, mainly non-for-profit organisations of local, or transnational scope. Both are claimed to take over statist tasks and thus, in the long run, replace the state by making it irrelevant to social organisation. This sort of 'post-statist govern-ance' is often presented as means of re-capturing another actor, who successfully evades state regulation. The international companies of globalising capitalism comprise this third group of actors (Strange 1996: 44-65). Finally, a fourth type of actor deserves some discussion, non-state armed, political groups (common examples include war lords, crime cartels, and armed groups of identification (tribes), again operating on both sub-state, and transnational level). In discussing the kind of challenge these actors pose, I intend to show that the state's role in early 21st century politics remains paramount, as these do *not* seek to constitute "parallel authorities" to the state (contrary to Strange 1996: 65).

1.4.1. Overcoming national limitations to international regulation: IOs

Interdependencies between actors within and those without individual government's reach have intensified. In attempts to regulate foreign trade, global communication, ecological stress management, health-, and security threats, even the most powerful are faced with the impossibility to effectively govern their affairs alone (Zürn 1998). Thus they increasingly cooperate, partially in legally binding contracts (international regimes, and International Organisations; both of which subsequently will be referred to with as IOs). This cooperation is said to restrict the originally unrestricted - or sovereign - power of states in international anarchy (Zacher 1992; Zürn 1998). However, from the perspective of IO-creation, it becomes clear that states create the 'restrictions' on their sovereignty *voluntarily* (Zacher 1992)¹⁸. If they have power in negotiating conditions of treaties, states do not as readily align themselves with binding regulations, as global governance enthusiasts would claim. The seemingly endless Doha negotiations, or the attractiveness of G-20, a club with non-binding powers, are cases in point. What is more, IOs do not replace states, but rest on their very powers to implement contractual commitments. This is especially visible when signatory states meet resistance from their populations (Schlichte 2005A: 137-49). Strong states use IOs to keep regulative power in an interconnected world. And thus, states decide what IOs do.

Of course, it is important to consider that states' powers vis-à-vis each other are highly unequal. It is true that less powerful states are indeed often not fully capable of pursuing a government's agenda inside an IO (e.g. for constrained agency of developing countries in WTO cf. Kosteki 2001; Ostry 2008; Shaffer 2006). However, this challenge does not originate from international institutions as such. Instead, it is a result of harsh power asymmetries (esp. in terms of funds, expertise, military capacities etc.) between states of juridical equal sta-

¹⁸ One should also be aware that this is not a recent development. Van Creveld (1999: 380-82) refers to the example of the International Telegraph Union, which already in 1865 compelled member states to follow its binding guidelines. And states did follow the lead, as it would have been extremely costly to stay outside of transnational communication regulation.

tus. In a world still shaped by post-colonial dependencies, powerful states are able to enforce their interests beyond the juridical limitations of their borders; IOs are one means of doing so. To the disadvantage of less powerful states, more powerful ones can enforce their interests via *their* IOs.

Putting it more general, sovereignty should not be regarded an *intrinsic* quality of individual states. From the very beginning of the international system (in form of 17th century European state system), sovereignty was *granted* in and through relations between multiple states (Giddens 1985: 84-88; Spruyt 1996: 178f; Tilly 1990: 167). It was the mutual assurance between hereditary monarchs, not to interfere with ruling the commoners populating the land they effectively controlled¹⁹. States which submit certain regulatory competencies, in mutual recognition that all states are *de jure* in possession of these powers, do not make themselves redundant (Giddens made this point already in 1985: 283f for the case of what is now EU). The notion of statehood as ascribed quality will be elaborated on in Chapter 3.

1.4.2. Power to international businesses: Governments against the state?

A second observation of undermining state regulation concerns the apparent lack of regulation of international business activity. Even when avoiding assigning maximalist functions of state "domination" over the economy (van Creveld 1999: 394; similarly Strange 1996: 44-65), one has to note that transnational companies evade the state's regulated space. And when it comes to tax-evasion, wage dumping, or race to the bottom in social and ecological standards, this is contrary to the core interest of statist agencies to upkeep their monopolies of taxation and regulation. It has to be kept in mind however, that it was the national governments themselves enabling this deregulation, which now seems to threaten their competencies. Starting from the monetisation of the economy, over guarantees of private property, while simultaneously coercively manipulating the allocation of the labour pool, and finally letting lose these forces in global free trade – all these have been conscious decisions by national governments (the centrality of economic policies to any modern state will be discussed Chapter 3.3.5).

Today the driving force behind capitalism are no longer states alone, but the 'the spirits that they summoned' in the process, the emerging transnational companies, as they became more independent of the political frames which enabled them. However, national politics still remains decisive in their investment activities, be it the 'business-friendly' political framework for investment, or 'merely' political relations between nation-states, which heavily shape business relations (Mann 1997: 487). And still, also globally active companies target states with their advocacy efforts (Giddens 1985: 277). Lobbyists for market or civil society interests may indeed be the ones who develop, and even formulate content of draft laws in the pluralistic state. But they still depend on the state to cast their norms into generally binding rules. They do so because the global regime of private property and free trade cannot be enforced without the mo-

¹⁹ That is not to say that monarchs could do as they pleased with their folk. As relationship based on mutual recognition, sovereignty has always been conditional; just the specific conditions have changed. This will be elaborated on in chapter 3.

nopolist institution of violence-backed regulation. Business organisations lack the necessary instruments to enforce their order by themselves, at least outside the most precarious legal systems²⁰ (cf. Giddens 1985: 290). As argued for IOs generally, also global economic regulation truly diminishes the regulatory space of less powerful governments only (Mann 1997: 482f). Thus, without being ultimately able to show *why*, it is clear *that* modern states always have promoted capitalist development, even if it sometimes negates their regulatory competencies²¹. Economic, profit-oriented organisations avoiding statist regulation thus are to be regarded an issue not beyond, but actually involving statist agency.

1.4.3. Civil society actors: Creatures of legally defined spaces

The apparent lack of regulative authority over internationally operating companies also provokes other non-statist, non-profit actors to engage in political action. And state officials might even assign certain tasks to such, especially since the 'lean state' became en vogue (thereby at least implicitly acknowledging a lack of state capacities). However, civil society organisations do not constitute a principal challenge to the state, but rather serve as addition. The very concept of civil society is developed to denote exactly the sphere of formal societal organisation that is not the state, but works inside its legal framework (in most conceptions this is additionally restricted to non-for-profit organisations; cf. Mamdani 1996: 14f). The Western mainstream debate on who constitutes civil society speaks volumes to this, as scholars usually fail to recognise non-statist, non-profit organisations if they do not work inside a legal framework of permitted activities (besides Mamdani: id, cf. the critiques of Kasfir 1998; and Migdal 2001: 131). Like companies, non-profit, non-state organisations have to rely on states to pass and implement regulation in their interests²² (Mann 1997: 491f). Especially instructive are pleas for representation by indigenous groups. Instead of taking literally the right to self-determination of all *peoples*, these are referred back to 'their' state (Kymlicka 1995: 27f). Thus it can be concluded that civil society organisations also do *not* constitute "parallel authorities" to the state.

1.4.4. Military developments and sub-state challenges: The demise of interstate war

Technological developments, especially in ranged weapon armament, led John Herz already in 1957 to observe a "demise of the territorial state". Although he later revised part of this vision of state demise (Herz 1968), he still argued for a profound change in the character of modern statehood. This character was once constituted by a government's ability to effectively protect its territory against other states' interferences (Herz 1968: 12; 26f), esp. through a bulwark of border defence against foreign invasion (Herz 1957: 477). In an era of eco-

20 It is only conceivable in very weak states that legal business enforces its interests directly via armed personnel. But even there, one rather expects them to rely on connections to local armed groups.

21 However a strong state is the only organisation capable of effectively utilising or completely banning globalised capital in its territory.

22 Even in the rare case of direct regulative action by civil society organisations, pursuing public interests against companies, this can never be aimed at generally binding, but only case-specific regulation. This would pose an ultimate challenge to state regulation only, if crucial political regulation from such unauthoritative modes of governance would be considered legitimate (which I cannot conceive for the time being).

conomic dependence on both foreign trade, and a mass-workforce, manipulable through propaganda, as well as air-, and finally nuclear strikes however, governments find themselves devoid of such a protective "hard shell" (Herz 1957: 485-89). Further restricting states in their military efforts, attempts to prey on others' relative weakness are bound to meet "defensive nationalism", massively increasing costs of warfare and thus effectively safeguarding the independent territorial status of lesser countries, even the ones outside nuclear deterrence alliances (Herz 1968: 13-24; van Creveld 1999: 344-54 makes similar points). Kaysen (1990: 53-58) elaborates that modernity's complexly interlocked production chains cannot easily be absorbed through territorial expansion, especially if the subjugated labour force is unwilling. Van Creveld (1999: 390) adds that annexation of foreign territory is not crucial to economic success anymore. Thus, according to Herz (1968), modern polities will retain a statist form, but they are not the "impenetrable" units they once were. Governments find themselves exposed to foreign intelligence agencies' surveillance, and dependent on economic exchange, military support, and technical assistance (Herz 1968: 26).

What these obstacles and following infrequency of interstate war brought about however, is not expanding peace but intrastate-, or civil war. The armed, political actors in these conflicts are portrayed as disorder incarnated (Kaplan 1994; Münkler 2002; Zartman 1995). Executive politicians in capitals (which remain *the* symbol of centralised, hierarchical state power, after monarchs and dictators have gone out of fashion) call these groups terrorists, independent of their own seizure or practice of power. And the more centralist rulers are affected by armed challenges, the less appropriate seems the (classical) modern vision of a world, neatly divided into spatial units of culture (the nation), and decision-making (the state). But as e.g. Prkic (2005: 131-35) argues, these wars are not denying statehood per se. Non-state parties are rather aiming to facilitate "the re-emergence of statehood out of the ashes of the old state" (id: 132). In the Post-Cold-War era, organised exploitation of (and thus rule over) territory became a necessity to sustain war efforts, due to lack of external sources (id: 134). The territorial expropriation schemes of non-state actors are made possible through the lack of capacity of existing states, the lack to effectively dominate the whole territory demarcated by their internationally acknowledged borders (Schlichte 2005B). Contrary to statist regulation becoming increasingly irrelevant on the domestic level, many of the political conflicts in weak states are manifestations of the state's struggle to realise the henceforth only claimed sovereignty²³ (Schlichte 2005A: 128f; cf. Niemann 2007 for a corresponding interpretation of the violence in notoriously fragile DRC). These conflicts may turn violent more easily than in strong states, because they evolve in a situation of

23 Trotha (2000) on the other hand is claiming that the success of such actors in Africa prove the failure of modern statehood as ultimate ordering model of global politics. Instead, 'para-statist' orders are on the rise, composite arrangements of shared sovereignty between central state and local actors in one state territory. What he describes however, might exactly be the consolidation of territorially bound, direct rule in smaller parcels of contemporary states. And in his example of Northern Mali, this is also driven by external prescriptions of how internal order, economic development, and bureaucratic setup of the affected states should look like (id: 274-77). The case of Somalia as analysed by Hagmann and Hoehne (2009) is also fitting in this regard. In all of the three regions they identify as determining in Somalia's 'post-collapse' experience since 1991, attempts to constitute at least regional institutions of ultimate political authority are present (cf. also Menkhaus 2003: 407-9).

lacking monopoly of violence *and* around the aim of establishing it²⁴. Thus the topic of this thesis is not only one of a history forgotten by many Europeans, but of an ongoing reality in most parts of the world; the violent subjugation of territorially defined populations under the regulative monopoly of just one regime - the modern state. And although not framed as such, also in strong states struggles for regulative hegemony are far from being ancient history²⁵. Thus not only states 'in-the-making', but also established strong states regularly resort to violence when perceiving their rule being challenged (just as analysed Benjamin already in 1921).

1.4.5. State expansion in the 21st century

Contrary to the over-emphasis of challenges to statist sovereignty, it seems important to recognise elements of continuing statist expansion in the 21st century. Two important of such trends shall be briefly described. First, monopolisation of violence is, although largely achieved in the West, still an ongoing process, further constraining the space for 'allowed violence' (Reemtsma 2004: 349). Consequently, the private use of violence is increasingly prohibited, e.g. visible in the sanctioning of domestic violence (Kössler 2008: 41; Nedelmann 1997: 76). This development clearly illustrates the ongoing, profound impact which state organisation exerts onto global societal relation. Another momentous development is the ongoing formalisation of social relations. Informal groups cease, and urban, mainstream civil society groups usually employ formalistic procedures (members are registered, and pay monetary fees, the organisation has a postal contact address, juridical responsible officials, etc.). As such they are perfectly "legible" for state bureaucracies (Scott 1998). Also an ever higher share of interactions becomes recordable through electronic communication (Giddens 1985: 13f, 41-49). Thus, prospectively all social interaction has to abide by the reality of surveillance of high-capacity organisations. Beyond the relatively few corporations employing sufficient administrative capacity for such endeavours, it is strong states which are set up to reap the benefits from this development. The continuous expansion of organisational power strengthens the state, especially over the (not organised) individual (Briesskorn 2005).

1.4.6. Conclusion

Instead of declining in importance, states in the 21st century are continuing to 'order' society. But they are faced with (seemingly) new actors. However, only few of these organisations, namely internationalised businesses, actually do avoid statist regulation. And even these are not autonomous from state power, as they must rely on statist regulation to sustain themselves devoid of violent

24 Highly fragile or failed states constitute a special problem to conflict insofar, as the context of a lacking monopolist of organised violence allows for diverse parties in the potentially violent struggle for state power (Lambach, Johais & Bayer 2015: 1310; Menkhaus 2003: 416).

25 There are various incidences of Western states responding violently to perceived challengers of their order. Anti-communist persecution like the McCarthy trials of 1950s USA, bloody suppressions of secessionist movements e.g. by British forces in Northern Ireland, systematic and comparatively unrestrained use of police force against globalisation critics' demonstrations in Geneva 1998 are just three prominent examples.

means to do so²⁶. The state is the *main* institution that effectively can institute binding regulation in a given territory. Especially when meeting resistance to regulation, the state's institutional setup proves superior to other organisations. Real sovereignty (unlike idealistic conceptions) has never been independent of other powerful actors and structural conditions (Giddens 1985: 287; Migdal 2001: 114f). The proclaimed anarchy of the international system is nothing else than a complex web of rather unstable power-relations, affecting not only the relative power between states, but also their power vis-à-vis other actors. And states react in increasing their reach, too. Thus, the 'new' agendas of governments, cooperating in IOs, and incorporating non-state organisations into their structure of dominance may exactly be a way to sustain the state as prime game-setter for all other social actors. The projections about the state's decline are derived from an idealisation of certain state's power in certain periods of the past. The different timing in which states are said to have been *really* autonomous, sovereign, etc., promoted by the different authors are telling in this regard. Herz' classical territoriality was already in demise during the 19th century. At this time, van Creveld's all-protective state was not even invented. This points to the analytic difficulty of ascertaining what states must effectively do to be considered at the peak of their power (already Weber 1978: 55 warned about the pitfalls of state definitions based on their tasks; cf. Lambach, Johais & Bayer 2015: 1304). Instead, in this thesis the state will be conceptualised as prime regulator of social affairs (cf. Migdal 2001: 114f). While this is not independent of specific activities, these do not as such constitute definite features of statehood. All state activities are circumscribed by demands from an international community and do constantly, although not radically, change. Herz already prepared this argument in his 1968 revision of state "demise". Qualitative changes in state activity do not mean the end of statehood, but an adoption to new circumstances. Before going into the specific institutional logics of the modern states in Chapter 3, a clarification of the term violence is needed.

2. Violence

Being able to discuss the ways modern state institutions influence the exercise of violence necessitates a clear understanding of what violence is. This shall be developed in this chapter. I will elaborate what I found a narrow, yet comprehensive concept of violence. To make the concept employable in analysis of political order, I will pay special attention to violent threats. After discussing the violence in domination generally, I will describe the dynamics of violence in bureaucratic administration. Based on the insights of this chapter, I will conclude with outlining which state-society relations I will further investigate for violent interactions.

²⁶This of course is no unalterable fact, as one can imagine companies fighting weaker states for property, esp. land, in the foreseeable future – just like the quasi-companies of colonial appropriation did until high imperialism.

2.1. Assessing violence beyond pro-order sentiments

Violence is what human beings label as such. This trivial statement not only dismisses views on violence as an essential phenomenon itself²⁷. It also implies that exercise of violence usually has a meaning, which is embedded in wider cultural frames. Different understandings of what signifies violence are also mirrored in the sociological debate. And in this, despite contestation over specific definitions, I find a consensus on a core set of human actions which are to be labelled violent - to be sure, consensus fades as the set gets wider. In reflecting arguments from this debate, I aim at establishing a concept of violence that is narrow enough to avoid overburdening the concept, esp. in making violence the prime cause for all human suffering (Imbusch 2005: 23 criticises Galtung 1969 in this regard; similarly Schroer 2004). An inflationary use of the term compromises the modern consensus to condemn violence. At the same time however, the concept shall be able to include common but 'hidden' manifestations of violence. Specifically I will *not* limit the notion of violence to the interpersonal use of physical force with intent to harm (what subsequently will be called *direct violence*, following Galtung 1969: 170).

Aiming for a conceptualisation broader than direct violence, institutional effects on the willingness to act violently must be considered. Galtung's (esp. 1969; also 1990) delineation of "structural violence" still provides an insightful point of departure. As Schroer (2004: 168f) points out, Galtung (1969) explicitly widened the focus to avoid the common ignorance towards repressive structures, which motivate subaltern and marginalised humans to act violently. To illustrate with a fictional example: Urban poor and peasants are crowding the streets, in the process attacking security forces, well-off citizens, and politicians. Limiting analysis of this violence to psychological-cultural investigation of the visible perpetrators (e.g. uneducated, often male, culturally backwards individuals tend to react aggressively to change), is to deny systemic discrimination, and exclusion (like market pressures on already precarious livelihoods, and cultural devaluation of the formally uneducated; cf. Scott 1985). Acknowledging the institutional embeddedness of individual actions, also violent ones, might suggest that perpetrators of direct violence find little space for civil expression, or are even expected to display 'illegitimate', deviant behaviour, suitable for amplification through media representations.

Going beyond such frequent, but specific cases, political orders commonly "naturalise" their intrusive actions (borrowing the term from Migdal 2005), while criminalising resistance. When desertion or withholding taxes are considered as crimes, the current order is depoliticised. Following such a hegemonic approach problematises a population's refusal to grant legitimacy to their statist rulers, while not even touching the question why they should do so (cf. Bayer & Pabst 2014: 12-14; Williams 1984:123-39; Zinn 1989: 264). These perspectives, apologetic to 'benevolent' repression, are blaming the victims of discrimination and repression when they mount the barricades²⁸ (Galtung 1990: 295). Limiting ones perspective to direct violence thus turns a blind eye to those able of en-

27 cf. Nedelmann's (1997) critique of so called 'innovative' researchers of violence (also Schroer 2004: 161-63).

28 By now hegemonic, neoliberal discourse even blames these victims when not liberating themselves from the 'self-imposed' poverty (cf. Schroer 2004: 17).

forcing their power over others without exercising physical force (cf. Scott 1985: 40). In a world of consolidated power apparatuses, this categorically absolves the ones who rule. Instead, any individual decision to act violently must not be isolated from the cultural, or *institutional*, context it takes place in. In politically highly organised circumstances, direct violence can often be seen as reaction to the continuous threat of violence in case of non-compliance, implicit in all political orders²⁹. The threat of violence, esp. its relation to direct violence, will thus receive special attention in my conceptualisation of violence. Independent if pro-, or contra-state, the normative position underlying my thesis is the wish to minimise violence. This normative stance corresponds with the modern consensus of aspiring less violent orders (Imbusch 2005: 12f; Reemtsma 2004: 349; 2008).

2.2. A subjective concept of violence

Violence is perpetrated by and against human beings³⁰ (Reemtsma 2008: 57). The effect of natural forces might be a constitutive experience for humans to 'discover' violence (Brieskorn 2005: 80). However, only the focus on human action makes the concept assessable for social science³¹. And, while motivations to commit violence, or label an act as violent, are diverse, there is one common feature that signifies all violent acts, the suffering of the victim(s). Only the actual feeling of pain, or the intent to cause pain, characterises the specific set of means that can be labelled violence (Nedelmann 1997: 74-79; also Fattah 2002: 967). While the perception of pain is subjective, it is not entirely relativistic³². Anchoring violence in the victim's perspective makes differentiations of various forms of violence (esp. psychological) unnecessary.

