

Roman Krtsch

Wartime Violence, Collective Grievances and Post-Conflict Protests

Evidence from Uganda's LRA Insurgency

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ABSTRACT

The immediate aftermath of civil wars is a period prone to heightened contention: Political decisions about the distribution of aid or power, for example, can deepen social fault lines and in some instances even result in violent unrest. Yet despite its relevance, our knowledge on the drivers for individual participation in post-conflict contentious activism remains limited. Previous research has found particularly wartime experiences to affect political and social behaviour of individuals in the post-conflict period. Based on these findings, I argue that exposure to civil war violence increases the likelihood for individuals to participate in post-war protests. Moreover, I conjecture that this effect can be explained with the reinforcement of group-based grievances. Using survey data from the *Afrobarometer* collected shortly after the end of the Ugandan civil war in 2008, I find support for the argument: Results from linear probability models show a consistent and robust relationship between county-level war violence and the likelihood to participate in protests. An additional analysis with a novel measure of group-level exposure and a causal mediation analysis furthermore corroborate the assumed mechanism.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Unmittelbar nach dem Ende der Kampfhandlungen beginnt für Post-Bürgerkriegsgesellschaften häufig eine Phase, die anfällig für Auseinandersetzungen ist: Politische Entscheidungen über die Machtaufteilung können beispielsweise soziale Gräben vertiefen und in einigen Fällen sogar in gewalttätige Unruhen münden. Trotz dieser Relevanz ist unser Wissen über die wesentlichen Antriebe individueller Beteiligung an Protesten in Nachkriegsgesellschaften nach wie vor begrenzt. Die bisherige Forschung hat insbesondere die Bedeutung von Gewalterfahrungen für das politische und soziale Verhalten in der Nachkriegsperiode hervorgehoben. Aufbauend auf diesen Erkenntnissen ist das Argument des vorliegenden Aufsatzes, dass lokale Intensität von Bürgerkriegsgewalt die Wahrscheinlichkeit individueller Protestteilnahme in der Nachkriegszeit erhöht. Ich argumentiere ferner, dass dieser Zusammenhang durch die Verstärkung gruppenbasierter grievances im Zuge von Gewalterfahrungen erklärt werden kann. Mithilfe von Umfragedaten des *Afrobarometers*, welche kurz nach dem Ende des ugandischen Bürgerkriegs 2008 erhoben wurden, kann mein Argument empirisch gestützt werden: Die Ergebnisse Linearer Wahrscheinlichkeitsmodelle zeigen einen konsistenten und robusten Zusammenhang zwischen der Intensität von Bürgerkriegsgewalt auf der County-Ebene und der Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Teilnahme an Protesten. In einer zusätzlichen Analyse untersuche ich den Mechanismus mithilfe einer neuen Messung für gruppenspezifische Kriegserfahrungen und nutze eine Mediationsanalyse zur weiteren Unterstützung des Mechanismus.

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1. Introduction

For war-torn countries, the transition to the post-conflict phase often entails new challenges to domestic stability. Especially the early period after hostilities have ceased – when state capacity tends to be low and different possible paths of political and economic development are still open – can be prone to increased contention. Political violence and protests erupting in the course of post-conflict elections (Salehyan/Linebarger 2015), in the context of broader peacebuilding and development activities (Lee/Park 2020; Lai 2016), or over the distribution of political power (Krtsch/Vüllers 2019) are far from uncommon and may in some instances even jeopardize the further trajectory of the peace process as a whole – up to the point of conflict relapse.

Yet despite its apparent relevance for post-conflict stability, protests in such settings have remained a largely understudied subject of investigation. In particular, we still know little about the conditions and mechanisms that explain individual participation in post-conflict protests. On the one hand, empirical studies have identified wartime experiences as crucial determinants for individuals' attitudes and behaviour in the aftermath of conflict. At the same time, however, findings remain unclear as to whether and how these legacies translate into collective action (Bauer et al. 2016). This paper contributes to the discussion by first shedding light on the factors that explain individuals' propensity to engage in protests during post-conflict periods, and second by testing the mechanism through which the conjectured relationship is assumed to operate.

I argue that experiences of wartime violence reinforce group-based perceptions of threat, vulnerability and eventually grievances. These shared perceptions of grievances can – in turn – decrease barriers to collective action and result in an increased propensity to join protests in the immediate aftermath of war. Taking the case of the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) insurgency in Uganda, I draw from survey data collected shortly after the end of violence (Afrobarometer 2008) and geo-referenced conflict data (Raleigh et al. 2010) to test the argument empirically. Results from linear probability models show that the local intensity of violence correlates significantly with individuals' reported protest participation in 2008.

In order to examine the mechanism, I secondly assess the conditional effect of group-level exposure to violence on the found relationship. I therefore match individual violent events with precise geo-located information about local ethnic settlement patterns (Müller-Crepon/Hunziker 2018). The results suggest that conflict intensity increases protest propensity if the respondent's own group has been highly affected by the violence. A causal mediation analysis finally shows that specifically group-based grievances are a plausible explanation for the relationship between conflict intensity and protest.


The paper contributes to current debates in two major ways: First, by showing that exposure to conflict-related violence increases protest activities after hostilities have ended, the paper adds further evidence to a more cautious interpretation of post-conflict social capital formation. Protests certainly constitute an important means for marginalized communities to articulate their interests in the peace process. At the same time, however, the mechanism of collective grievance formation also suggests that post-conflict protests may be a symptom of increased alienation with the state. These implications corroborate earlier works that see eroding trust in political institutions (De Juan/Pierskalla 2016) and a stronger retreat to autonomous local self-governance (Grosjean 2014) as an outcome of wartime experiences.

Second, it expounds on the mechanism through which wartime legacies transition into post-conflict collective action. Previous studies have demonstrated that immediate or contextual conflict exposure – e.g. approximated by the local intensity of violence – can have ramifications for post-conflict attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Freitag et al. 2017; Bellows/Miguel 2009). While principally lending support to these findings, the results presented here shed light on the question *how* this effect may come about.

2. Previous research on wartime exposure and collective action

Civil wars often place heavy burdens on societies even after hostilities have ceased. Particularly the early post-conflict period can be critical, with pivotal moments such as elections (Flores/Nooruddin 2012; Salehyan/Linebarger 2015), the implementation of power-sharing provisions (Krtsch/Vüllers 2019) or aid allocation decisions (De Juan 2020) being prone to social unrest. Figure 1 provides a cursory overview about the phenomenon's extent and plots the change of average protest intensity for African countries with at least three years of armed conflict followed by at least three years of peace since 1997 (defined according to the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