With taking the victim's suffering as central definitional aspect of violence, one must be aware that an inferior party in a given conflict might have an interest in labelling a situation violent to deny its outcome as just (again following modernity's consensus on non-violence). Thus, additional to the victim's perspective, violence shall be characterised by the subjective motivation of the perpetrator (Nedelmann 1997: 78f). Whatever the specific intention (i.a. material gain, ensuring compliance, or sadism are conceivable; Nedelmann 1997: 64f), perpetrators regard the victim's suffering at least as acceptable to fulfil their goals; often it is instrumental. However, the true motivation of an actor is usually unknown to others (here specifically the social scientist can only speculate; cf. Reemtsma 2008: 51). But still the very concept of an actor would be useless if one follows that it becomes irrelevant. Generally it is a prime concern of a perpetrator to

29 On the constitutive role of violence for modern, also democratic orders cf. i.a. Baumann (2000: 30), Popitz (1992: 55), and famously Weber (1978: 54).

30 Objects cannot be harmed, but one may harm a person by affecting an object (Burgess-Jackson 2002: 1247; Popitz 1992: 24). Also, destruction of objects may symbolise violence, especially as threat (Galtung 1969: 170). Animals as feeling beings may be included, at least as victims of violence, but whether one does is insignificant for this thesis.

31 This limitation may require some justification, as the general scientific fashion to assess human behaviour with theories from natural science also leads to explanations of human violence beyond sociology (e.g. Gat 2006; Keeley 1996; Pinker 2011). I criticise such approaches for their biological mono-causality (contrary to their explicit multidisciplinary claim). Although I am not denying that these may provide additional insight to basic social phenomena like violence, the mere simplicity of attributing all behaviour to nature suggests the failure to consolidate biological perspectives with insights from psychology and various social sciences.

32 This is a major charge against definitions of violence as dynamic cultural pattern. These carry the risk of simply reproducing discourses shaped by the ones with (esp. ruling) power, who define violence in a way sustaining their rule (Kössler 2008: 41; Münkler & Llanque 2002: 1217).

ensure the victim understands the violence as such. To be sure, in other situations the perpetrator might not even be interested if she is violent. However, this indifference towards 'the other's' pain already strongly indicates a violent relation (Popitz 1992: 66-71)³³. A stronger objection against such a definition criterion is the outright denial of a violent relation by the perpetrator. Often this is not relevant, as perpetrators want to make sure that also others beyond the direct victim realise the violence in her actions (cf. the below aspect of communication and violence). But e.g. modern statist security forces usu. put the blame for acting violent on their victims (Kössler 2008: 41; Reemtsma 2008: 59). Thus, the victim's perspective takes precedence over the perpetrator's in recognising a violent situation.

Completing the triad of actors in violence, as suggested by Nedelmann (1997: 66), violence occurs when spectators, collaborators, reporters, in short third parties, perceive an act as violent. But one can rarely expect that all actors involved share the same assessment of the situation. A subjective assessment of violence leads to different interpretations of the same situation. This subjectivity however is only appropriate to an object discussed as controversially as violence (Burgess-Jackson 2002: 1247f; Schroer 2004: 152f). Actors (perpetrators, victims, and third parties) will contest over the ascription of violence to specific situations; "[t]he notion of violence itself constitutes a weapon" (Kössler's 2008: 36 translation of Brieskorn 2005: 80)³⁴. To further complicate matters, the clear labels of perpetrator, victim, and third party are highly situational, and can be reliably attributed only in hindsight (if ever; cf. Nedelmann 1997: 67-9). This qualification notwithstanding, I will continue using these terms simplistically - suggesting unambiguousness - in the interest of terminological clarity.

The foregoing already clearly suggests the centrality of communication in violence. Generally, violent acts communicate the victim's humiliation, her subordination vis-à-vis the violator (Fattah 2002: 967f; Kössler 2008: 34f). Interestingly, any act of violence is always both culturally specific in the modes of its exercise (Nedelmann 1997: 76f), and interculturably understandable in its general message of a superiority-inferiority relation (Imbusch 2005: 22). The former quality points to context-specific modes of violence, the specific symbols of e.g. superiority, subjugation, or humiliation. The latter aspect is the main reason why there is violence in all societies, and understandings of violence revolve around a common core, *direct violence*³⁵. To summarise, violence is an ascription to specific actions by human beings; humans are initiators, targets and 'designators' of violence (perpetrator, victim and third parties; Nedelmann 1997: 66). The victim always experiences if violence is committed. The perpetrator usually intends to commit violence, regarding her gain higher than the victim's suffering. The perpetrator *can* always know that she is violating the victim, as she at least accepts

33 Following this argument of taking ignorance towards suffering for a lack of acknowledgement towards the victim's existential expectations means rejecting the idea which Galtung (1969: 171f) promotes as "unintended" violence.

34 Also the social scientist acts as third party. While impossible to be objective, I can disclose my normative positions to facilitate intersubjectivity.

35 While in practise, socialisation will massively influence the willingness to act violently, this willingness is by no means determined by socialisation. A reflected actor will eventually recognise violent, cooperative, and other potential strategies of action. But the question if and when a strategy is opportune, or appropriate, can be meaningfully answered only in relation to concrete cultural frames, and more specifically, institutional orders.

her suffering. Lastly, third parties are often intended to recognise the situation as violent, and like the perpetrator can always be aware if a situation is violent.

2.3. Violence and power: The centrality of *the somatic* in politics

Nedelmann's (1997: 74-76) insight that meaningful concepts of violence centre on the aspect of feeling, esp. the victim's suffering, results from conceiving any social self as bodily existence. Only as and through the body, social interaction is possible. This body is vulnerable, and normal social interaction depends on the assumption of deserving to be free from harm and suffering (Nedelmann 1997: 74-6 in reference to Popitz 1992). To deny a 'fellow human being' this very basic acknowledgement places her outside the common social interaction; more specifically the customary way to treat persons of equal or higher status. Popitz (1992: 45) follows that suffering pain is never 'merely somatic'. A violent experience affects the physiological, and social (and consequently psychological) status of a person. This denial of treatment as a co-member of society (of equal or higher status) leads to the political meaning of violence. One major underlying rationale of committing violence is to deprive another person of her agency; effectively reducing the victim's capability to act (cf. Popitz 1992: 44f). This is also the reason why violence is often used as mode of conduct in escalating conflicts. As one's own strategies appear obsolete in constantly changing conflict dynamics, and the 'enemy's' behaviour is perceived as increasingly incalculable, conflict outcomes seem more and more risky. Compared to this uncertainty, the successful exercise of violence seems very attractive. It promises to strip the other party of agency altogether, and would thus allow the victor to shape the situation (and potentially future ones), unimpeded by the other (Popitz 1992: 47). Exactly this aim, taking the agency of another being, connects violence to the broader concept of power.

These abstract theorisations about intentions and effects of violence, I found deepened through the experience-based perspective of Jeans Amery's (1977 [1966]: 41-70) stirring reflections on torture. In the intensely violent relation of torture, Amery portrays how the torturer, initially considered a fellow human (*Mitmensch*), becomes a 'counter human' (*Gegenmensch*), subjecting the victim's bodily existence to his power in 'excessive, untamed self-expansion' (*Exzeß der ungehemmten Selbstexpansion*; id: 63). Strikingly accordant to the-orientation on the centrality of one's body in social interaction, this violence works against the unity of body and mind (Amery 1977: 37-58)³⁶. Through this experience, the victim loses the basic trust (*Weltvertrauen*) of being recognised worthy of remaining unharmed (Amery 1977: 51).

2.4. The ultimate threat: Violence and domination

Acknowledging furthermore that perpetrators and victims might be collective actors enables to transfer of the foregoing to the meso- and macro-level of social relations. Direct violence, humiliation, and domination are also functions of group interaction. Also planned actions by modern, collective, self acclaimed rational actors are by no means void of risk for escalation, and the consequen-

³⁶ Also Nedelmann (1997: 74f) describes the mind-body dualism becoming tangible during violent experience.

tial attractiveness to nullify another party's agency. And while violence is always perpetrated, and felt on the individual level, broader societal configurations (meaning institutions) massively influence when and how violence is applied (and perceived). The aim of this thesis is to identify the institutional patterns of modern statehood that promote, allow, or restrict violence. These institutional pressures are ubiquitous, but they are rarely (if ever) compulsory (Popitz 1992: 48; Reemtsma 2008: 54f). Even incidences of mass-violence, like wars or genocides, cannot be understood without analysing the individual decisions to act violently – even if it means just to comply with an order, while the refusal to do so will lead to punishment. Such threats, e.g. in case of non-compliance, are what institutionalised power relies upon. The constitutive role of threats for domination follows from the social effects of direct violence.

Violence subjects the victim to the perpetrator's power. This power over the victim enables the perpetrator to shape not only the violent situation, but also future ones (Popitz 1992: 46-48). Besides direct material gains which improve the 'winner's' livelihood (especially relative to the 'loser'), the social prestige of both parties, and consequently the power ascribed to them, has been affected through the outcome of the violent situation (Popitz 1992: 44-47). E.g. defeated leaders will encounter distrust in their powers, and reluctance to follow their instructions. One can expect their authority to be considerably weakened. Already subjugated individuals (e.g. slaves) find their inferior position confirmed by violence; in fact pain is directly intended to be a sanction against non-compliance (id: 46). And violence between equals might create a permanent relationship of subjugation/ domination (id: 47). This is not to suggest that victims are doomed to continuous submission towards the perpetrator. But future threats of successfully violent actors will meet significantly higher chances of compliance by former victims, and third parties (Popitz 1992: 79-82). Even beyond explicit threats, the power of a victorious perpetrator might influence other actors' future considerations. As violence itself, credible threats of violence deny the basic social acknowledgement that the threatened party can remain unharmed. The threatening actor intends to gain possession and/ or compliance, at the cost of lowering the victim's social status, and psychological confidence (Popitz 1992: 79-82). If done in presence of others, such threats also call into question the victim's agency³⁷. Thus, the intention of the perpetrator, the interpretation of third parties, and consequently the social effects on the victim(s) resemble those of direct violence. It is in the suffering of the victim where the crucial difference between direct violence and threats lies. Instead of physiologically suffering from the perpetrator's 'self-expansion over ones bodily existence' (Amery's terminology), threatened parties are 'merely' confronted with the threatening party's disrespect towards their essential expectation of remaining unharmed. Such threats however also make direct violence conceivable for both parties (cf. Popitz 1992: 51 on the role of imagination in violence).

Analogous to suffering from direct violence, the credibility of threats is based on subjective perception as well³⁸ (Popitz 1992: 83). To the perpetrator, there are objective advantages to threats as compared to direct violence. Popitz (1992:

37 If however done covertly, the threatened party is enabled to comply without 'losing face', which in some situations might increase chances for compliance (Popitz 1992: 90).

38 The conditions influencing this are beyond the scope of this thesis (apart from former experiences of violence, as mentioned above).

90) points to the fact that threats are usually 'open'. If, when, and how a threat is fulfilled is up to the threatening party – while the other party is the sole bearer of the risks of a miscalculation in these criteria. With weapons, especially modern ones, one may threaten several other humans simultaneously (Giddens 1985: 304), simply assuming that not all the threatened ones will 'cash in' the threat at the same time (using Popitz's 1992: 95 image). At the same time, the perpetrator's risk of being hurt herself is massively minimised. Thus, credible threats may be much more effective than direct violence when attempting to establish domination (Popitz 1992: 94f). Unsurprisingly, a central aspect of definition of political organisations generally, and the modern state specifically, is the ability to enforce regulation with violent coercion (at least since Weber 1978 [1921/22]: 54). "[T]he state not only monopolises, it fundamentally organises violence and rests upon violence" (Kössler 2008: 36).

2.5. Organised violence, and bureaucratic violence specifically

While all domination attempts are based on violence (besides Kössler 2008; Popitz 1992: 44; and Weber 1978: 54f; also Giddens 1985: 18-20), distinctions can be made regarding the kind of violence employed. Two following examples shall illustrate political rationales underlying the use of violence which are systematically different from this thesis' objective, modern state-rule. Thus I intend to stress that violence is an 'all-purpose-means', employable in various domination schemes. While the violence specific to states will be analysed in subsequent chapters (esp. Chapter 3), the examples of terrorism and 'barbaric', non-state domination are precisely interesting in the challenge they pose to monopolist rule.

First, what is commonly called terrorism, is a strategy for weak-capacity, non-state domination. Facing harsh power asymmetries (Münkler 2002: 48-55) political actors, framing themselves as representatives of victimised groups, intend to intimidate large groups of 'enemies' by visible, single acts of brutality. Massively amplified through modern media, the initiators of this terroristic violence aim to create the allegedly already existing group-conflict, hoping to become major political players as the conflict escalates. Such openly displayed cruelty is a way to communicate dominance to many recipients with very low costs (Brieskorn 2005: 77f). Secondly, also direct 'barbaric' violence, e.g. of a fist-fight, especially when unrestrained by social organisation, attempts to directly and visibly humiliate the victim(s) into apathetic submission. The emotional satisfaction from overpowering another, taking pleasure in her powerlessness, is conceived a truly barbarian act (Brieskorn 2005: 72f). Such sporadic, direct violence may also constitute domination relations – albeit of limited durability only (Popitz 1992: 46-48). It may either serve as intimidation (to facilitate compliance, to silence unrest etc.), or contribute to motivation and group cohesion, depending with whom the observers identify (Appadurai 2006: 6f). But the common intention and perception is that of attributing power to the perpetrator. In both examples cruelty aims at domination insofar, as the violent acts are intended to create a behavioural adjustment, not only in one situation, but some time into the future. This is possible, precisely because of the diffuse character of threats based on such 'unregulated' violence. The threatening party alone decides when, where, and why violence would occur. In contrast, the monopolist territorial domination which the modern states relies on employs different

kinds of threats. Modern states aspire to systematically dominate mass-populations, which ideally respond with active, voluntary compliance. This rationale demands specific threats, immediate and clearly circumscribed. Consequently also the manifestation of the threat, the exercise of violence, needs to be more systematic, or 'orderly'. Modern states outline rules for the use of violence in a generally applicable framework. While such instructions indeed circumscribe the exercise of violence in a formalistic, rule-based manner, this does not equal a reducing the actual use of violence (Reemtsma 2004: 346).

But this is not only resulting from the unavoidable discrepancy between instruction and implementation (through defecting personnel of statist agencies specifically; cf. Lakitsch 2014: 45; and Schlichte 2005A: 130f). Instead, as Reemtsma (2004: 351f) argues, actors inside of states' armed forces need to retain a critical level of decision space to be fully effective. For one, as in any other organisation, formal rules are insufficient to capture the range, and detail of decisions necessary to keep them functional (also Reinhard 1999: 130). And secondly, even military orders are rarely unambiguous and must trust in soldiers' agency, e.g. when ordered to 'report suspicious activity', or 'take an enemy position' (Reemtsma's examples 2004: 351f). Hence, central governments are wise to leave part of the decision about when, and how to act violently to their armed delegates³⁹. With this in mind, one can assume that individuals inclined towards violence seek positions in the state 'security' forces. And these organisations find themselves in need of such individuals who 'get their hands dirty' to fulfil orders. The de-personalisation in bureaucracies does not nullify decision space for individual actors⁴⁰. Although institutional imperatives are crucial in understanding this kind of 'bureaucratic violence', it is not without agency (contrary to Galtung 1969: 170; and Krippendorff 1985: 27, 47; Brieskorn 2005: 81 makes this point). The longer the chain of command, and thus more detached from an initiator of an ultimately violent act, the more actors are involved 'along the road'. To bureaucratically exercise violence, these must either choose to be violent (even when this is the institutionally recommended path), or at least let others suffer without interfering. What is more, any institution had originally been set up by actors (as already has been argued in Chapter 1.3). The ones operating in violent structures, thus applying and adjusting them (or failing to do so), are actors who can be held responsible at least for omission – actors are able to reflect on their behaviour, even if 'institutionally bounded' and they can shape institutions, too⁴¹. It is effortful, but possible to analyse complex organisations with a subjective concept of violence.

³⁹This is also the reason why regimes that are making excessive use of violence usually employ armed organisations parallel to the official ones (Reemtsma 2004: 353). Thus they can maximise their chances of finding someone unscrupulous enough to implement any order (cf. also Chapter 3.3.2 on monopolisation of military draft).

⁴⁰This line of argument for one defies the thesis of the 'banality of evil', of average men just following orders, famously stated by Hannah Arendt. Secondly, this is the reason for regimes to invest in propaganda, especially amongst its officials. And finally, it stresses the functional importance of corporate pride - including the legal-rational facade kept up by German administrators during the mass-murder of Jews, Russian prisoners of war, Romani people, and more groups designated unfit for Germany's future (Reinhard 1999: 476f).

⁴¹This also extends to violence delegated to machines, like software-controlled drones which attack on basis of programmed identification patterns. These too have been engineered and are continuously put to use by human actors.

2.6. Summary

In this chapter I conceptualised violence around the central criterion of human suffering. While pain is primarily physiological in its effects, violence usually also aims at humiliating the victim, to prove the perpetrator's superiority. The deeper rationale to reduce another human's agency not only assigns communicative quality to violence. It also suggests its intimate relation to the establishment of domination. To follow this implication, I widened my approach beyond *direct violence*, which only denotes the interpersonal use of physical force with intent, or ignorance, to harm. Specifically, I discussed the violent content of threats. Credible threats resemble the effects of direct violence insofar, as they also express disrespect for a person's basic trust to engage in social relations free from suffering. In their political effect, just like direct violence, threats degrade the social status of a person by questioning her agency by herself and others. Additionally, credible threats relate to direct violence as they are imaginations of violence. Building on this relation, the violence institutionally inherent to a political order relying on threats (here the modern nation-state) can be critically examined.

But modern states also rely on individual acts of direct violence; the argument on informality in bureaucracy reflected that. Direct violence as conventional means in the facilitation of domination is also employed in personalistic, non-rule-based regimes. However when it comes to the systematic domination, this 'barbaric' subjugation of individuals is not durable enough. Durable and spatially bounded authority benefits from formalising, and thus explicating which acts might carry violent sanctions and when it is applied. But such rule-based violence is not synonymous to a decline in direct violence. I will investigate the relation of specifically modern nation-states to violence in this thesis. My analyses will be restricted to relations between central regimes and local populations, including local authorities – the classical scenario being a central government attempting to regulate behaviour of non-state groups and individuals. Not included will be the violence between states ('Clausewitzian wars'), as these usually do not re-configure the dynamics of modern states⁴². However, the state and population in question do not have to share a territory. Military campaigns against non-state groups 'abroad' (cf. Kössler 2008: 42; von Trotha 2005: 6) do fall into my research focus.

3. Statehood

3.1. Statehood in *longue durée*

In this thesis the nation-state of European origin will be conceptualised in its institutional history. The *longue durée* perspective then places it into the legacy of pre-modern states, or domination generally (an approach chosen by Mann 1993; Migdal 2001; Popitz 1992: 258; Reinhard 1999; Scott 1998; 2009; Spruyt 1996; Tilly 1990; and Zinn 1989)⁴³. Besides the many changes that modern rule

42 The violence committed by states versus other polities is principally relevant, when enforcing the ideal of modern statehood onto different types of political orders.

43 This is in explicit contradiction to Giddens (1985) whom I follow in other arguments. Giddens finds modern states too different from earlier polities, in the socio-economic structure of societies they rule, in

brought about (which will be extensively discussed later in this chapter), some rationales of statist rule remained unaltered since its very beginnings.

3.1.1. Basic institutions of pre-modern state rule: Superior coercion capabilities, territoriality, and organisation

To assess polities in a millennium of European state-formation, Tilly (1990: 44) defined the state as violence-wielding organisation, dominating "all other users of coercion" in a specifiable (albeit not -yet- clearly demarcated) territory. Similarly, Giddens (1985: 18f) names as constitutive elements of states dominating violent power, territory, and organisation. The first of these three, dominating violence capabilities, connects to the foregoing Chapter. As established there, the consequences of the exercise of violence transcend the temporal and spatial context of the violent situation. Violence is communicative, and thus can be utilised to continuously dominate others. Durable political domination seems only thinkable when based on violence, organised towards the purpose of installing that rule (Popitz 1992: 63-65). All political orders, state or non-state, modern or pre-modern, strong or low-capacity, employ violence in their domination. Also it has been argued that beyond direct violence, violent threats are a much more cost-efficient way to sustain rule. But the larger pre-modern polities had no way of continuously conferring *credibility* to their threats, as for most of their history states lacked the surveillance capabilities bulky bureaucracies later provided (Giddens 1985: 46-49). Non-compliance to their – very modest - regulation usually went unnoticed, and logically unpunished. Thus it was a rational strategy to rely on the exemplary excess of violence⁴⁴ against deviant commoners, and especially intermediaries⁴⁵. Thus, compared to modern states, internal violence had been little organised, but cruel. Externally, war was conceived a common mode of political conflict over limited objects (Reinhard 1999: 381; Schulze 1994: 85). Violence, just like any other form of human action, is spatially bounded (Brieskorn 2005: 83f), and any domination hence necessarily takes some kind of territorial form. However, pre-modern authority was organised along exclusive rights over people, which were overlapping in a territorial sense (Reinhard 1999: 42). The principle of *sovereignty* as exclusive regulative domination was not yet established. Coming to the third central aspect of statehood in *longue durée*, organisation. While especially the larger 'composite states' before high modernity were characterised by administrative diversity (Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009; Reinhard 1999: 45-47; Ther 2011: 38), ruling institutions (as institutions generally) aim at routine interaction, or in Weberian terms, 'to find obedience for a command' (Weber 1978: 54). Any order which is persistent over some time has shaping influence on the actors inside this order. This is valid for both ruled and rulers, although to a different degree. Subjects are socialised to obey dominating organisations, esp. through the diffuse power of threats – and at least occasionally also through direct violent coercion. But also

the way they rule them, and in their dependence on external acknowledgement to do so (id: 3-5). This however is not entirely plausible, as his book, too, is attempting one grand narrative of European state formation - albeit a one of "discontinuity".

44 Reemstma (2008: 53) has a point when qualifying that such violence is never completely rational. But at the same time he is adding to its understanding when suggesting that mutilation also symbolises that 'the power of authorities does not necessarily stop at the surface of their subjects' bodies (id, with reference to Foucault).

45 A pattern continuously facilitated in the lean colonial administration of high-imperialism (Reinhard 1999: 197).

rulers are facing demands from subjects, and especially their delegates, to exercise their power in some routine-based manner (Popitz 1992: 221-226⁴⁶). These individual delegates of power however are always replaceable (despite the systemic dependence of domination on auxiliaries to establish rule over even marginal numbers of people; Popitz 1992: 221). Thus while there is systemic pressure to institutionalise rule, affecting both rulers and ruled, the former logically have more decisive influence in shaping the organisation of rule – but cannot determine it completely (a point emphasised by Migdal 2001).

The major difference resulting from the looser domination relations in pre-modern states was its relation to the population. Even the most politically developed pre-modern states, 'bureaucratised empires'⁴⁷, have only socialised a small group of administrators; ideological citizenship was not intended for the majority of the population (Giddens 1985: 71-78). Especially these larger empires have been characterised by an internal diversity of political order (Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009: 10). The multiplicity of legal centre-provincial relations mirrored not only the path dependence of incorporation, but also cultural diversity, which was a pillar instead of threat to the stability of imperial rule (Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009; Ther 2011: 38). Rulers principally constituted a different cultural group than their subjects (Giddens 1985: 71-76). Generally, early states did not interfere with their population much, as long as the demanded tribute was paid, and rebellions were absent (Giddens 1985: 59; Mann 1993: 504; Scott 1998: 52). This lack of interest in their daily activities notwithstanding, it did not make the identification patterns of the general population completely irrelevant for the rulers. All polities require some basic acceptance by the mass, even when they do not depend on direct mass contribution to sustain their rule (Ohnacker 2011). Emblematically illustrated by the grand ancient empires, common self-portrayals employed an image of civilisation versus barbarism, which usually equalled sedentary versus vagrant livelihood (peasant versus nomad) – ultimately legitimising the state as force of order, while non-state 'tribes' were framed as chaos incarnated (Scott 2009). This kind of othering not only legitimised the political order 'this side of the frontier'. Also the lower strata of the imperially confined societies were identified as partially embodying 'the others'; still, but redeemably so, through aligning themselves to the high-cultural, or civilised, lifestyle (Scott 2009). The hegemonic discourse thus provides an ideal of discipline for all (free) members of society (cf. Popitz 1992: 221-225). Mirroring the indirect ruling logic, this however took the form of a vague narrative, and not a completely spelled out national culture, as propagated later.

3.1.2. The rise of modern states

Along the basic state features, dominating violence, territory, and organisation, the difference of modern states to earlier ones can be outlined. The rise of the

46 He argues anthropologically that humans seek acknowledgement for their actions, especially by their 'betters' – the ones shaping the order to their advantage. The more a human's actions are in line with any order, the more she has to lose should it be altered.

This also means that arbitrariness cannot sustain any larger orders - most actors favour reliability of expectations (Erwartungssicherheit; id: 226; Giddens 1985: 11f agrees that routine interaction 'calms down' the everyday violence of political order).

47A term borrowed from Giddens (1985), without sharing all his implications of a discontinuitist view on political history.

modern state is by now typically narrated as the process of monopolisation of violence (esp. Tilly 1990, also Elias 1997; Giddens 1985; Popitz 1992: 258-60⁴⁸). This places state-formation in the midst of warfare, specifically what anachronistically may be called intra-state- or civil war. The pursuit of a monopoly of violence-backed regulation had massive consequences for the mode of violence used internally. The high-capacity political organisations emerging from this monopolisation process do not need to be openly cruel to be dominating. Instead, they rely on anonymous, dispassionate (non-cruel)⁴⁹, but still highly effective violence of massive bureaucratic apparatuses (cf. Popitz 1992: 74f). While monopolisation of violence promotes hopes for pacification, there is a counter-rational at work. Becoming the prime regulator of societal affairs, the modern state must first establish the powerlessness of potential competitors. The (violent, if deemed necessary) repression used to that end thus becomes a continuous exercise to enable state monopolist regulation (Benjamin 1971). And still in today's weaker states, potentially violent conflicts between central and regional elites underlie conflicts management strategies (Hartmann 2013: 123f). The conduct of external wars was also altered by modernity, especially by modern weapon technology. Even before transformation into ideological conflicts, gradually "European wars became more lethal, and less frequent" (Tilly 1990: 72; also Giddens 1985; Zinn 1989). Concerning the second basic feature of states, its territorial reach was consolidated, either by enforcing congruence of all regulative spaces, or by establishing dominance over all other regulative institutions (Reinhard 1999: 42). Only in nation-states fits the administrative reach its territorial demarcation (Giddens 1985: 173; Mann 1993: 56). This is especially visible at its territorial limits. What formerly were frontiers, a space of gradually decreasing influence of a "state core" (Scott 2009⁵⁰) became fixed boundaries (Giddens 1985: 49-51; Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009: 10). These rather resemble a clear cut line, increasingly agreed upon in formal treaties. On either side of the border, only one state organisation possesses (de jure) prime regulatory competence. Coming to the third aspect, state organisations continuously grew to unprecedented extends during modernity. But relative to their (also increasing) population, state capacities only started to *massively* expand during industrial revolution (Mann 1993: 364-81). It was until this major boost to their capacities that "[s]tates were little more than revenue collectors and recruiting sergeants, although they were now biting deep and painfully into social life, thus politicising it" (Mann 1993: 504).

Through the monopolisation of the means to organise violence, the modern state evolved into a special, more uniform type of domination institution (Mann 1993: 727). Organisational homogeneity also fostered societal homogeneity⁵¹ (esp. Scott 1998: 82). Mann (1993: 727) claims that the uniformity of modern states results from their standardised economic foundation: industry (consequently the diversity of pre-modern political orders resulted from the diversity of

48 In contrast, Giddens (1985: 18), Mann (1993: 55), and Popitz (1992: 258-60) agree that this monopolisation is only attempted. The private command over violence can never be completely banned. Thus I will use the term monopolisation of the means of organised violence.

49 Hidden cruelty, e.g. in torture chambers, psychological and medical 'experiments', is a result of the operation- and esp. recruitment-logic of violence administrations, as analysed by Reemtsma (2004). Additionally, cruelty might also be pushed to the margins of Western societies, and thus only seems to be absent (Lakitsch 2014).

50 He also points to seasonal and general temporal variation of spaces of state influence.

51 Although one must be aware that this homogeneous society is always only aspired; administrative unity does not equal social homogeneity (Giddens 1985: 193f).

ecological, usu. agricultural conditions). It was the 'enlightened monarchies' of the European 17th century which first went beyond the age-old practise of annexing, and losing territory, resulting in "composite monarchies" characterised by internal diversity (Reinhard 1999: 45-47; Renan 1992). Constantly widening their grip on social life (esp. production), states became a reality of social life which ever less people could evade, until today no larger social group can claim to be unaffected by it. As the acclaimed regulative competence of modern states is ever-expanding (Mann 1993), it is unprecedentedly easy to get into conflict with the state (Migdal 2001; Schlichte & Migdal 2005; Scott 1998; 2009). A final difference between modern states and their predecessors must be mentioned. While the masses of 1400 were just as landless, dependent, and illiterate subsistence farmers as the ones of 1800, there was a growing minority of urban, semi-emancipated, literate counter-elites. This will feature prominently in the further discussion of the institutional logics of modern rule. The emergence of this new group notwithstanding, domination usually developed continuously; rarely did actual revolutions happen (Mann 1993: 15f⁵², 247-53; Williams 1984: 123).

3.1.3. Short ideational history of modern European statehood

Parallel to the historical rise of the ruling institution, also theoretical reflections on state rule developed. Modern domination is usually outlined as impersonal, rule-based, and functionally circumscribed, in one word, legal (e.g. Reinhard 1999: 127). In contrast, traditional domination is based on 'rather unsystematic' claims (id; based on Weber 1978: 215f, 226-236), organised in "patrimonial" fashion, "primarily based on personal loyalty" (Weber 1978: 227) - a 'miscellaneous' category in the typology of domination⁵³. The principal distinction then is that modern states do rely on a specifiable set of rationales. The major trajectories in ideational history towards this common legal framework shall briefly be depicted here. Centuries of conflicts between authority of state and church left multiple mutual demarcations of competences in written form (Schulze 1994: 53). The distinction between 'the religious' and 'the political' ultimately also affected the legitimisation of ruling orders. Not anymore the Fall of Man, but its nature as 'political animal' (reflecting Aristotle's thoughts) necessitated the tyranny of the ruler (Müller 2011: 174; Reinhard 1999: 103; Schulze 1994: 36). This leaves no room for tyrannicide, or more benign forms of resistance, as the dictatorial malevolence of one is always preferable over the unorganised malevolence of many (Reinhard 1999: 103, 115f). This remained the case with Thomas Hobbes, who however centred his political theory on violence as a problem of rule (Reemtsma 2004; 2008, cf. also Reinhard 1999: 108 on a general 'post-Machiavellian' shift towards appropriate exercise of principality). This consequentially undermined the naturalised conception of a ruler being under god only, untouchable by common humans' criticism. A ruler now is defined by a clear duty to protect the population, which he may fail at, thus potentially losing the justification to rule at all (Reinhard 1999: 123).

52 Among his investigated cases, he finds only three in which emerging groups, previously being categorically excluded, replaced the regime: USA 1776, France 1789, and Russia 1917.

53 Being aware that Weber is outlining ideal cases, I still find a common Western chauvinism here. All pre-modern European and contemporary non-European experience are lumped together under one heading - while presumably the only thing they have in common is what they are not; that is being comprehensible to the disinterested European observer (cf. Mamdani 1996: 11f; Lambach 2011: 264f).

The impersonal understanding of the state was already implied in monarchy, which remained in place beyond the individual ruler (Schulze 1994: 25f). However this requires a certain degree of regularity in dynastic succession, which can be assumed largely absent before high Middle Ages (cf. Müller 2011; Ohnacker 2011: 203f). At least since Thomas Hobbes then, ideational reflections interpret the sovereign as equalling the state (Reinhard 1999: 115f). In the 16th century Jean Bodin as seminal thinker of modern politics added the idea of *unitary* sovereignty, instead of the previous institution of enumerable privileges for a ruler. Bodin's ideas also restrained the sovereign ruler in two dimensions, as exercise of rule has to usually conform to the law, and secondly shall not intrude the private sphere of the household⁵⁴ (Reinhard 1999: 112f). Completing the ideational basis of modern sovereignty in the 18th century, William Blackstone finally abstracted the position of the monarch from a genuine person to an office of state – put into reality in the USA (Reinhard 1999: 122). Legal codification of this modern conception was first undertaken by German jurists in 1837 who constituted it as legal entity (Reinhard 1999: 16). In doing this they also coined the decisive definition of statehood, constituted by a unity of territory (*Staatsgebiet*), people (*Staatsvolk*), and sovereign authority (*Staatsgewalt*; id). The modern state now needs no external legitimisation anymore. Its legal self-evidence and (latter) presentation as custodian of the nation sufficiently legitimise the principal of statehood in modern international relations (IR; Reinhard 1999: 22; Schulze 1994: 172). The mutually constitutive role of states and the IR system will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.

3.2. Statehood as status of ascription

The approach underlying my thesis can be called, following Migdal (2001: 252-55), "historical institutionalist". To assess the state in light of its organisational legacy means to place it into the history of social domination. This perspective acknowledges that states are shaped by specific histories, which are present in the behavioural patterns of their representatives. These *institutions*, conceived in a broad understanding as structuring patterns of routine behaviour, are not determined by rulers - past, or present - alone. Because everywhere states seek to control societal forces, these in turn shape the domination patterns set in place (Giddens 1985: 288; Migdal 2001; Reinhard 1999: 22-29; Spruyt 1996; Zinn 1989). Still, the differing histories of individual states in interrelation with societies do not principally repel analysis under a common framework. I find three conditions allowing for taking 'the modern state' as object of investigation.

First, modern states do have a common history. For centuries, the major locale of the historical process, leading to a specifiable institutional setup, had been Europe. But, the form of rule that emerged in these European struggles for land and labour, was exported to other locations, where it was incorporated into different political configurations, which in turn shaped the idea of statehood (Migdal 2001; Eriksen 2011: 235; Reinhard 1999: Chapter VI; Schlichte 2005A: 111f; Tilly 1990: 195; also cf. Herbst 2000 for domestic re-configurations 'the European state' in Africa)⁵⁵. Secondly, resulting from that history, modern states

⁵⁴ This may be seen as consequence of Popitz (1992: 221-226) anthropological argument of desired reliability of expectation mentioned above in Chapter 3.1.1.

⁵⁵ Tilly (1990: 195) observes a homogenisation of state models, first in Europe, then worldwide. Beyond forcing European state structures upon other orders, Spruyt (1996: 178f) describes how (European)

have a common goal, establishing ruling order in a territorially delimited mass society (Hobsbawm 1983; Krippendorff 1985; Mann 1993; Reinhard 1999: 28; Schlichte 2005A: 171f; Williams 1984: 127-30). The foregoing sub-chapter already stressed the common historical and ideological basis of modern states. And thirdly, the existence of a common peer group, deciding who shall be granted admission to international relations as formally equal member, makes it feasible to discuss *the* state (also Eriksen 2011: 235). Already the very beginning of modern statehood with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 indicates that modern states do only exist in an international environment (Giddens 1985: Chapter 4; Krippendorff 1985: 264; Spruyt 1996: 178f; Tilly 1990: 167). The term *international*, and the distinction between internal and external politics, only becomes meaningful after central states effectively dominate all other "entrepreneurs of violence" (Giddens 1985: 170; Tilly 1990: 69f). Thus, sovereign statehood is best understood as relation of mutual recognition between actors who accept themselves as formally equal (Spruyt 1996: 178f). Hence sovereignty is no *intrinsic* quality of states, but a status based on recognition, *external* to the individual state (Giddens 1985: 263-66; also Schulze 1994: 84f). Giddens' argument additionally qualifies concerns about states losing their distinctive qualities when increasingly 'restricting' their regulatory power by internationally binding treaties. States which formalise their competences in mutual assurances do not make themselves redundant (Giddens 1985: 283f. for the case of EC). Neither IOs, nor hegemonic states deny sovereignty. Instead they challenge, and constitute it at the same time (Giddens 1985: 263-65; also Spruyt 1996: 193). After 1918/ 1945, the League of Nations, and UN resp., formally overtook the task of signifying the status of a formally sovereign state to political organisations (Giddens 1985: 258f). By granting membership only to states, the UN and its sub-organisations, and also IMF, World Bank, WHO, and other IOs manifested the ideal of the nation-state as *the* modern political order (Herbst 2000: 100; Migdal 2001: 136-42). This not only excludes other political organisations (e.g. representative of native peoples)⁵⁶. The act of acknowledgement also sets and reshapes standards which states must comply with to be recognised (Herbst 2000: 27; Migdal 2001: 141; Tilly 1990: 195; cf. Jackson 1990 for non-European agency in reshaping IR). Thus modern statehood can be conceptualised as 'a given' beyond the individual cases. However, contrary to any teleological claims, one has to be aware that the outcome, the modern state of the early 21st century, is just a temporary result in this ongoing process, with no entitlement to special recognition. As target for my critique, I must choose the state in its current form, only because it is the most recent manifestation of the ruling institution which over centuries evolved to becoming the prime vehicle for politicians globally to frame their ambitions (Migdal 2001: 233; Waldron 1985).

state structures aligned in processes of "institutional learning". For one, state builders imitated and adapted the innovations of others. Secondly, by forging social alliances, based on subjective interest, certain political orders were empowered over others, irrespective of their performance in functional terms.

56 Tilly (1990: 202) interprets the rise of intra-state war as reaction of politicians of "excluded nationalities" to create their nation albeit the world already being completely divided.

3.3. Five dimensions of activity demanded to be considered a state, and constituting the distinction between weak and strong states

The foregoing now allows for specifying the institutional requirements to be considered a state; or as previously put, what the status of 'prime regulator of overall societal affairs in a given territory' means. I find five sets of institutions, or *dimensions* of state activity, which are required from any state. These dimensions are the monopoly on military draft, direct taxation, bureaucratic organisation, creation and promotion of a formal economy, and keeping internal order, or policing (see table 1). I choose these five, because they capture both the main developments of modern states until today, and (consequently) the principal demands put onto states applying for international recognition.

Table 1: Dimensions of state activity as functions of external demands

Dimension	External Demand
Monopoly of military draft	Monopoly of the means of organised violence; Absence of armed groups beyond state control in the state territory;
Direct taxation	Ability to fund a central state budget, to finance the other tasks;
Bureaucratic organisation	Central unitary government, horizontally (functionally), and vertically differentiated, Including diplomatic- and other specialised central state agencies; Legal-rational practise (absence of corruption, personalism)
Creating and promoting economic activity	Provide legal and material infrastructure for trade and commerce; Create national welfare (changing conceptions: from the splendour of court to GDP/ capita);
Keeping internal order: Policing	Provide internal order (again changing specific demands: from absence of (confessional) civil war to R2P)

Own compilation

Already this overview suggests the centrality of the monopoly on the organisation of violence, and provision of security. It thus mirrors the focal point of most conceptualisations of statehood 'after Weber'. By framing the criteria as demands put on individual regimes by their peers ('the international community'), it becomes clear why these dimensions define statehood *at the present time* – and implies how a change in these comes about. In the following I will outline for each dimension of statist activity what it entails, its institutional connection to use of force, and how the domestic function is framed as an external demand.

Before doing that, it is already possible to point out the difference between strong and weak states. As critics of sovereignty based on international recognition rightly point out, admission to the circle of states is based largely on juridi-

cal criteria. It is commonly assumed that states *should* perform effectively in the underlying demands of statehood (as part of a global 'community'). The factual ability to deliver on these claims is a very different matter (esp. Jackson 1990). However, the failure to do so usually does not result in recognition as a state being revoked⁵⁷. But it brings with it the devaluing attribute of 'weak', or 'fragile' statehood. Thus, being a state is a recognition based on institutional setup⁵⁸, whereas *strong* statehood is based on evaluation of performance.

3.3.1. The move towards direct rule

The first two demands on modern states concern the ability to rule *directly* over the populace. The modern central state was historically the first organisation able to effectively eliminate this mediation level (Giddens 1985: 56-58; Hobsbawm 2000: 80; Mann 1993: Chapter 13)⁵⁹. Traditionally, rule above face-to-face communities was organised through self-interested intermediaries. Central government had been synonymous to indirect rule, while direct rule had been the distinct feature of sub-statist, gentry rule (Reinhard 1999: 212). Even the comparatively advanced centralisation of pre-revolutionary France was based on this 'intermediary, often indirect power' (Schulze 1994: 34). Especially for smaller states reliance on the gentry provided a cost-efficient and well established mode of decision-making and implementation, mobilising resources and loyalty (Reinhard 1999: 223). The consolidation of the central state's power then was inevitably undertaken at the expense of intermediaries. Mann (1993: 483) argues that still in the 1860s the British government was keen to frame the general, and undeniable, trend to centralisation of state power in rhetoric of single case pragmatism to accommodate the still powerful intermediaries. Also Tilly (1990: 103-9) describes how central regimes massively pushed to extend their direct authority since the 18th century, while still depending on at least some of the intermediaries for their effective power. At the same time, more powerful, urban groups lobbied the central institutions to incorporate their interests into national legislation (Tilly 1990: 115). Thus not only modern rulers, but also newly emerging social groups conceived to profit from centralisation of political power. Ultimately, the central state's reliance on direct rule proved extraordinarily effective in terms of resource mobilisation. In the context of competitive IR of the time, this major advantage ultimately determined the demise of all non-nation-states (Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009: 107f; Krippendorff 1985: 274f; Spruyt 1996; Tilly 1990: 64f; Zinn 1989: 254)⁶⁰.

57 Only in the emblematic, extreme case of a long-term failed state, Somalia, this is practically done (cf. Hagmann & Hoehne 2009: 53f; Menkhaus 2003: 418).

58 However, this is only a necessary, not a sufficient criterion as cases like Republic of Abkhazia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or Palestinian Authority Territories show. These are not awarded recognition as states by the collective of their peers, although they do resemble states institutionally (and may even be more effective than some of their acknowledged counterparts).

59 In comparison the autonomy of communes (a common, albeit heterogeneous, feature during medieval times), was abandoned relatively late, only in the 19th and 20th centuries (Reinhard 1999: 238-40).

60 While Krippendorff, and Tilly stress the importance of military mobilisation, Spruyt (1996: 185) finds the sovereign claim of "internal hierarchy and external autonomy" (id: 3) advantageous in mobilising resources, lowering opportunity costs through standardisation, and effective combating of free-riding. Leonhard & Hirschhausen (2009) suggest lacking adoption capabilities of the last European empires to an IR increasingly shaped by nation-states.

3.3.2. Dimension 1 - Monopoly of military draft (including a discussion of modern statehood's relation to totalitarianism)

The elimination of intermediaries from the practise of rule requires the *central* enlisting of recruits. In line with the more common term of the *monopoly on the means of organised violence*, this practise will be called *monopolisation of military draft*. For one the monopolisation of the military draft means the ability to muster an army sufficiently strong to enforce the central government's will throughout all its acclaimed territory, even against the resistance of sub-statist political actors. Only technical progress enabled the maintenance of larger, standing armies, suitable for a centralist ruler to project power over a wider territory, which roughly coincided with the onset of modernity (Giddens 1985: 56-58; Scott 2009; Zinn 1989). Secondly and in extension, it implies the effective prohibition for others than the central administration to assemble an army; hence a central monopoly on recruiting. The protracted, and violent history of how this monopoly became installed, and the accompanied by societal changes, are exactly why European state history is perceived largely as history of warfare (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Reinhard 1999; Tilly 1990; and Zinn 1989). After these conflicts, the reliance on an oligarchy of violence organisers was abandoned, who before presented a principal threat of rebellion (Giddens 1985: 56f; Ohnacker 2011: 197; Reinhard 1999: 226-38; Tilly 1990: 75f). Thus, central regimes could fulfil the nominal claim to effectively rule 'their' country (Giddens 1985: 173; Mann 1993: 56; Reinhard 1999: 42).

The exclusive mustering of the military by the central state also changed the institutional rationales of its organisation. But this is not to suggest a clearly one-sided relation. Military developments are themselves always effects of societal ones, so changes in military strategy mirrors societal change (Krippendorff 1985: 207f; cf. also Popitz 1992: 71-74; Zinn 1985: 147). The change inside the military organisation can be labelled *professionalising* the armed forces. On the socialisation level, motivation replaced drill to make soldiers risking their lives in battle, and rational, rule-governed organisation replaced harsh punishment (Giddens 1985: 228; Krippendorff 1985: 75; Mann 1993 426–428; Tilly 1990: 83). This modern, rule-based discipline was increasingly applied to all ranks, hence replacing noble privileges. And the military was gradually opened for careerists from low social strata, due to the logic of merit-based appointments. Thus, especially the army became a forerunner of legally equal citizenship. In contrast to this emancipative vision, Krippendorff (1985: 265, 362) finds that professionalisation of the army in effect led to technocratic fulfilment of duty, uncritical of the commander's, and ultimately the regime's motives (id: 68-71). This however can be dismissed with reference to Mann (1993: Chapter 12) who argues that professionalisation of the army met the disinterest of nationally organising political opposition groups (id: 412-26), and so actually resulted in a more autonomous military.

A second major shift in modern military organisation occurred during the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon's achievement had been the connection of the professionalism of the state army with the national enthusiasm of 'a nation in arms' (Reinhard 1999: 359; Torpey 2002). His enemies copied the strategy, albeit employing officer candidate schools to sustain noble privileges (id: 359f). The nationalisation of the military made the formerly self-interested warrior a paid

state employee - a *soldier* (Krippendorff 1985: 249). And beyond motivation and reliability, recruiting citizens instead of mercenaries proved cheaper (Tilly 1990: 83f). With mass-conscription, the fitness for military service of the whole populace became a concern with central recruitment (Bousquet 2012: 186; Tilly 1990: 106), and the birth rate a major military power factor⁶¹ (Reinhard 1999: 362; both being an aspect of “bio-politics, cf. Foucault 1990: 139-141). The collective mass-effort in WW1 brought state and population in an even closer relation. Universal male suffrage and citizenship rights were thought of as acknowledgement of military duties (Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009: 79-84). And through the coordination of the war economy, unions were incorporated into economic governance, and rationalisation of production was furthered (Giddens 1985: 234-36).

Before discussing the links of this dimension of state activity to violence, a short reflection on ‘totalitarian rule’ shall be undertaken here⁶². This seems insightful, as the most violent regimes during the notoriously violent 20th century, did defy the state monopoly of violence from within (Reinhard 1999: 458ff⁶³). While totalitarian political practice requires well established bureaucratic administration of ‘state in society’ to approximate its massive claims to social engineering, political leadership cannot expect the designated administrations to smoothly implement orders, especially mass-murder (as already discussed along rationales of organised violence in Chapter 2.5; with reference to Reemtsma 2004: 351-53). Terror is a viable means of political control of bureaucracies, which have only been taken over from predecessor regimes⁶⁴. As long as parallel institutions exist, no bureaucrat or party member (including the ones in armed sub-organisations) is indispensable to a regime (Reemtsma 2004: 353). A resulting mutual surveillance of state bureaucracy and party apparatus enables ‘maximum capacity’ efforts such as the Holocaust (id). It is thus not justified to attribute the intentional mass-violence of regimes such as NSDAP-Germany, the Soviet Union headed by Stalin, or Mao's rule in the Peoples Republic of China to bureaucratic organisation, which is a core feature of *all* modern states. However, bureaucratic planning brings about its own institutional logic of violence. Just like Scott's (1998: Chapters 6 and 7) instructive comparison between Tanzania and the USSR in collectivising agricultural production shows, any bureaucratic interference with social arrangements is prone to create violence, due to an institutional culture of top-down ignorance, backed by violence. Should the implementation of bureaucratic agendas fail due to resistance, efforts to implement the policy might be enhanced. As state administrations have access to “legitimate” means of violence, this is a potential side-effect of bureaucratic rule. But only if the expressed political will is to act violently, the *planned violence* of genocide occurs. So, while the violence that all modern states are capable of is an effect of bureaucratic abstraction (Scott 1998: 91-99), the excessive violence

61 Today, armies are decreasing in number of men (and women) in arms, but feature a massively increased ‘input value’ per soldier (Bousquet 2012: 187). He implies means-end rationalism and bio-power as major motives underlying the image of the soldier on a modern battlefield (id).

62 Totalitarian regimes are understood here as real type, characterised by aspiring not only dominance or hegemony, but absolute control over society.

63 Thus, state definitions with the core criterion of a state monopoly of violence, would have to qualify whether totalitarian regimes are to be regarded as fully fledged modern states.

64 Constitutional jurists, like Schmitt who is quoted in this thesis, legitimised German totalitarianism as re-politicisation of the state, considered having been turned into a technocratic abstraction by developments of bureaucratisation, especially de-personalisation (Reinhard 1999: 469f).

of totalitarian regimes is only thinkable when bureaucratic implementation is coupled with political will (or at least total ignorance) towards human suffering.

Discussing the institutional links of the modern state to violence, first it is obvious that the centralisation of the military, and especially the monopolisation of military draft, puts massive coercive potential into the hands of the central regime. At the same time, the dispossession of the traditional intermediaries' armed forces can be employed as indication of less intra-state violence, in a Hobbesian line of argument that only one supreme violence-wielder in a territory is preferential to more (Brieskorn 2005: 86-88). Secondly, anticipating a latter argument, through separation of military and police (the latter of which will be discussed in Chapter 3.3.6), most societal organisations do not have to suffer from military suppression through 'their own' states anymore.

"[A]rmies latter became recognized as inappropriate instruments, especially in cities and when gun technology began to deliver too little show and bang, too much death on crowds. [...] Regimes saw that the two military functions [external war and domestic repression] were diverging in tactics, weapons, barracking and discipline" (Mann 1993: 410; cf. also Giddens 1985: 187; Krippendorff 1985: 330).

This however is not valid for the significant exception of groups perceived as principal opposition to the regime (typically ethnic- and class-based; cf. Mann 1993: 410-12; Reinhard 1999: 364; Schlichte 2005A: 91; Tilly 1990: 114f). Third, as the brief reflection on totalitarianism suggests, a resolute bureaucratic control of the state's coercive apparatus constitutes a possible limitation to mass-violence, a kind of veto-player in decisions about atrocities. Instead of a serving as submissive instrument in the hand of politicians, the military emerged as self-interested, partially autonomous bureaucratic organisation. But, following Krippendorff (1985), and Mann (1993), that does not mean a more bureaucratic military would be *less* likely to promote the exercise of violence.

As external demand, the monopoly on the draft (as major part of the means of organised violence) features paramount. If governments fail to keep competing armed organisations from their territory, the 'international community' might chose to militarily intervene (von Trotha 2005: 6), thus explicitly denying the state's sovereign status⁶⁵. Max Weber (1978: 56) was already expressing the by-now zeitgeist on the issue, when propagating that "today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it". It is here where the violent nature of modern states' rule is located internally (cf. Kössler 2008; Schlichte 2005A: 128f), and externally, as necessary demand on any modern state.

3.3.3. Dimension 2 - Direct taxation, and its institutional consequences

Parallel to the military draft, taxation was eventually becoming the sole right of the central administration. Before, reliance on self-interested intermediaries when collecting taxes always meant the loss of some of the potential income on

⁶⁵ Following Menkhaus (2003), Somalia provides a case in point, as it is almost exclusively external actors who regularly attempt to create a central Somali government, while both Somali elites (id: 418f) and the common population (id: 409) rather fear an effective central violence-wielding institution. And indeed the attempts to establish a central government regularly escalate political conflict, instead of pacifying society (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009: 51; Menkhaus 2003: 409f).

the way (Reinhard 1999: 316; Scott 1998: 38). Thus, central collection of taxes constitutes the second requirement for the supreme mobilisation capabilities of modern statehood, and a logical supplement of the first in disempowering local elites (Elias 1997: 142; Krippendorff 1985: 250f; Tilly 1990). Taxation initially was usually promoted to finance wars (esp. Tilly 1990). But Tilly (1990: 89; also Mann 1993: 375) describes the common development that "an inflated wartime budget fails to return to its pre-war level", because of bureaucratic resistance to budget cuts, and new demands discovered or created through war (incl. war debts; cf. Reinhard 1999: 306-19).

Through the institutionalisation of taxes, war indirectly also aided representation (Mann 1993: 381; Reinhard 1999; Tilly 1990). As the central state's own productive property (esp. land) was insufficient to finance the notoriously excessive war efforts of early modernity, intermediaries of state rule (still) had to be included in the mobilisation of resources. The more resources a state expropriated, the more it depended on social groups, and organisations (incl. their own bureaucracies) to provide these regularly. This however brought central rulers to ever new bargaining tables, acknowledging complaints, understanding interests, allowing concessions, etc. E.g., while indirect taxes could antagonise wealthy supporters from gentry, or grand bourgeoisie, direct taxes usually stimulated demands for participation (Mann 1993: 381). Hence, the move to direct rule also brought new pressures onto the government; modern rulers have to deal with societal interests to an unprecedented extend (Tilly 1990: 117f). But Reinhard (1999: 316) makes the significant addition that as long as it was intermediaries whom the state bargained with, they did not increase their own burden, but those of the peasants working their lands. What is more, while these intermediaries directly faced the consequences of overexploitation, they always could additionally increase the amount they kept from the collected taxes – a practise probably implied when the central ruler was requesting a tax increase. Thus, while more intense taxation put intermediaries and other powerful citizens into a bargaining position towards the state, the mass of (usu. peasant) population lost an ever-increasing share of their income, their "routine resistance" notwithstanding (Scott 1985; Tilly 1990: 99-102; Schlichte 2005A: Chapter 4).

But institutionalisation of representation led to another, paradoxical effect. Arguing along the case of England, Reinhard (1999: 325) suggests that its comparatively strong parliamentary control of the central budget in effect aided the expansion of central government's power, as taxation was perceived more legitimate, and earlier so. So despite reliance on sub-state intermediaries, central taxation strengthened centralisation through representation. However again, the represented groups were not the ones effectively paying the bulk of taxes. Direct rule is thus potentially more violent than mediated rule, as the detachment of central decision makers from those they make pay usually equals ignorance towards local practices, capacities and interests. In the context of successive centralisation, the intermediaries were plausibly unwilling or unable to moderate central demand on exploitation, as they found themselves increasingly pressured from above. The failure to deliver on central command could have served as a welcome opportunity to get rid of another potential challenger of centralist power.

Summarising, the historical formation of constitutionalism and parliamentarism can be traced to conflicts surrounding both taxation, and the installation of a central military (Krippendorff 1985: 226). But one of the centralising effects was that resources were increasingly channelled out of the local economy (Tilly 1990: 98f). Thus risks of over-exploitation significantly increased, as outsiders are much more prone to be ignorant towards local livelihoods (Scott 1998: 37-40; for the historical case Mann 1993: 504). The two functions of *direct rule* are manifest in external demands vis-à-vis all statist administrations to hold the monopoly of the organisation of violence, and the ability to fund a central budget via taxation, to finance this task, and others as described in the dimensions below. If a state fails to raise the means for performing effectively in the other dimensions, the 'international community' might offer support in the form of development assistance (DA), which however brings with it the devaluing attribute of a *developing* state, as marker for weak statehood.

3.3.4. Dimension 3 - Bureaucratic organisation: From despotism to rule-based conduct

To perform both dimensions, the recruitment of centrally organised armies and central taxation without local knowledge, requires personnel in central administrations (Mann 1993: 472f; Scott 1998: 2f, 219; Tilly 1990: 75; Weber 1978: 223). A modern state is necessarily a hierarchical, "administrative order" (Weber 1978: 48-54). Historically, the logics of rule-based, specialised, and hierarchical administration shaped military organisation during 17th and 18th centuries, and civil administration a good century later (Giddens 1985: 95-113; Hroch 2005: 43f; Mann 1993: 395, 472). The third feature of modern states is thus found in its bureaucratic organisation. This however not only massively increased the number, but also changed the type of administrators required (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 55; Mann 1993: Chapter 13; Reinhard 1999: 127-131). The various enumerations of ideal bureaucratic behaviour (famously Weber 1978: 956ff) indicate the degree of prescription necessary to organise the novel practice of direct rule (cf. Mann 1993: 473; Reinhard 1999: 128-31). In contrast to traditional, self-interested delegates of central power, modern, *professional* bureaucrats have to dispassionately follow instructions⁶⁶. Prominently the central tax collector's unambiguous loyalty lies with the central regime paying his salary. In contrast, his local equivalent always factored in personal relations to tax payers, and had to directly suffer the consequences of a neighbourhood feeling exploited beyond their limits⁶⁷ (Scott 1985). As these kinds of administrators had to be socialised, or educated to the functional and ideological requirements of modern bureaucracy, regimes started their efforts in (what was later to become mass-) education (Hroch 2005: 43f, 77; Reinhard 1999: 194; Mann 1993: Chapter 13). But also functionally set-up organisations like bureaucracies inevitably depend on informality (Reinhard 1999: 130f). Bureaucracies developed agency on their own behalf (Tilly 1990: 117); and institutions were used by populations in their own interests (Tilly 1990: 118).

66 The service gentry (Dienstadel) are taking an interesting middle position here. Principally delegated, thus dependent on loyalty to the central regime, some of these office holders could rise into more independent positions, which sometimes brought them into conflict with the central state (Reinhard 1999: 196).

67 Be it in the extreme, but rare form of violent uprising, or benign "routine resistance" (Scott 1985).

Initially, central administration required 'reading' societies, primarily where to find how much taxable income, and recruits. However, the schemes aimed to achieve a "legible" populace, actually resulted in social engineering, ordering society along criteria, which may be called rational (only) from a ruler's perspective (as Scott 1998 analyses along a multitude of examples⁶⁸; cf. also Giddens 1985: 309f; and Krippendorff 1985: 27-29). Taking this perspective of re-ordering society, bureaucracy can rather be seen an all-encompassing episteme, than 'just' a way to administer society (Beetham 1985: 81; Reinhard 1999: 466f; Weber 1978: 1403). Basic human relationships are abstractly re-conceptualised, compatible with bureaucratic formalities. This i.a. includes partnerships (marriage), occupation (employment), insurances, and assets (land titles, bank account etc). Mann (1993: 473) consequently considers bureaucracies "the most important way state elites penetrated civil society". The rulers' meta-objective in socio-political regulation is to create a standardised society; a legible, easy to govern mass-population (Scott 1998: 219). And as such, it is opposed to any more localised form of society. Societal organisation beyond the state was assigned a secondary role (Reinhard 1999: 466). This by now led to the negative connotation of interest groups, promoting particular interests, while the state supposedly represents the common interest (Reinhard 1999: 407).

The dominance state intervention is directly visible in the way states engaged human settlement patterns (Scott 1998: 34-44, 57-62). Traditional central authorities had little means to alter the way humans settled (except blunt destruction), at least beyond their very core of power (Scott 2009). And traditionally the land distribution between leaseholder, and other dependent peasants, and the livelihoods of slaves was a decentralised affair. But, as bureaucracies grew, rulers got bolder in interfering with population patterns to their own advantages (the classical state tasks of recruitment, taxation, and holding the rabble down). This finally resulted in full-scale designed cities (Scott 1998: Chapter 4). This central re-organisation of the populace is necessarily conflictual, and due to its dispassionate enforcement, potentially violent.

As an external demand, bureaucracy serves as expectation of a certain structure of the central administration. Beyond the depersonalised monarch, a head of government, a functionally differentiated setup follows on several levels (usu. central, provincial, communal; cf. Hartmann 2013: 7f; Mamdani 1996: 60f). The minimum setup is completed by central-state agencies, designed to execute specialised functions – above all the diplomatic service (to engage in IR, thus receiving the acknowledgment as state). This horizontally and vertically divided institutional setup is expected to operate as one unitary government (Mann 1993: 472). Additionally this design and its workings shall be legally codified in a constitution. But bureaucratic organisation is expected beyond mere organisational charts. Demands include actual administrative behaviour, diffusely structured along the Weberian ideal type. Prominently charges of corruption and personalism are synonymous with malevolent, despotic, and thus pre-modern regimes (Tetzlaff 1999; cf. Mamdani 1996: 11; and von Trotha 2000: 264 for a

68 One prime example, acknowledged by authors beyond James C. Scott, is the manipulation of a populace's identification through the census. In the first place, the criteria which it is based on are chosen by regimes, or administrations (Appadurai 2006: 83f; Ther 2011: 53). With its ambition to unambiguously list religious, lingual, etc. groups, the census creates the desired unambiguity (Anderson 1991: 166-70; Giddens 1985: 179-81; Ther 2011: 53). Once listed, there is usually no designated procedure to change e.g. one's linguistic 'identity' (Ther 2011: 53).

critical position). Power asymmetries dictate low-capacity states to align to these ideals; as Tilly (1990: 195) puts it, "the adoption of one Western model or another has become a virtual prerequisite for recognition by prior members of the state system". Some alignments may also be done out of functional rationales, copying strategies which seem to work in other states (cf. Spruyt 1996: 178f on historical alignment between European states). But other administrative structures are put in accordance to Western standards in a much more direct way, through external assistance aiming at capacity building, prominently in the fields of security agencies (Menkhaus 2003: 412; Tilly 1990: 207), or financial administration (Hartmann 2013: 126; Schlichte 2005A: 185). The gap between bureaucratic ideal and administrative practise also took centuries to be bridged in Europe. For modernising states until 1914, Mann (1993: 473) finds that "[t]he modern bureaucratic state appears at first imagined, then inexorably, functionally, in reality". But, as has been argued, bureaucratic conduct can never be all-encompassing, because general formal rules principally cannot capture the complexity of decision-making of human beings.

State administrations, as *the* emblematic case of a bureaucratic organisation, are designed as hierarchical, rule-governed instruments of political control. However bureaucracies are also self-interested actors - collectively, and additionally retaining critical individual decision space for each 'public servant'. As such they do both enable central state dominance, and also limit the power of governments. Already the discussion of the military employed this argument (cf. Chapter 3.3.2). Bureaucracies are necessary to commit mass murder on the scale of genocide (cf. Chapter 1.2.2), but excessive violence is also based on political will. As bureaucracies usually lack such will, politicians have to make bureaucracy comply. The multiple layers necessarily involved effectively serve as checks on decisions, as each step grants at least a minimum of individual opportunity to influence the implementation (cf. Chapter 2.5). But overall, the rule-based organisation will sanction arbitrary decision-making of administrators. In the hierarchical context of bureaucratic organisation, responsibility is always bottom-up. Thus, an unrealistic instruction from a superior might lead to unpunished breaking of the rules. On the other hand in case of conflicts between bureaucratic planning and real social life, administrative procedures might not be responsive at all (Scott 1998). Inputs outside the standardised form of bureaucratic conduct will find no responsible official.

Considering the execution of violence, the hierarchical, rule-based conduct will usually follow instructions. This still implies personal responsibility of the individual administrators. They might actually add to violent conduct, if perceiving it an effective and/ or appropriate way to fulfil their 'responsibilities'. Keeping in mind this individual decision space, one can expect the exercise of violence to be massively influenced by cultural socialisation of the administrators. This is presumably the underlying cause why bureaucrats, who by definition should treat all citizens equally, discriminate against individuals and groups, already underprivileged in the overall societal contexts. Governments seem aware of this, and provide special education facilities for bureaucracies and specialised administrations like military and police.

3.3.5. Dimension 4 - Creating and promoting formal economic activity

Fourth, the modern state is expected to perform certain economic functions. While today the statist role in economy is often reduced to stay out of the economy, and merely maintain basic regulatory frames and material infrastructure for markets (Reinhard 1999: 342f; Schulze 1994: 288), other authors include in their concepts state action to adjust market distribution, esp. to lessen social hardships (van Creveld 1999:354-82; Strange 1996:44-65; Zürn 1998). What both perspectives miss is that modern, globalising capitalism could only emerge through conscious decisions by governments to formalise the economy. Adam Smith and other contemporary promoters of *laissez-faire*, conceived the state's economic role as very creator of markets through legal re-definitions, turning societal stocks into tradable commodities, and creating legal and infrastructural frames to allow for such trade (Mann 1993: 480). Thus, a market economy is not simply permitted, or 'let loose' by a government, but instead consciously constructed. To establish this argument, the following shall give an overview of important functions of the state in the creation of today's capitalist order, in a roughly chronological order.

The basis of pre-capitalist economy had been possession in productive land, which was largely tantamount to developed farmland, populated by working peasants. This possession was formally granted to supporters of the central monarch - the political economy of what today is called Feudalism, but still applied during (what is, again anachronistically, called) Absolutism (Giddens 1985: 152). The legalisation of this 'primitive accumulation' through formalisation of land titles seemed to be a statist occupation since the invention of writing (Scott 2009; cf. also Ohnacker 2011: 196f)⁶⁹. Building on this, land, and increasingly labour were commodified (Cramer 2006: 206-13; Dal Lago 2005; Giddens 1985: 67-71, 150-52; Krippendorff 1985: 244; Tilly 1990: 100). To allow for the commodification, a second necessary condition has to be installed, the monetisation of the economy. This was politically pursued first in 13th century Italian city-states, to alter the structure of tax income (Imbusch 2005: 200-2 in reference to Alfred Weber; also Giddens 1985: 156f; Reinhard 1999: 336-39). Massive, usually war-induced spending later led to the creation of "fiduciary money", lacking any material basis, backed by political guarantees only, of the monarch creating the money (Giddens 1985: 153-56)⁷⁰. Land, labour, and its produce were tradable on nationally unified markets, necessitating national measurement units, and development of public infrastructure (cf. Giddens 1985: 173-78) since 17th century all over Europe (Reinhard 1999: 226-37; Tilly 1990: 100). This included safeguarding productive property (Giddens 1985: 100), and contractual obligations between private parties (Giddens 1985: 148). More recent domestic economic policies include industry-promotion (Mann 1993: 489-93; Tilly 1990: 120), and demand-oriented welfare policies (Giddens 1985: 243). Projecting economic strength globally had equally been an occupation of states, from the protection and extension of overseas-trade (Krippendorff 1985: 341; Reinhard 1999: 339), which already in late medieval transformed agriculture to production for the anonymous world market (Zinn 1989: 87, 118f). Later the protection of the national economy via tariffs (Carr 1968: 17; Tilly 1990: 115f), manipulating the

69 According to Krippendorff (1985: 228), William the conqueror commissioned the first central, comprehensive cadastre, at least in Europe.

70 Again the mutual recognition in a system of nation-states favoured this development (id).

value of the currency for national economic rationales (Reinhard 1999: 337), and (so far finally) free-trade promotion followed (Reinhard 1999: 342), which today specifically means attracting foreign investment (Appadurai 2006: 65), and ensuring compatibility to financial markets (id: 84). All these economic policies were conscious decisions by central regimes (Williams 1984: 123f).

A very direct advantage for the states more successful at these tasks is the increase of the taxable income, and thus revenue base of the state (e.g. Carr 1968: 11). But the rationales are also to fulfil external demands, as a functional state is considered *sine-qua-non* for development by the organisations of global (economic) governance (Menkhaus 2003: 409). All regimes find themselves faced with very detailed prescriptions how to administer 'their national unit' of the world economy according to common standards (cf. Reinhard 1999: 336f; Schlichte 2005A: 185; von Trotha 2000: 261). Expanding the formalised economy is synonymous with progressive development; GDP-growth rates are *the* indicator for successful governance (cf. Krippendorff 1985: 358). Additionally, as economic development is currently conceived as being based on free-trade, certain infrastructures rudimentary to trade, and financial transactions are required to be considered a functional state. By expanding their extractive capacities, states also employed violent expropriation. The promotion of capitalism, or market exploitation, is usually conceptualised as non-violent, mere "dull economic compulsion" (Giddens 1985: 160 borrowing the phrase from Marx). This already implies potentially deadly state intervention, as it means restructuring the relations which humans base their livelihood on. More directly however, "non-market expropriation" did not cease as governments promoted market mechanisms. Mamdani (1996: 148-65), and Dal Lago (2005) clearly show that the two kinds of expropriation are absolutely compatible. In order to raise their revenues, states relied exactly on this mix of state intervention and promotion of market governance (esp. Reinhard 1999: 466).

3.3.6. Dimension 5 - Keeping internal order: Policing

While the promotion of the formal economy aided taxation, and bureaucratic administration enabled both tax appropriation, and military organisation, the fifth and final dimension of tasks demanded by modern states ultimately transcends "the older objectives of statecraft" of mustering armies, and appropriating resources from subjugated populations (Scott 1998: 52). In historic perspective, only modern states aspire to deeply regulate societal spheres previously ignored by central rulers (Giddens 1985: 56-58; Mann 1993; Scott 1998: 51f). Maintenance of a detailed internal order (or *policing*) is claim of and demand for modern states. Parallel to capitalism, urbanisation, and especially industrialisation, the aggravating "social question" led central states to expand activity into socialising larger parts of their populations, according to the rulers' norms (Mann 1993: 481). This dimension will be discussed here in two steps. First, a narrow sense of policing, the actual upholding of internal security will be discussed. Afterwards a wider notion of internal order will be outlined in the areas of law, education and cultural policies.

Conceived narrowly, creating internal order means keeping the unprivileged mass of the population in line (Schlichte 2005A: 137-49). During modernisation this gained special relevance to rulers as "[c]apitalism and urbanization had

weakened local-regional segmental controls over the lower classes" (Mann 1993: 500; cf. also 479-85; and Giddens 1985: 182; Tilly 1990:114-19). The violent side of this new control regime was found in "proactive repression" against perceived revolutionary threats to the regime (usu. socialist, or ethic-separatist; Tilly 1990: 114f; also Mann 1993: 410-12; Reinhard 1999: 364). This however is not limited to the past. Davenport (2007: 7) cites several studies on statist repression which support Benjamin's (1971) theoretical claim. In any state, including recent democratic ones, those who are perceived as systemic opposition are violently repressed. To that end, specialised police forces were separated from the military (as already mentioned in Chapter 3.3.2; Mann 1993: 410; cf. also Giddens 1985: 187; Krippendorff 1985: 330). While their deployment was increasingly circumscribed by the rule of law, this is no principal argument against excessive violence. For one, *preventing* the rise of revolutionary threats, as major aim of narrow policing activities, is notoriously open to interpretation, when translated into specific action (Reinhard 1999: 467; cf. also Benjamin 1971: 189f). Secondly, if police action seems unnecessary or excessive, even in this wide frame, it may be legalised 'on demand' by the responsible authorities (Reinhard 1999: 370). Again, rule-governed conduct promotes both a sense of the appropriate use of violence (resulting in some resistance to commands deemed inappropriate), and ignorance towards potentially violent consequences of re-structuring society according to abstract plans.

Conceived widely, policing, or keeping internal order in modern states goes beyond immediate regime consolidation via repression of the opposition. Historically, this wider notion of policing as general social control can be traced back to 'moral politics' of the early modern state, which was often labelled as "policey" (Mann 1993: 281f; Reinhard 1999: 300, 364; Tilly 1990: 119). Already pre-industrial regimes sought to institutionalise unified systems of effective formal regulation (Giddens 1985: 89; Mann 1993; Scott 1998: Chapters 1 and 2). This means, broadly speaking, the attempt to establish *the law* as principal guide line of public behaviour (Migdal 2001: 13). As it was, the law represented the formal codification of political decisions, based mainly (although not solely) on interests and values of a hereditary elite (Giddens 1985: 100). In addition to the character of legislation, also administration of justice fundamentally changed. While early modern arbitration was still rooted in settling specific conflicts, modern law attempts to deduct any verdict from an abstract, complete system of formalised order (Reinhard 1999: 298-301; cf. also Ohnacker 2011: 189-191). At the same time, the 'humanisation of criminal law' took place, successively abandoning torture and the death penalty⁷¹ (Reinhard 1999: 302). Another benign aspect of this social control had been the gradual instalment of welfare-systems (Giddens 1985: 100f; Mann 1993: 481; Schlichte 2005A: 91). In GB, as the first country to experience the social hardships of industrialisation, the establishment of general welfare policies took place in the context of Victorian elite morals. From the first implementations, social politics was thus always applied for a double rationale, the provision of public goods and intensifying social control (Bevir 2011: 84 in reference to Foucault; Mann 1993: 481-83⁷²; again following rationales of "bio-politics", as management of the vital functions of a population, Foucault 1990: 139-41).

71 For Foucault (1990: 138), this however is, far from humanitarian motives, a result of bio-politics.

72 A further political rationale was the weakening of socialist movements, by relieving grievances of workers (id).

Also the development of statist cultural and educational policy plays out in the context of domestic policies for the masses. As already mentioned when discussing bureaucracy (Chapter 3.3.4), the roots of modern mass-education can be traced back to the education of a comparatively small group of functional delegates, necessary for administering central state tasks. With taking on ever new tasks in designing social order, the need for such central state delegates expanded, and so did state efforts towards education (Hroch 2005). As Hroch (2005: 77) argues, major motif in this was socialisation towards loyalty to the regime. In the logic of a gradual extension of the social regime basis (from a few patrimonial relations to the masses; most obvious in the gradual extension of legal citizenship status), more groups of the population were eligible for (or targeted by) public education. This was only consequential, as governing success increasingly depended on their loyalty. And until today, modern states still formulate the content of teaching at the schools they finance, 'democratic corrections notwithstanding' (Reinhard 1999: 466; cf. also Williams 1984: 139). The increased spending on education was also accompanied by financing, and promoting arts as prestige project, first of individual rulers, later to enlarge the high-cultural reputation of whole nations (Reinhard 1999: 400-3). Already during monarchy, the portrayal of the ruler was intended to increase legitimacy, by connecting to motives already established in folk culture, religion, art and history (Reinhard 1999: 95-99)⁷³. While the specific motives varied significantly, at the core they were intended to justify, and glorify personal rule. With depersonalisation of the position of the ruler, such symbols of superior power, like impressive architecture, or predator animals as national symbols, were applied to state institutions⁷⁴.

Violence in this policing dimension is directly present in its narrow understanding of repressing regime opposition and lower classes (exactly what leads Benjamin 1971: 189f to his principal critique of the police). But repression and surveillance found their beneficial aspects in public services for the majority of the population (Tilly 1990: 115f). This however required breaking up, and formalising societal relations, and connecting them to central state institutions. Thus, in the wider notion of policing, state interference to create a desired order is bound to meet the limits of "bureaucratic abstraction", which may lead to the use of state coercion, as already discussed in the dimensions above (with reference to Scott 1998). The specifics of what states engaged in, what constitutes a 'good' social order, are defined by an international discourse. These demands may also vary between different groups of states. While e.g. strong states are supposed to shine with excellent tertiary educational systems, and support for technological innovations, developing states' performance is evaluated based on health-, and nutrition-indicators. Besides the already mentioned per capita income (Chapter 3.3.5), another common standard regarding internal order is the adherence to hegemonic conceptions of human rights (Appadurai 2006: 65; Krippendorff 1985: 337⁷⁵). While Human Rights offer a basis to clearly denounce systematic violence backed or accepted by governments, they obvious-

73 Both the promotion of arts, and legitimisation along established (usu. religious) symbols were already utilised by rulers since antiquity (Müller 2011; Ohnacker 2011).

74 Krippendorff (1985: 34) calls this 'secularised symbolism of religious origin with military message'.

75 Krippendorff describes how already in 19th century, European states were singling out Russia to criticise internal repression. The articulators of such criticisms were doing the same, but inside the framework of the rule of law (another case in point for Reinhard's 1999: 370, 467-79 point that legalisation of police action is easily achievable (also) in legalistic rule).

ly lack binding implementation and sanction mechanisms. At the same time external interventions offer a notoriously violent track-record, also when labelled humanitarian, and not least due to principal, conceptual problems (Hippler 2011).

3.4. Summary: Institutional logics of the modern state

This chapter conceptualised the state based on its protracted history and ongoing development. Compared to the diversity of its predecessor polities, the distinct feature of *modern* state domination is its enforced claim as prime regulator of societal affairs in a specified territory. While no state is a monolithic block, modern states can be discussed as one phenomenon, as they have a common history, a common task, and collectively create one environment, effectively deciding on which organisations are to be considered states. The necessary criterion for statehood in this hegemonic practice can be found in a specific institutional setup, which I outlined along five dimensions. While these are inherent to modern statehood due to its claim as prime regulator of societal affairs, they constitute a temporary list only (although the retrospective on several centuries of state-formation suggests no *massive* alterations). For example the ability to wage war, or at least to prevail against foreign aggression, had been a prominent feature to define a state (Krippendorff 1985: 274f), but was dropped after decolonisation in favour of an unqualified right to independence (Herz 1968; Jackson 1990; Reinhard 1999: 353f). Similarly, one might speculate that the latter will be abandoned and replaced by the requirement to safeguard human rights, e.g. in form of a binding commitment to the 'responsibility to protect' (Kössler 2008: 39). To be considered as state in contemporary IR the central monopoly on military draft, and taxation, bureaucratic organisation of social regulation, promotion of the formal economy, and keeping internal order are the dimensions of state activity demanded by 'the international community'.

Based on these five dimensions, the institutional setup of a modern central state in a more narrow sense as organisational structure can be deduced. Parliaments result from conflicts over central taxation and conscription, which in the process of establishing direct rule brought the central rulers in direct interaction with the common population (first limited to men). The government, now headed by a de-personalised ruler, is composed of several ministers, and central state agencies, mirroring the functional differentiation of the central administration, as it took over evermore tasks to 'order its society'. These ministers serve as political figureheads of otherwise widely de-personalised bureaucracies. High courts finally indicate that keeping the internal order still requires arbitration, and not solely legislation. Everyday jurisdiction however still remains on the communal level - albeit using central legislation to reach verdicts.

The foregoing already implies that the distinction along five dimensions is bound to meet its limits when analysing specific policies⁷⁶. For example, monetisation

⁷⁶ Further, it is perfectly conceivable that the delineation of the dimensions changes in future, too. To explain along the example already mentioned, the dimension of state activity here called "monopoly of military draft" was only part of the larger task of sustaining a large-enough war machine for self-defence, less than a century ago. And similarly what is now called "keeping the internal order" may in decades to come be more appropriately be subsumed under a wider category of safeguarding the population from violation of human rights.

is both economic intervention, and basis for modern taxation. Central taxation, and the establishment of "fiduciary money" were both massively boosted by wars, fought with centrally recruited armies (Giddens 1985: 156). And such war-induced tax increases were usually sustained after war, and utilised for civil interventions, e.g. Keynesian policies in USA post-WW2 (Giddens 1985: 243). And finally, all these state activities required expanding bureaucracies – reaching the point where bureaucratisation and legalisation of all human existence is observable (Reinhard 1999: 466). And contrary to advocates of state demise, this trend is not decreasing, and state administrations are by now omnipresent in societal life, and I find no indication that this will change in the foreseeable future.

Concerning the violence in modern rule, the discussion repeatedly focussed on the implications of legal-rational or bureaucratic procedures of direct rule. In the course of replacing intermediaries, and moving to direct rule, states built up immense bureaucratic apparatuses to handle their ever expanding set of tasks. As has been argued along excessively violent totalitarian regimes, these also depended on bureaucracies in pursuing mass murder. At the same time they did not limit themselves to them, but created parallel, usu. party organisations to strengthen their implementation capacities. It has been followed that, while only bureaucratic organisation provides the means for large scale social engineering, their inherent agency is problematic when pursuing agendas, considered inappropriate. Thus, totalitarian regimes erode the central claim of a unitary, monopolist central organisation, and it would be incorrect to attribute their excessive violence *solely* to the institutional design of any strong, modern state. However, the internal logics of bureaucracies can cause violence, especially as they are backed by violent means. Bureaucracies follow formal procedures, deducted from centralist logic, detached from social affairs. They are thus prone to disregard facts 'on the ground', and might intensify implementation efforts when meeting resistance⁷⁷. This violent potential is likely to manifest when considering that the basic agendas of modern states consist of restructuring the economy, and pressing a legible, standardised order onto society (Scott 1998) – claims considered legitimate only for the prime regulator of social affairs (Migdal & Schlichte 2005). Additionally, it has to be stressed that the limitations to bureaucratic mass violence have been found in norms and values of the individual bureaucrat, and the institutional culture of 'the bureau' (which for mid-20th century Europe can be considered that of an established bourgeois background). Especially longer terms of totalitarian rule could socialise bureaucrats to more loyally follow inhumane orders⁷⁸.

The narrative of modern state-building can indeed be begun as one of war, the military being a forerunner not only for bureaucratic professionalism, but also (and in extension) legal equality (Mann 1993 426–428). With the whole nation becoming a potential recruitment pool, governments developed a genuine interest in birth rates and the general health status of populations (Foucault 1990: 139-41). In exchange, universal (male) suffrage was established (Leonhard &

77 Scott (1998: 4f, 101f) suggests that authoritarian rule is more prone to the pitfalls of bureaucratic rule, due to their lacking participatory- and feedback-mechanisms.

78 This aspect also leads to other contexts in which 'smooth' implementation of violence can be expected. For one, regimes may recruit mainly from specific social backgrounds, a strategy used by authoritarian regimes to man armed forces used for internal repression. But also where chauvinism is wide-spread, bureaucracies are likely to show little regard for discriminated groups.

Hirschhausen 2009: 79-84); parliamentary mass-representation being further aided by direct taxation (Mann 1993: 381), as yet another result of excessive warfare (Tilly 1990). But central rulers relied not solely on military service to 'educate the nation' (Krippendorff 1985: 313). Instead they extended education efforts from bureaucrats to the general population, with the continuous goal of socialising loyal subjects (Hroch 2005). Achieving all this without 'traditional' intermediaries requires bureaucracies. These are successively expanding in their exercise of social engineering, i.a. formalising relationships and settlement patterns, restructuring the economy and people's livelihoods according to market standards, or expropriating land, labour, and produce through direct, 'non-market' coercion (Scott 1998). All this amounts up to a bureaucratic control regime, granting public goods to those who comply with formalisation of their identity (Bevir 2011: 84f; based on Foucault). For those who resist modernisation of society, internal armed forces are in place, specialised to keeping them in line.

The development in the five core functions of states had its benefits for rulers who for the first time in history found it possible to *directly* benefit from the collective resources of the mass of the population. Tilly (1990: 107) names additional advantages, such as mass identification with the rulers, efficient communication, administrative universalism, and unification against external enemies. But the development had its price, too. For one, this is found in the power struggles between central and local power holders that shaped European history in the 17th and 18th centuries (Reinhard 1999: Chapter III; Tilly 1990: 75f). 'The absolutist state put an end to the civil war, by remaining the only organisation deciding upon life and death of its population' (Schulze 1994: 82f). But now states have to govern the population centrally, which presents another major dilemma. In the words of Tilly (1990: 83): "Although a call to defend the fatherland stimulated extraordinary support for the efforts of war, reliance on mass conscription, confiscatory taxation, and conversion of production to the ends of war made any state vulnerable to popular resistance, and answerable to popular demands, as never before" (Tilly 1990: 83, also 103). Ensuring absence of armed groups other than state-sanctioned ones, exploring and monitoring schemes to make masses fund the central state, prescription of settlement patterns, pressing the diversity of human relations into bureaucracy-legible forms, mass-education, developing the formal economic exchange of the whole population, and policing as safeguarding order beyond regime survival; all this means deep interventions into societies (Giddens 1985: 41-49). To succeed at such tasks, states need routine compliance of the groups it seeks to regulate. And beyond direct violence, which is a very crude mechanism to ensure this, more sophisticated strategies were created; *nationalism* being the hegemonic solution (Hobsbawm 2000: 80-85; Mann 1993: 484; Migdal 2001: 255-62).

3.5. Implementing modernising rule: Proto-nationalism

The five core dimensions of state activity this chapter suggests, shape the state-governed society. This is especially prominent in the "policing" dimension. In the narrow sense it implies surveillance and active, partially preventive suppression of groups expected to show deviant behaviour. In a wider notion it terms the active forming of society. Cultural and educational policies directly aim at establishing a new common identity in the interest of the rulers. And law

serves as supreme codification of behaviour, at least in the sense of enumerating unacceptable forms and the sanctions they carry. The category of *criminal* is the result of the narrow understanding of policing, perceived as threatening to the regime, while the wider notion resulted in a variety of terms for behaviour deemed not normal (immoral, sick, crazy; cf. Bevir 2011: 84; Giddens 1985: 195-97; both based on Foucault). Directed influence on social behaviour via incentive and negative sanction is also visible in other dimensions of state activity. Fiscal and economic regulations frame the chances of livelihood under state domination. The unification of markets "by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, and legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transport and communication", also challenged older, usu. local identities (Tilly 1990: 100; often to the point of creating active resistance). And the desire to be able to 'read' society directly and increasingly influenced the very basic social conditions of how humans settle. Also cultural politics, in the very narrow sense of state symbols of superior power, made its mark in people's minds; the monarch as representative of the whole *patria* can be seen as precursory form of nationalism (Krippendorff 1985: 234f). Finally, centralisation of the military brought significant part of the population into direct contact with the central state; military service being regarded as 'educator of the nation' (Krippendorff 1985: 313, 334). Through this massive presence "[p]eople could not return to their normal historical practice of ignoring the state" (Mann 1993: 479).

Well before these societal transformations had been channelled into fully-fledged nationalism, states engaged in punctuated manipulation of social identities of their subjects. Following Hobsbawm (2000) and Mann (1993: 730), I call these "protonational" identifications". These served as prototypes for latter state designs of group identification, which I will discuss in the next chapter. Generally, I will label polities which pursue such an agenda as mass-political orders. This refers to the situation that the population is politicised to the degree that governments must constantly consider popular reaction to their policies in order to effectively "'govern' in the modern sense" (Giddens 1985: 4). Regard for popular opinion in itself is not a modern rationale, as rulers always had to devote some consideration to how the general public felt about them, and to integrate powerful groups (who might otherwise challenge the current regime). What is modern in this, is the unprecedented extent to which public sentiment affects state politics, and that the part deemed important for effective domination successively expanded, ultimately comprising most (sometimes almost all) of the population. To be sure, acknowledging the interest of significant groups of the population does not necessarily mean that rulers care about actual concerns of 'their' people. But at least they have to manipulate public opinion, or interest, such that the ruled perceive their interests to be taken into account. But then one question gains political significance. Who is (considered to be part of) the political mass? Whose support must elites seek? The answer to this is found in the concept of the nation. This will be discussed in the following, final chapter, before concluding. The emergence of the mass in state politics also leads to other changes in mode of rule, usually labelled as democratisation. Its institutional effects on modern state domination will be discussed at the end of the following chapter.

4. Nationalism

Further following Migdal's (2001: 255-62) recommended approach, I will blend my institutionalist perspective on the state with a "culturalist" one – on the nation. Moving beyond the analysis of institutions of the foregoing chapter, this chapter will focus on the way that statehood is socialised into people's minds; more specifically how it shapes their social identities. To this end, I will first outline what can be understood as a nation, paying special attention to the way national identity is (re-)created. This will only be done here in a very abstract manner; the elimination of all kinds of likely and unlikely candidates for valid, definite features of a nation has already been done several times in the relevant literature (Gellner 1983: 1-7; Hobsbawm 2000: 5-10; 54-78; Hroch 2005; Chapter I.1; Francis 1965: Chapter II; Renan 1992: I; Smith 1991: Chapter 1). Secondly I will investigate nationalism, as the political agenda to create a nation. I will do so along the well researched history of European nationalisms. Finally, I will discuss how democratisation relates to the institutional practices of the nation-state.

4.1. "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?"

"What is a Nation?" Already in 1882 this question scientifically was reflected upon by Ernest Renan in a lecture thus titled (translated 1992 edition at hand). While providing a still instructive rejection of treating social groups a primordial givens, his principal conviction that a nation is continuously re-created in a "daily plebiscite" (id: III) has to be refuted. As Hobsbawm (2000: 8) points out, subjective categories of a feeling to belong does not suffice to be member of a nation (cf. also Gellner 1983: 56f). But neither do objective criteria like language, customs, or a historic polity sufficiently define a nation. These fail to clearly distinguish nationality from identifications on a similar scale, such as ethnicity, religion, or class (cf. Barth 1970: 28-34; Hobsbawm 2000: 8). Nations can only be apprehended in a very abstract manner, as groups of identification *and* ascription. Nevertheless, one specific characteristic of the nation can be named; each nation is related to a state (existing, or desired; Gellner 1983: 4; Hobsbawm 2000: 9f). But this criterion is only applicable in retrospect; to make an identity a national one, at least a pro-state movement has to exist (Gellner 1983: 62; Hobsbawm: id; on definitions cf. also Hroch 2005: 20, 61-66; and Smith 1991:14). Thus it is impossible to specify what cultural traits any group has to boast to be considered a nation. What the nation lacks in specificity, *nationalism* has in abundance. The scholar of nationalism can draw on a clearly traceable history, as nationalism is dependent on communicative elements, which may be written down⁷⁹. This is why Hobsbawm (2000: 5-9) follows Gellner's (1983: 1) detour to study the nation after studying nationalism, defined as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". I will approach the topic in the more conventional way, first discussing the object, then how it became a fundamental category in social life.

⁷⁹ The lack of any other objective criteria to define a nation led Torpey (2000: 1) to the amused statement that a legal document is the only way of knowing someone's nationality.

Nations are “imagined communities” as they are too large for any member to know all co-members (Anderson 1991 [1983]). This implies that their 'real' (mainly cultural) characteristics are unknown, even to its acclaimed members. Hence they can be easily manipulated or even created. This is not to say that nations are *arbitrary* inventions (Gellner 1983: 56f). To be accepted as socially relevant, the boundary of these groups must find its equivalent in societal reality. But in extreme cases this 'real correlate' of the imagined community might be largely a result of nothing else than the delimitation of the group (as Scott 2009: 259-65 argues in "a radical constructivist case" for ethnogenesis of 'tribes' in interaction with pre-modern South-East Asian states). The 'others' might have had little in common before the social boundary was set in place. But the ascription of the excluded groups mould their behavioural patterns during interaction with hegemonic groups, and - if such interaction is frequent and lasting - their overall identification⁸⁰. The complementary, internal dynamics of group construction are analysed by Barth (1970), in a more general discussion of ethnic groups, which he conceived nations to be a sub-type of. Any group of identification and ascription is necessarily exclusive (id: 15). Their very existence depends on the maintenance of a boundary towards other groups on the same level; a differences between members and non-members which is perceived as being socially relevant (id). Ethnic boundaries are maintained through logics of appropriate behaviour and social sanctions. All groups constantly bargain over the rules which apply to intra-group relations. Barth's concept has deeply constructivist implications. Everyone who claims specific characteristics of one's social group (or of others) is trying to establish these⁸¹. Whether this claim is successful however, depends on the power of the actor. The ones in control of an established ruling apparatus find themselves in a position especially favourable to their ascriptions being followed. Simultaneously they reconfigure criteria of who belongs to the group – which identity a person has to express to be considered as member, and consequently who may be part of, or must be excluded from the group. For nations, as groups related to a state, these criteria are usually (if the related state is an existing one) codified in legal documents, and membership is framed as citizenship. Such formal codifications however are accompanied by a true complex of informal, cultural elements⁸².

As the 'real' characteristic of all such macro groups - their culture - is never completely known by any individual, it is object of continuous political struggle (Migdal 2001: 14f, 259f; Hobsbawm 2000: 10, 93). So another central feature of nations (as *modern* mass-groups) is that they only are thinkable when means of mass-communication exist (also Anderson 1991: 37-45; Hroch 2005: 64-66; and Gellner 1983: 7, 74f). Finally, and in extension of state monopolist claims, nations are distinct from other collective identifications in being the *primary* source of identification of the affected groups (Anderson 1991: 12; Hobsbawm 2000: 85; Migdal 2001: 114). Thus they seek to replace other sources of (mac-

80 This seems to be more true for outcast groups created from negative ascription, such as 'Gypsies', 'Negroes', or (American) 'Indians' than for groups which were from the start actively outlined by members, such as Arabs, Germans, or Han-Chinese. Group-members' latter endorsement of originally devaluing names may then be seen as attempt to regain agency in group construction.

81 This is only true if and where identity politics is based on conscious agency. In contrast, Waldron (1985: 428-30) suggests that group construction might just be a side-effect of politicians' attempts of “finding something to rule”.

82 This is most clearly visible for migrants (or even their children and grandchildren) who might be discriminated against as 'foreigners', due to i.a. their names or skin complexions, and despite their legal status as equal citizens.

ro-sociological) identification. Summarising, a nation is a group of *macro-political identification and ascription*; where "macro-" means beyond face-to-face level (or "imagined community"). It is political, because identification with this group includes subscription to an (albeit changing) set of collectively binding norms (Hobsbawm 2000: 18f). And finally, national membership is determined by a duality of subjective identification and 'objective' ascription (cf. esp. Barth 1970).

4.2. Nationalism: Citizen ideology and government co-optation

As already depicted during its discussion in Chapter 3, modern states did massively widen and deepen their regulatory agendas, when becoming modern (Hobsbawm 2000: 80-85; Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Migdal 2001: 125f; Reinhard 1999: 406f; Scott 1998:51f; Tilly 1990: 103). The common population, before largely irrelevant to central rulers, found itself targeted by the aspired in-depth regulation of societal affairs. Out of the perceived need for mass-compliance, a new way of conceiving the population was born: the nation. Since then, nationalism is the hegemonic way for facilitating compliance in mass-populations – strong, modern states are necessarily nations (Hobsbawm 2000: 80-85; Mann 1993:479-505; Reinhard 1999: 406). Nationalism then can either refer to the nationalising of an existing state population or the creation of a new state for a national group.

4.2.1. "The government perspective"

"In one of their more self-conscious attempts to engineer state power, rulers frequently sought to homogenize their populations in the course of installing direct rule. From a ruler's point of view, a linguistically, religiously, and ideologically homogenous population [...] made a policy of divide and rule more costly [...]. But homogenization had many compensatory advantages", specifically identification with the rulers, efficient communication, administrative universalism, and unification against *external* enemies" (Tilly 1990: 106f).

The first modern nation was born in the French revolution (Renan 1992: I; Schulze 1994: 107, 168), and its spread to other European states was facilitated by the Napoleonic wars. These impressively showed the effect of nationalism, as an unprecedented mobilisation of recruits and resources was achieved (Leonhard& Hirschhausen 2009: 12; Torpey 2002). In fact, "[w]ar itself became a homogenizing experience, as soldiers and sailors represented the entire nation and the civilian population endured common privations and responsibilities" (Tilly 1990: 116). Since then nationalism remained *the* mobilisation tool in conflicts, external (Carr 1968) and internal (Waldron 1985; Snyder 2000). However, as the initial quote of Tilly states, this advantage of direct rule presupposed social engineering. This sub-chapter summarises the rationales of modern(ising) state administrations when attempting to create a national culture; in Hobsbawm's (2000: Chapter 3) words "the government perspective" of nationalism.

As already pointed out, the main argument here concerns mass-compliance. In the move to direct and more intense rule "states required a civic religion ('patriotism') [...] because they required more than passivity from their citizens" ((Hobsbawm 2000: 80-85; also Gellner 1983: 56f). At the same time, older insti-

tutions and loyalties were pressured to the point of collapse by modernisation (Hobsbawm 2000: 46; Waldron 1985: 416). Easier than gaining local knowledge on the various codes of normal conduct inside a population and translating policies in a 'culturally sensitive' fashion, states can simply use their violence-backed power to enforce their interest for routine compliance by their subject population. This is what I call standardising the populace and it must involve an agenda of homogenising the (majority) population over which rule should be exerted, while minorities might be targeted by different policies. They might even be actively encouraged to be 'different'. Contrary to homogenisation, standardisation of the people refers to the process that states press different roles on specified groups of the population, be it the one of full members, '2nd class citizens', outcasts, enemies or even targets of expulsion or genocide. To be sure, today's modern states usually do not formalise such unequal treatment of citizens anymore, but might still rely on informal discrimination. Nevertheless, non-citizens often endure unequal legal treatment, up to violations of even their *human rights* (Depelchin 2008).

Rulers promote their interpretation of the national culture. The display of national symbols, narratives, public holidays, etc. (Anderson 1991) make the nation lived experience, embedding all cultural experience of the state in an overarching framework of one common, national culture (Migdal 2001; cf. Schulze 1994: 172; Tilly 1990: 115f). The specific symbols and narratives are aimed to "naturalize the regency and the contingency of the nation-state through providing its myths of origin" (Giddens 1985: 221; similarly Smith 1991: 9-11). And it seems that modernisation leaves the populace in a receptive state for such endeavours. Analogous to Foucault, Giddens (1985: 195-97; also Bevir 2011: 84) argues that the 'outsourcing' of emotional investment in our daily relations (through the banning of sexuality, death, illness, madness, etc. in isolated facilities), which is a necessary pre-condition for a life dominated by routine, "engender[s] a psychological basis for affiliation to symbols". Nationalism can exploit this created disposition (id: 218f).

And here it becomes clear why, from a top-down perspective, the nation needs to become *primary* identification of the people. As Migdal (2001: 114) puts it "state leaders want the state to matter most, enough to die for". Rulers promote these via the time-proven, bureaucratic way of social engineering, as abstract visions, based on general rules, mediated through several layers of hierarchical organisation (Gellner 1983: 57). Thus, these plans are usually incompatible with the immediate, dynamic, subjective lives they are affecting. For example Ther (2011: 14-16; 50-53) raises awareness to the role the bureaucratic tool of 'unambiguous statistics' played in determining a person's belonging, and all or her descendants, to a predefined identity group (similarly Anderson 1991: 168f; Giddens 1985: 309f). But as the organisation pursuing these plans has access to the monopolised means of violence, society is usually forced to adapt to unreality, instead of the plans aligning to reality. Concisely put, from a ruler's perspective, nationalism enables the ambitious task of direct rule over a mass-society; to cope with the dual challenge of ruling deeper, and wider than attempted before (Hobsbawm 2000: 80-85). The devotion that ever more resourceful state organisations invested in creating national identities, provide a necessary part of explaining the global result, a world structured by national identity groups. But they cannot preclude a less state centric analysis of why

nations could be set into existence. This is ultimately an investigation of single cases, which however will not be undertaken here. In the style of the foregoing, general patterns of regime strategies will be analysed here.

4.2.2. Citizen ideology

Following Hroch's (2005: 41-48) typology, nationalism spreads gradually in a population. Starting as "purely cultural", non-political expressions, nationalism is carried to the public via political "pioneers" (usually writers and other artists), to become finally a mass phenomenon (also Hobsbawm 2000: 12). In 19th century Europe, which Hroch's (and Hobsbawm's) analysis is based on, the first stage would then be grounded in the (petite) bourgeoisie culture of Romanticism. In the literature, I found two interpretations on how specifically Romanticism affected the political mass-identities in of the time – and as path-dependent extension, nationalistic ideals generally. One is given by Carr (1968: 8), who conceives this as ideational basis for the consequential departure from earlier, liberal and enlightened constitutionalism. The other, much less negative framing of Romanticism, is provided by Schulze (1994: 178), referring to a romanticist zeitgeist as one motivation to create nationalist history particularly, in the context of a dissolving traditional order. Whatever position one takes, at least parts of the population thus took part in developing and promoting the idea, also enhancing their role in the state to being more than just 'the random mass' under its control (Gellner 1983: 62f; Giddens 1985: 210; Hobsbawm 2000: 43; Leonhard & Hirschhausen 2009: 11f; Schulze 1994: 209). These groups striving for the nation were especially emerging urban ones (Mann 1993: 484, 504). Around 1800, the determining cleavage in European societies ran between the *Ancient Régime* (including the already co-opted grand bourgeoisie), and the petite bourgeoisie (Krippendorff 1985: 363-65; Mann 1993:247-52; Tilly 1990: 100). Their marginal, but existential incorporation into the systems of political representation and advancing (pre-industrial) high-capitalism left this group with a sense of precariousness, and at the same time with some political power to do something about it. Resulting demands of political emancipation challenged the political regimes of the day. Additionally, shared enlightened values, and above all an alignment to scientific education, made the advancing urban classes useful recruitment pools for expanding bureaucracies (Hobsbawm 2000: 117-122). According to Zinn (1989), the specifics of that bourgeois education have inhumane implications. While sharing Elias' interpretation of suppression of emotions through longer societal interaction chains, Zinn (1989: 246) does not see this as violence-reducing. On the contrary, the instrumental reasoning applied, only distances humans from one another. This for one motivates people to comply with the hegemonic reason of state (cf. also Krippendorff 1985). In Foucault's words: "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity" (Foucault 1990: 137). But it also provides a foundation later utilised by capitalism in the creation of an anonymous labour force, structured by incentives of national labour markets.

This solution included an expansion of citizen status to large classes, previously marginal for societal domination (Gellner 1983: 55-57). This gradual extension was mirrored on the level of representative participation. As elaborated before, this was a concession by rulers granted under pressure from the subjects, on

whose mobilisation their governing success depended ever more. Also, the political movements which emerged in the petite bourgeoisie were often designed to co-opt the potentially revolutionary groups (Mann 1993: 247-52). But at the same time, the ruled ceased to seek ways out of statist domination; they yielded in turn for some participation in the overwhelming powers of the modern state. Using Mann's (1993: 252) image "the cage tightened. As it did [... t]he inmates cared more about conditions within their cages than about the cages themselves" (cf. also Torpey 2000: 11f who uses the German word "*erfassen*" to grasp the dual nature of state activities, installing administrative management of people and fostering their emotional investment in the apparatus). As before, representation of non-ruling groups basically took two forms. Either central power was to be restricted by federal setups, or by permanent, effective participatory representative structures on the very central state level (Mann 1993: 252). But there is also path-dependency involved in which of these options was utilised. Federalism mainly suggested itself to those countries in which the landed nobility was major bargaining partner of the central level (cf. Spruyt 1996). Thus, bourgeoisie (read urban) representation usually favoured centralisation, as it effectively can be utilised to suppress gentry (read rural) privilege (id).

4.2.3. Starting below, co-opted into a ruling force

Rulers manipulated the petit bourgeoisie's ideals of a national group. In doing so, they followed the time-tested strategy of successive enlargement of the political group (the nation in the older sense; Gellner 1983: 55; Hroch 2005: 43f) – although not on equal terms. The urban, lower middle classes were co-opted instead of emancipated. This might be due to the perception of being carriers of Jacobin revolutionary ideology. However in turn, they seemingly overcame their feelings of insecurity and, instead of destabilising, embraced the high aristocracy's claim to rule – now actually their claim of being prime representatives of the nation (Carr 1968: 8). While the nation makes all the processes of developing a relationship of direct rule over a population much easier from a ruler's perspective, the specifics of a national culture were often *created* by the very group which later was co-opted by (a modified version of) it; the petite bourgeoisie. Nations seemed to have only *lasted* however, when vaulted by an effective political organisation. This usually is the political structure of the state⁸³ (Gellner 1983: 63f).

In a remarkably similar process workers were later co-opted by a programme to create an expanded nation. As a numerous class of urban labour, ideologically undomesticated due to the collapse of rural orders (which dominated their origins), aiming for re-distribution of productive power, in an explicitly *international* framework – the workers presented *the* revolutionary threat to the 'ruling-as-usual' (of a high aristocracy cum grand bourgeoisie which was nationally organised, yet trans-European in origin and method). After incorporation of the grand-, and co-optation of the petite bourgeoisie, nationalism found the urban workers to address. With national welfare, and nationalist propaganda, the workers were captured, as were the comparatively small class of petty bourgeoisie before

⁸³ It may also be organisations not in full possession of acknowledged statehood, as Palestinian nationalism (promoted by the quasi-governmental Palestinian authorities), or the Sub-Yugoslavian identities (by sub-state governments) indicate.

them (Hobsbawm 1983). As Mann (1993: 624-83) further analyses for the later 19th century, regimes rather successfully divided and ruled the masses by manipulating the class struggle to co-opt skilled labour versus "semiskilled and unskilled workers" (id: 682), leading to vigorous anti-socialist sentiment (esp. in Germany and Austria; id: 587). In effect, this gradual extension of citizenship over centuries led to a politically empowered mass-population (Schulze 1994: 168). Both Giddens (1985: 195-97) embrace of Foucault's argument that modern outsourcing of emotional investment favours the dominance of 'empty', national symbolism, and the critique of instrumental thinking (Zinn 1989: 246) explicate that Nationalism is perfectly equipped to substitute human mental needs in modernising societies (Anderson 1991; and Gellner 1983 take a similar perspective, although not as critical). Thus a market society in which most people mainly need to function in the labour market, and are otherwise detached from their agency in the making of society, can emerge (Gellner 1983: Chapter 5).

The spread of nationalism, from an ideology of precarious middle classes to a truly global identity construction pattern could have only happened with the willing support of the ruling classes of the day – reactionary governments in fear of the social question posed by the spread of capitalism. Not matter if depicted as Jacobinism or Bolshevism, the cure for revolutionary aspirations was sought and found in the 'substitute revolution' of nationalism (Hobsbawm 2000: Chapter 5). At the very latest in form of the 'Wilsonian' order of Europe after the First World War, the 'nationalisation of world politics' (Carr 1968; Hobsbawm 2000) became hegemonic. With its massive mobilisation capacity, the nation became too attractive to be disregarded by any regime. But the ambiguous notion of self-determination of the people promoted intra-state wars exactly under this label (Carr 1968: 24; Wildt 2006). This trend is further exacerbated by rationales stemming from international relations (IR), constituted by the states who successfully established themselves as nation-states. As a system, IR provides membership mainly for states, thus promoting the multiplying of states (Jackson 1990; Waldron 185: 429), while retaining little advantages for the merger into new big states. Consequently, new nations are created by splitting former 'multinational' states, instead of representing assimilatory projects of unification. And wars are fought to (re-)create such nations, instead of subjugating 'foreign' populations – as the latter would probably mean exhaustive resistance by the affected societies (Herz 1968: 13-24; Kaysen 1990: 53-58; van Creveld 1999: 344-54). And even processes of market unification – most prominently visible in the European Union – have to continuously accommodate nationalism to ensure their existence. So promising is the prospect of ruling an own state (Waldron 1985) that even history-proofed states like Spain, Great Britain, or Belgium might separate. It is presumably a function of vested material interest that this separatism does not manifest violently.

When- and wherever regimes fail to manifest a nationalist agenda, competing elites might establish themselves with nationalist claims (Snyder 2000; Waldron 1985: 433). Already the revolutions of USA 1776, France 1789, and Russia 1917 can be interpreted as a failure to co-opt the emerging bourgeoisie with a strategy of pro-regime nationalism (Mann 1993: 15f). In most empirical cases however, nationalism provided a successful strategy to conserve legitimacy *in spite* of the appearance of 'the masses' in the political arena (id; also Snyder 2000; and Williams 1984: 123; while Hobsbawm 2000: 92 is somewhat contra-

dictory on the matter). And often the masses seem to be satisfied with merely the perception of their interests being regarded in politics.

Thus, to me there is little ground to suggest two principally distinct types of nationalism – benign, inclusive patriotism and war-mongering, ethnic separatism – as is often done (Carr 1968; Hobsbawm 2000: 18f; Mann 2005: 61; Ther 2011: 50; Tilly 1990: 116; Wildt 2006: 96). State-prescribed nationalism is always prone to create conflict, as it seeks to top-down standardise diverse livelihoods. Historically, the establishment of hegemonic codifications of language, religion, and history brought centralist policies into the daily interactions of a previously 'uncaptured peasantry'⁸⁴. The pressure to learn a 'high language' or to teach it to one's children is just a benign beginning of this (as one can speak more than one language, which usually is even considered as emancipating). To interfere with a population's religion, rites and habits (e.g. dietary, drug use, cropping patterns) is more so intrusive. To regulate where and how to settle, what kind of jobs to be allowed to take (if any) and how to organise one's family (marriage, reproduction) can easily lead to violent implementation by the monopolist of the means of violence.

4.3. Violence and the national “monoculture”

Coming to the violent potential of nationalism, the preceding theoretical arguments point to the logic of a vicious circle. The more successful a state in enforcing its demands, the more resources it has. These can be utilised to further streamline compliance, but will also increase the need for more resources. Any resulting resistance meets the state's iron fist, as any regime's acclaimed regulatory monopoly includes legitimacy to suppress alternative concepts of order – which now includes culture; a true "monoculture" (Scott 2009: 75). The usual justification to use force, a however vague, latent threat perceived to antagonise the state, could easily be re-interpreted as threat to the nation's continued existence. The standardisation of the populace is bound to be deeply conflictual. Following the bureaucratic episteme, social ordering efforts are based on an image of the state as planning organisation for society – an approach Scott (1998: 4f) finds to easily lead to repression. Also Tilly (1990: 100f) argues that top-down standardisation of populations created resistance. This is unsurprising, given the severe political implications, as now only co-nationals legitimately have some say in politics. As nations are exclusive groups, nationalism as the very process of group construction, is now mainly concerned with defining distinct traits of nation-members, and consequently in- and out-grouping.

But the question on who belongs is never answered. Not only cultural change through migration suggests that. Any culture is dynamic and will constantly evolve, its values are constantly re-negotiated, and thus any related conflicts will always be at least latent. Besides categorically excluding the voices of some of the population, as these are deemed 'foreigners', nationalism is easily used to justify violence as legitimate when in the interest of the nation (Snyder 2000; cf. Niemann 2007: 36 for a concurrent interpretation of contemporary violence in Central Africa). Renan (1992: I) famously inferred that “[f]orgetting, I would even

⁸⁴ Borrowing the term from Hyden (1980), who thus framed whom he conceived as main obstacle to post-colonialist African modernisation.

say historical error, is an essential factor in the creation of a nation". National history then is an attempt to mask "the violent acts that have taken place at the origin of every political formation" (id.; also Appadurai 2006). What is worse, elites will use their hegemony to define what counts as violence in the first place (Münkler & Llanque 2002: 1217). But before I will draw further conclusions, the impact of democratic norms on the nation-state shall be outlined. Is nationalism tempered when almost all population is regarded as citizens, and being represented in political decision-making?

4.4. Democratisation as civilising contribution to the nation-state?

The emergence of the mass on the political scene did not only lead to attempts of manipulating its agency via nationalism. Also it was institutionally channelled, typically into majoritarian-representative institutions⁸⁵. The process is commonly and enthusiastically called democratisation. I will discuss it under the heading of "electoral regimes" (following Hobsbawm 2000: 83) to avoid the notoriously wide reaching implications of the term democracy. Democracy implies at least two more institutions beyond elections, the rule of law, and individual rights. These will also be briefly discussed after "electoral regimes". On the rule of law, a brief remark suffices to place it into the institutional rationales of modern statehood already discussed, esp. under the heading of bureaucratisation (Chapter 3.3.4). This will then lead to a concise reflection on the genesis and implications of individual political rights and liberties. A critique of the modern state would be incomplete without considering these aspects. A brief discussion of these vast topics shall suffice here, focussed on their effects on the institutional links to modern statehood and violence.

4.4.1. The political rationales of electoral regimes

The rise of the modern state also led to the institutionalisation of national representation in the form of a permanent and increasingly powerful assembly of delegates – a parliament (Mann 1993: 252). Its staffing was decided upon in public elections, with suffrage continuously expanding until including the huge majority of the population (Hobsbawm 2000: 83). This is only consistent with the move to *direct rule*. As historical accounts show, representative institutions have been critical already in pre-modern states to foster compliance with the groups rulers depended on (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Reinhard 1999; Tilly 1990: 99-103). As the modern state depends on mass-compliance, broad segments of the population were now integrated into this representation mechanism. Mass-democracy then has to be regarded a rather quantitative expansion of the citizen group, than a new quality of constitutional state. This perspective of historical continuity qualifies elevating rhetoric about the revolutionary achievement of democracy, typically employed in public holiday speeches. Consequently, 'real-existing democracies' have to be perceived as part of the history of domination. More often than not, democratisation was decreed – although under pressures from non-state groups, prime example being the bourgeoisie (Giddens 1985: 201-5; Mann 1993: 15f, 732; Reinhard 1999: 340f). These concessions to an

85 Parallel to constitutional provisions, regime elites additionally co-opted segments of the petite bourgeoisie in their segmental (usu. ethnic, or religious) parties, thus preventing it to emerge as unified, class-conscious actor (Mann 1993:247-52).

empowered mass have one major implication; the citizenship status becomes much more meaningful. Simply put, in electoral politics the problem of defining a populace becomes acute. Three very different authors point to the institutional logics, aggravated by the "electoralisation of politics".

First, Carl Schmitt (1996: 13-17) argued that to ensure political equality of the citizens, all real-existing democracies relied on the (if necessary violent) exclusion of some, perceived as politically different. Although this argument was eagerly integrated into fascist ideology, it fits a historically grounded perspective on what real-existing democracies did, at least until some time after WW2. Repeating arguments from the literature review, during the decades around 1900, democratic governments had no trouble enforcing severe human rights violations when deemed beneficial to their plans of political development. Mann (2005) has argued that exclusive settler democracies acted significantly more violent than their authoritarian equivalents against local populations⁸⁶. And the frequent mass-deportations in 20th century Europe since the Balkan Wars had commonly been welcomed by leading politicians of democracies as means to achieve the desired congruence of nation and state⁸⁷ (Carr 1968: 33f; Ther 2011: 51; Wildt 2006). To use one illustrative quote of Winston Churchill, who still in late 1944 found mass-expulsion a proper measure to deal with Germans in Poland (following appraisal of the by now infamous Treaty of Lausanne):

"A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by the prospect of the disentanglement of populations, nor even by these large transferences, which are more possible in modern conditions than they ever were before" (Churchill 1944)⁸⁸.

But these are not just instances of democratic politics, promoting ethnic violence because of some cultural sentiment *external* to democracy (like racism, or religious fundamentalism). Such 'resettlement schemes' represent a manifestation of the conflict over who constitutes the nation, which comes to full relevance only when nationality results in the right to active political participation. Schmitt (1923) names one way democratising Europe attempted to prepare the populace for democracy, 'pre-political' homogenisation.

Secondly, Carr (1968) finds another institutional logic of electoral politics which creates violence. For him more universal suffrage automatically means more policies aimed at direct material redistribution (id: 18). This results in distributional conflicts between the electorates of different nations for jobs, resources, access to markets, etc. (id: 19-21). The international class struggle transforms into wars between nation-states. Third, Snyder (2000) analyses that 'playing the national card' still presents *the* major strategy to stay on top of a pluralising ('electoralising'), formerly authoritarian regime. Politicians might try to capture new electorates by convincingly representing 'national interests' – which is done easiest by out-grouping minorities. In this line of argument, the mass media plays a decisive role in aggravating nationalist propaganda – in a worst case scenario to the scale of genocide (as he argues along the emblematic case of

86 This is in line with (Krippendorff 1985: 340f), describing Ireland as Britain's 'colonisation laboratory', the lessons of which were soon applied in colonial repression elsewhere.

87 These (euphemistically called) 'population transfers' were executed on the very blueprint of earlier colonial mass-deportations, as the cited authors show.

88 Notable in this is also the modernist spirit, the trust in superior bureaucratic capabilities, which only too inevitable led to the immense human suffering when such plans were implemented.

the Rwandan genocide; id: 296–300). Albeit throwing spotlights only, these three pointed arguments suggest that no moderation of the violent potential of modern states through universal suffrage is to be expected. But one has to qualify that the above arguments restricted first to the electoral dimension of democracy. Secondly, they also gain validity mainly in contexts of extending suffrage, or democratisation⁸⁹. When simply ignoring the question 'how to get there', one can indeed argue that citizens of established democracies suffer significantly less violence by the ruling order (as compared to despotism; Mann 1993: 59f), as it is institutionally ensured that they can at least choose between presented persons and programmes.

What is more, notions of the democratic state imply that the use and threat of violence is sanctioned for the state, too. But this implication of democracies, typically discussed as *state of law*, can also only raise limited expectations to violence-minimisation, as the discussion of rule-based conduct in state bureaucracies has already showed (Chapter 3.3.4). Now I cannot conceive how bureaucratic domination would principally change when the rules of routine behaviour are *very remotely* susceptible to popular demand, as the case in majoritarian-representative systems. Principally Schmitt (1996) was right: *legal* is merely what the state legislation decides, in line with a formal process, which is largely put in place by this very institution itself. However, i.a. as lesson from such cynical terminological conceptualisations, law is by now only considered legitimate only when acknowledging a catalogue of basic human rights. In order to assess the contribution such a state of law (*Grundrechtsstaat*) may make to the civilisation of statist conduct, the rationale behind the codification of human rights will be briefly outlined here.

4.4.2. Excursion: Human Rights

Additional to the concession of active participation, mirroring the growing influence of the mass of the population, the mass also became eligible for passive liberties – usually both are combined under the heading of individual political rights. According to Giddens (1985: 206), rights were granted as concessions to compensate for deeper intrusion of the state into societal (bourgeois) life. As the *Ancient Régime* at first only incorporated the grand bourgeoisie into their regime (in a wide notion of the term), property guarantees were codified before the protection of liberty (Carr 1968: 4; Mann 1993: 247-52; Tilly 1990: 100). In line with the continuous extension of suffrage, universal rights might then also be seen as gradually inflated rights of the (grand) bourgeoisie (Williams 1984: 126). Individual (political and liberal) rights can be considered part of the state's regulation monopoly insofar, as they create a basis for individual claims against all (other) organisations. The individual may be 'liberated' from all duties except from certain ones to the state⁹⁰. This however applies only to 'state-members', who are by now usually citizens (Carr 1968: 10; Noiriel 1994: 83) – subjects with certain privileges. After rights are no longer withheld from any specific group of a state's acknowledged population (as has been done before esp. with

⁸⁹ This is no principle contradiction to my argument, as I consider maintenance a constant re-utilisation of the rationales necessary for the formation of the order in the first place.

⁹⁰ In fact, individuals are by now eligible to enforce claims even against the state. They can do so however only to the degree they are permitted to by state law (or, in extension, international commitments state governments agreed to).

the poor, female, or non-whites; cf. Williams 1984: 126), worst off are those subjected to a state's control without being considered as citizens – in the hey-days of nationalist separation these were minorities, later political deviants, today it is refugees (Noiriel 1994: 83-86). Even if granted protection, they always depend on the voluntary benevolence of the state. As Depelchin (2008: 28) points out, it is common only in cases of such underprivileged people to speak about violations of *human* rights. The notion of equal 'rights' even seems paradoxical in earlier conceptions, when rights termed privileges, which per definition must be exclusionary (Reinhard 1999: 515). In the light of the foregoing, one can claim that modern rights are not that different, as they are *de facto* inevitably based on the state, and thus citizenship – which is unequal in global perspective. Again, focussing on continuity of domination patterns fundamentally questions the revolutionary meaning usually attributed to the codification of individual rights.

4.4.3. A sobering reflection on the civilising potential of democracy

Regarding the possibility to act violently against the population, democratisation did not serve as a safeguard. In an electoral polity, citizenship is more consequential than in autocracies. So the decision on who constitutes the people gains paramount political conflict potential - the nation developed from mere mobilisation tool in conflicts to the object of conflict itself. National legitimisation narratives might even frame the worst crimes against humanity as appropriate, or at least acceptable, to achieve the desired congruence of nation and state (Appadurai 2006; Renan 1992: I). Hence, states do not simply act violently because they do not confer to democratic standards. Both democracies and autocracies committed mass-atrocities⁹¹ (Mann 2005; Schwartz 2013; Ther 2011). And it is the common features of all modern states, democratic and undemocratic, which enable this violence⁹². As analysed in this sub-chapter electoral regimes, mass-representation, the state of law, and individual rights can all be read as mere continuation of previous, non-democratic domination rationales. Thus hopes for ending this violence, if only the world would become more democratic are misplaced. Under the auspices of the "self-determination of peoples", such democratisation inevitably presents incentives for armed conflicts – inter- and intra-state.

4.5. Conclusion to Nationalism: The institutional logics of the nation-state

Before the background of dissolving traditional relations, the political rationale of direct rule, along the economic ideal of an unbound labour force - in short the constitution of modern mass-societies - suggested a new type of ruling technique, nationalism. Under this label, policies aimed at creating a nation - a macro-political group of identification and ascription, the cultural characteristics of which are being constantly re-determined in political discourse. The shift towards electoral systems of mass-representation (democratisation) is a latter

91 Today modern democracies also subject 'terrorists' to torture, or extrajudicial killing by aerial strikes, and asylum seekers to drown or die from thirst at the margins of their territory.

92 Already before (Chapters 2.4, 2.5 and 3.1.1) I quoted the conviction that all domination is based on violence (Weber 1978: 54f; Baumann 2000: 30; Giddens 1985: 18-20; Kössler 2008: 36; and Popitz 1992: 63-65).

adjustment to this new technique of rule. In contrast to emancipatory notions of nationalism (and extending suffrage), empirically it seems to resemble an elite strategy to conserve legitimacy in spite of the appearance of masses in the political arena (Hobsbawm 2000: 92; Mann 1993: 15f; cf. also Snyder 2000). And often these masses seem to be satisfied with just the perception of their interests being pursued in politics. But the political importance of the mass did increase to the extent that ruling elites cannot disregard nationalist strategies. For otherwise 'counter-elites' would establish themselves with such claims (Mann 1993: 15f; Snyder 2000). The result of this process was so momentous that military defeats were subsequently seen as humiliation of whole peoples – by both sides winners and losers. Unlike usually portrayed, this process was not one of rulers reluctantly giving in to overwhelming societal demands. Rather, the ruling class was co-opting emerging social groups to stay on top of this development (Hobsbawm 2000: 92). However, there is another striking new feature to this development. Domination now built less on violent coercion. Instead, new ruling techniques aimed to mobilise the populace, to *voluntarily* do as the rulers please.

Why exactly did the *national* identification rise to such globally determining prominence? For one, governments promoted nationalism concomitant to their expansion. Given the rising power of states apparatuses, national symbolism, ideals, and narratives became ever more prominent in social reality, especially in the normative basis of society. The modern state developed capacities which brought its ascriptive power to such dominance that identification patterns of its populace were affected to an unprecedented extent. Additionally, as history would have it, the modern state's agenda widened massively with two main effects. First making subjects comply with ever more and ever deeper regulation and second and consequently more societal developments being considered as challenges to statist rule. But, as argued along Barth (1970), nations are always both ascription and subjective identification. And the overwhelming acceptance of the masses of the invented high-culture (often building on romantic perceptions of common folk culture) seemed to have only worked in the special context of massive social mobility, resulting from urban capitalism, and especially its latter form of industrialism⁹³. Nationalism filled a gap left by dissolving traditional relationships. As these traditional relations presumably have been perceived by the mass as unjust (Dal Lago 2005), alignment of the rural masses to the new high culture had a promising start. The modern episteme, as symbolically opposed to provincialism and traditional exploitation relations, presented an acceptable resort to the (non-bourgeois) mass. There must have been attraction to the idea of becoming part of that national group.

But the identities thus fostered were always of tenuous reality, lacking cultural content – a bureaucratic abstraction (Scott 1998: 91f). The lived experience of persistent everyday exploitation, and the hollow rituals of authority-conform enactment of state-prescribed, nationally constituted community, proved insufficient to constitute a cultural identity. The census is an illustrative example. Starting from a regime's initiative to unambiguously list features they are interested in, it follows a bureaucratic form, pressuring the questioned persons to

93 For example the mobile worker cannot be expected to refuse learning a new language out of sentiment to lose her cultural identity. Instead, in trying to overcome the precarious livelihood of her and her family, command of the lingua franca facilitates chances of finding employment (Hobsbawm 2000: 31-39).

narrow their complex livelihoods into categories they have no comprehension of. The abstract, little-substantiated nature of these top-down cultures of the nation also may lead to a partial understanding of the seemingly ubiquitous uncertainty regarding the individuals' cultural identity, which may be promoting the separatist movements in the West, i.a. Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, and Spain. Hence, standardisation of the populace is always prone to create conflict, as it has to permanently manipulate society's cultures; the ideal being a national monoculture (Scott 2009: 75). The task of achieving habitual compliance also requires constant efforts by the regimes. New challengers might rise, new ways of challenging emerge, or simply 'undirected' environmental changes force the rulers to adapt their apparatus.

The coincidence of structural destabilisation with nationalist propaganda explains why nationalism succeeded as integrative ideology in 19th century in the West⁹⁴. By the same token it provides a possible approach to understand why more recent attempts were less successful (cf. Reinhard 1999: 482-508). Weaker states have trouble establishing a significant presence in the daily lives of their population, and consequently fail at promoting *their* nationalism. Thus, while all states have to cope with nationalism, those unable to channel as supporting the existing state organization will meet challenges in the form of separatism.

However, at least in the West the nation became the dominant group identification, in spite of its lacking substance, as it was favoured by structural conditions. The implication of alleged national interests became *the* standard pattern for politicians globally to gain legitimacy. This is as valid in the national arena (Snyder 2000), as internationally (cf. Carr 1968; Waldron 1985). As the nation is a mass-political group specifiable mainly in its connection to a state (existing, or desired), this legitimacy pattern strengthens the domination of states. Meeting the already pronounced claims for regulative competence, as outlined in Chapter 3, this leads to a situation where nation-states are perceived as the outstanding organisation caring for the (nationally confined) common interest. This further adds to a sense of righteousness, even when committing violence in the name of the nation. Consequently, the potential violence in nation-state-creation is a permanent threat in all political orders thus constituted. On this basis, it seems questionable that a strong nation-state is a desirable political order. Both, the institutional order of the nation-state and the extend and culture of the national group require regular adaption to remain functional for powerful actors. In effect these processes can be seen as continuous, conflictual re-creations.

5. Conclusion and discussion

The point of departure in this critique of the modern nation-state has been the self-portrayal of modernity as aspiring non-violent interaction (esp. Imbusch 2005; Reemtsma 2004; 2008). Elias (1997 [1937]) elaborated on how exactly this should be facilitated. The monopolisation of the means of violence through the state promotes civil conflict behaviour. But a perspective on the modern

⁹⁴ After all, states have been engaging in cultural engineering before the 'age of nationalism', as Scott (2009); Zolberg (1983), and Zinn (1989) suggest. But they did so with significantly less success.

state, grounded in its institutional history, must come to a very different conclusion. The state is a ruling institution, and as such has to be studied in historical continuity of domination. This perspective is often neglected, adopting instead ahistorical perspectives on the state; taking its institutions as functional necessities to e.g. organise a complex society, correct market failures, or allow smooth operation of market economy (as e.g. Strange 1996: 5 does; cf. Williams 1984: 120-30 for this line of criticism). While states indeed do that - and more - their basic rationale is to exercise domination. A state is the prime regulator of societal affairs. This major specification on what the state is, results from the specific way in which it exercises territorially bounded rule. The defining features of states are determined by the fact that statehood is a relation of mutual acknowledgment in international relations (IR). The specifics of state activity can then be deducted from demands made towards any state in IR. Although being no unitary organisation, statehood is thus based on specifiable ideas, albeit gradually changing ones. It is along these tasks that the institutional rationales of the state have been analysed. To conclude this thesis, I will first elaborate on the major findings of this research, an overall institutional logic of the exercise of violence through the modern nation state. To enable a more nuanced discussion of the relation of violence to the modern state, its aspects which were found to provide checks on the exercise of violence will be outlined afterwards. Combined with a brief final summary on what kinds of violent institutions the modern state replaced, this thesis shall shed at least some spotlights on potential improvements in the organisation of rule, under the premise of minimising violence.

Before doing that, one has to contradict any notions of ultimate state decline. More than ever, the state is established as prime regulator of human affairs. This is especially visible when considering ideas to reform society. Poor relief, protection of the environment, or emancipation of women, no other actor than the state is charged with facilitating these developments. Even more far-reaching societal reforms like an unconditional basic income evolve around a redistributive state - it actually seems that the more progressive the idea, the more it relies on the state. As market power is widely criticised, the much more focussed effects of state power are apparently ignored.

5.1. The modern state: Violent by design

Elias (1997) argued that by disowning private command over the use of violence through the superior violence-wilding institution of the state, subtly and gradually humans learned to solve their differences in a rule-based manner, building societal trust, and thus respecting one another and extending cooperation with others over ever longer distances - a truly civilised conduct. In a more sober, but nevertheless very similar argument, Hobbes suggested that the state reduces violence, as it puts the superior means to exercise violence in the hand of one person (or institution), which rules over a clearly demarcated area of influence. Consequently, central state monopoly prohibits the violent struggle for power in that space (exactly what Hobbes had to suffer from; cf. Reinhard 1999: 115f). What both did not (and Hobbes most likely could not) conceive are the developments of state-led violence, which today present state-organisations as most threatening to whole populations. The organisation they hoped to present an escape from violence, proved main butcher of humankind, and became even

a trap for some societies. I find four major institutional logics in the modern nation-state promoting the exercise of violence. First, the military destructive potential of states is massive, and ever increasing - even when ignoring the ultimate weapons of total global destruction (Giddens 1985: 293). These means, originally developed for inter-state war, are also regularly used against civilian populations. While also in Hobbes time massacres occurred (Zolberg 1983), the sheer number of victims in modern mass-murder are incomprehensible (Baumann 1992).

Secondly, any ruling order rests on (at least threats of) violence. But the state is not just any political organisation. Modern states not only organise persistent domination, they claim the *monopoly* of domination. To assert this claim, the 'back-up' violence may always be employed against potential competitors, even when the status as only legitimate organiser of violence is already achieved (Benjamin 1971; Reemtsma 2004: 347). Additionally, if organised under the rule of law, the exercise of violence is usually not labelled as such (Kössler 2008: 41; Reemtsma 2008: 59), instead blaming the victims of repression for their suffering. The modern state's monopolies of regulation and violence are co-dependent. Modern domination relies on far-reaching regulation, which is achieved with continuous repression of alternative social organisation, at least in the (by now excessive) areas of acclaimed state competence (Migdal & Schlichte 2005). And indeed Mann (1993: 410-12), Schwartz (2013), and Ther (2011), very much in line with Benjamin (1971), point to the exercise of direct violence by states in the suppression of movements deemed to challenge the far-reaching claims of this modern ruling institution. With its agenda for regularity and uniformity, the modern state might be considered completely inappropriate principles to govern existential human affairs (cf. Scott 1998). This claim is embodied in the state's role as only legitimate, violence-wielding, and prime regulator of societal affairs. This only too easily translates into violent disregard for societal self-organisation (Scott 1998). More localised forms of society are centrally re-organised, as they are deemed obstacles to progressive development, and violence may indeed be even applauded as means to this end (cf. Münkler & Llanque 2002: 1222-27).

Third, to fulfil their wide- and deep-ranging regulatory agenda, states rely on bureaucratic organisation. This normative framework of dispassion and hierarchy, lacking regard for local interests, also affects the organisation of violence. It promotes dispassionate following of orders by the less cruel members of state's executive authorities, and 'creative' violence by the ones more inclined towards cruelty (Reemtsma 2004)⁹⁵. Already Weber (1978: 1403) describes the totalitarian dangers of this conduct. Beetham (1985: 81) asks in reflection on this: "What can we oppose to this machinery, in order to keep a portion of humanity free from this parcelling out of the soul, from this total domination of the rest of the bureaucratic ideal of life?" The totalitarian nature of real-existing bureaucratic conduct has been qualified during the discussion in Chapter 2.5. However, although individuals are to blame for their violent acts, institutional (and cultural) context can either induce, or discourage individuals to act violently. Relying on their own modes of socialisation, modern bureaucracies often do serve as vio-

95 This also fits Amery's (1977: 63) elaborations on the extreme statist violence of 'dull bureaucrats of torture'. The delegates of statist power 'responsible' for this torture thus resemble dispassionate, functional tools of statist authority; an ideal case of modern bureaucratic ethos.

lence encouraging organisations, also because of their hierarchal, dispassionate proceedings. What is more, the underlying instrumental logic, subjecting social affairs to material means-end calculations challenges in itself humanitarian ideals in modern state- *and* market domination (Zinn 1989: 246).

Fourth, in several ways the nation contributes to the rationales inducing modern states' exercise of violence. In the course of building the modern administration, 'traditional' self-interested intermediaries of statist power have been replaced by a modern status group of functional administrators. Ensuring the loyalty of this group, and the obedience of an ever-increasing share of the population targeted by the statist agenda, provide the rationale for rulers to establish a nation. It is through nationalism that states engage in the regulation of their subject's group identities. Modern political elites consciously manipulate the factionalisation, or fragmentation of the population, and stratification of these different (sub-)groups. As macro-political group-building mechanism, nationalism must exclude humans who are not perceived to share the politically determined features of the national group. This exclusion easily leads to inter-group violence, as rulers will suppress all alternative constructions aimed at hegemonic macro-political identification in their territory, be it in the form of other nations, or non-national groups, historically especially classes. What is more, rulers are likely to additionally suppress diverging interpretations of 'their' national project; guising their interests as the community's⁹⁶ (Noiriel 1994:72). This process is principally never complete, and all related conflicts latently underlie modern politics. Both nationalism, and monopoly status lead to a "feeling of righteousness", or "entitlement" to use violence, which makes the state designated choice to commit mass-violence in modernity (Kössler 2008: 43). Williams (1984: 123) summarised his reflection of the legitimacy of modern nation-states:

"The nation-state, in subtly different ways, thus powerfully continued a way of thinking about society which started from an existing order and subordinated to this the needs of actual persons. In certain respects, the definition made sense: real needs (as for security) sometimes coincide with the needs that followed from the definition. But they have never necessarily done so, any more than the needs of the serf necessarily included the maintenance of his lord. [...] The real question, whether the social order actually serves our needs, cannot be asked when our social thinking is determined by the assumption that it is from the order that we must start".

Following him, also established liberal approaches to society offer no alternative to this bias, as such orders take market principles for a supreme order (id: 124). This is in line with the findings of this thesis. Electoral mass-representative regimes do not prevent these possibilities; they might even play a part in its creation. For one, this institution further politicise the question on who constitutes the people (Reinhard 1999: 479; Schmitt 1996; Schwartz 2013; Snyder 2000; Ther 2011). And additionally, the 'entitlement' to use ultimate means is fuelled when nationalists can even claim to be backed by popular vote.

When all of these factors develop uninhibited, ethnic cleansing occurs. "[T]here is no type of nation-state in the contemporary world which is completely immune from the potentiality of being subject to totalitarian rule", including consequentially mass-murder (Giddens 1985: 302; also Reinhard 1999: Chapter V). But,

⁹⁶ As has been argued, historically there never was benign patriotism, but nationalism has been ethnically exclusive (Schwartz 2013: 10; Zolberg 1983: 30).

also each of these rationales in itself promotes violence. Modern statehood enables mass-violence through its massive capacities, and promotes the exercise of violence through detached, bureaucratic conduct, and the legitimisation patterns it employs (the claim to be monopolist ordering institution and representative of the national interest). Pacification is at best only domestic, as also internally pacified nation-states do act violently "outside the boundaries of territory and citizenship" (Kössler 2008: 42; also Lakitsch 2014). It thus seems clear that the concept of modern nation-state is part of the problem of ongoing violence in modernity. So, contrary to Elias (and the less enthusiastic Hobbes), statist order has to be fundamentally problematised when striving for a less violent future. Such reflection must include principally different solutions to order human societies. While it goes beyond the limitations of this thesis to provide alternative approaches, the foregoing analysis has pointed to a few, very relevant aspects, along modern states' institutional implications for the exercise of violence.

5.2. A more complex picture of the institutions contributing to ongoing violence in modernity

Suggesting the potential for genocide in any strong state, one must explain why phenomena like ethnic cleansing are exceptional manifestations of the ubiquitous politics of state- and nation-creation. Besides (hopefully) most rulers' lacking willingness to promote mass-violence, nation-states also offer institutional arrangements which limit the exercise of violence. These shall be summarised here. As will be seen, the very same rationales usually minimising violent conduct, have principally violence-inducing consequences as well. So, while sustaining that the goal of minimising violence requires political development beyond strong nation-states, this reflection of real-existing orders exposes their weaknesses and strengths.

Prominently, bureaucratic checks and balances help to keep overeager plans of ordering society in the limits of the normatively appropriate provide. The great number of actors involved in public administration, each endowed with individual decision space, implies that. Especially where rules are contradictory, and multiple aims exist at the same time, grand schemes of statist action are doomed to fail. This is also the reason why massively atrocity committing regimes did not solely rely on the bureaucracy to follow their lead unforced, and instead established political control through parallel organisations (cf. Chapter 3.3.4). Thus the modern state's tendency towards totalitarian power is also kept in check by the very same institution which enables this power (cf. Beetham 1985: 81; and Weber 1978: 1403). Multiple divides between political leadership and differentiated bureaucracies (Mann 1993: 58f) underline the statement that no state is a unitary actor (also Giddens 1985: 13). Administrative centralisation has two further violence-reducing effects. For one, and in combination with the intrusion of market forces, it also gradually undermines unfree labour regimes (Dal Lago 2005; Reinhard 1999: 235-40; Zinn 1989). In striking contrast to Elias however, Dal Lago (2005), and Zinn (1989: 246) argue for the violent effects of increased market exploitation (cf. also Cramer 2006). This contributes to state violence in so far, as the extension of market forces was and is promoted by the state (cf. Chapter 3.3.5). And non-market coercion, also when backed directly by state violence, still resembles a strategy compatible to market expropriation (Cramer 2006; Mamdani 1996). Thus, also state institutions have to be investi-

gated, when discussing violent expropriation schemes in past or present. Lastly, the move to modern, direct rule also replaced older institutions of despotic violence. For one, it successively disempowered local elites, who just by virtue of being spatially closer to the common people still did not better serve their socio-economic interests (Tilly 1990: 106f). Additionally, pre-modern, sub-state rulers had incentives to rely on openly displayed cruelty, as they were usually lacking surveillance capacities. Thus, and in accordance with Elias, their replacement with disinterested, rule-bound administrators did all but abandon such violence. This was further aided by the creation of civil police units. But as is the case with other kinds of central administrations, these are also strengthening arbitrary potential of individual delegates of the state (Benjamin 1971: 189f).

As organised rule on both sub-state, and central-state level thus favours violent conduct, one might suggest a massive leap 'upward' to the world state. But this offers little redemption from the domination rationales of the state. A world regulative authority means, at the very minimum, a tighter regulated IR. An international order then is constituted by contractual commitments and enforced by powerful states or international organisations (as Carr 1968 suggests). But this is no alternative to state institutions, and hence does not avoid associated problems. Also an actual world state only presents a larger variant of the discussed strong state. Any ideal of rule in a centralised, regulated, unitary way over humans is bound to create violence along the rationales outlined in this thesis. A supra-national state is still a state (cf. Giddens 1985: 283f on the case of EC).

Also a complete 'exit' from the state seems no longer feasible. While earlier societies could still retreat from the state, this seems illusory for societies at large, given today's population density, and the sophistication of human technology (Scott 2009). At the same time, social interaction is ever more determining in human lives – and thus human suffering ever more preventable (cf. Chapter 1.3). The challenge then is to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic centralism, without resorting to 'decentralised despotism'. Doing that, one has to keep in mind that both nation and the state are 'merely' very elaborate variants of basic social concepts; macro-sociological groups and political order. Both concepts are human creations. Both require regular maintenance to remain functional for powerful actors. In effect, they can be seen as continuous re-creations. This opens space for transformation. But structural changes of political orders imply (sometimes massive) violence (Cramer 2006). In this regard, the observable pacification of every-day relations in consolidates states is a momentous achievement indeed (Eisner 2003).

This leads to the final problem in discussing Elias, the ambiguity of the term 'civilisation' (Imbusch 2005: 278-87; Lemke 2007: 31-35). It can either be understood to label an overall societal development towards independence of ecology (cf. Chapter 1.3), or more narrowly as the shift in societal interaction to non-violent (i.e. civil) conflict behaviour (what Elias was aiming at). In the latter sense, he is supported by anthropologically oriented researchers (Eisner 2003; Gat 2006; Pinker 2011). The overall societal 'climate' in developed societies is indeed civil - especially when compared to poorer countries, which often feature violent modes of internal conflict behaviour. At least the option to act openly violent to achieve political goals seems to be regarded much more appropriate in these contexts. Of course globally unequal distribution of wealth is also a

function of strong states' violence. But, as Schlichte (2005A: 128f) argues violence in weaker states is also owed to the very lack of a strong state – a Hobbesian condition that enables lesser wielders of violence to compete for political power. Struggles over who sets rules in specific situations are much more frequent, and (in the absence of an established monopolist) 'legitimately' violent. In extension, some powerful organisations are tempted to become the prime societal regulator, and to that end challenge other powerful organisations. While this may be considered state-building (Niemann 2007; Prkic 2005: 131-35; Schlichte 2005A: 128f) and consequently connected to the rationales of the modern state, it is its very absence as monopolist which enables this violence (Lambach, Johais & Bayer 2015: 1310; Menkhaus 2003: 416).

But again, effective pacification is precarious, when based on violent structures. And, as I argued along i.a. Benjamin (1971), Davenport (2007), Reinhard (1999), Scott (2009), and Tilly (1990), pressures for self preservation of regimes did not principally change. So, do modern, more inclusive states employ a different kind of violence than earlier domination schemes? Modern domination builds less on coercion. Instead, esp. nationalism is employed to make people voluntarily comply with the state's agenda. This however necessarily means to separate the entitled nationals from the excluded majority of humankind. Also, modern states rely on specific threats, rather than direct violence, and the exercise of violence is systematic, and transparent. But as the conceptualisation showed, credible threats resemble the effects of direct violence insofar, as they degrade the social status of a person by challenging her agency and expectation to remain unharmed. Additionally, credible threats relate to direct violence as they are imaginations of violence. And modern states also rely on individual acts of direct violence; the argument on informality in bureaucracy reflected that. Again, we are reminded that states as all other political orders are fundamentally built on violence (Kössler 2008).

Still, in a state of law, the exercise of violence is also sanctioned for the state and its delegates. And even beyond national, legal frameworks, human rights serve as guidelines for state institutions to respect the physical and social integrity of the person. Unfortunately, human rights principally lack legitimate enforcement mechanisms beyond the nation-state. However, since the mass gained political relevance during modernisation, the huge majority of populations are now citizens and nationals. While it seems highly questionable that such a status it is principally achievable for all humans (due to the inherent exclusivity of both concepts, nation and state), at least in a number of states the massive majority have their political rights safeguarded by national institutions. What is more, via elections they have some say in the conduct of rule, and kind of regulations these institutions impose on them. And indeed, also authoritarian, electoral regimes offer public services for the majority of the population, at least when complying with formalising their identity towards the state. But the necessary conditions are a consolidated power apparatus that has command over a certain level of material means. These conditions are only met in strong states, which have been fundamentally criticised here, as they are created through, and further enable mass-violence.

While the strong nation-state's potential for total war, totalitarian cultural homogenisation, and mass-exclusion unbrokenly remains (and is often ignored),

the status-quo offers even more dire prospects of the evolution of modern statecraft during the 21st century. Aspects of ever more refined mass-surveillance, targeted killings via unmanned, and increasingly software-controlled vehicles, and the challenge democratic state pose to transparency (esp. visible in their handling of 'whistleblowers'). The processes of intensifying political intervention are by no means complete. The state as the biggest potentate of authoritative resources is perfectly equipped to develop these and more areas of surveillance. Hence, as long as nation-states exist, there is reason to agree with the pessimistic perspective that the age of totalitarianism is yet to come. On the positive side, violence is problematised to a point that it is perceived incompatible with modern society – this thesis is an example of such a problematisation. At its end, the underlying normative question remains, unsurprisingly: How can an order be imagined which grants the protection of individual rights *as humans* and provides for pacification of individual relations *independent* of their nationality? Is even it possible to create political arrangements that do not build on violence at all?

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Cover-Design: Jan Schablitzki, Simon Rohde, Tamara Kaschek

Cover-Photos: Wolff | John Isaac | Jean Pierre Laffont (UN Photos)

ISSN: 2195-1659 (Print)

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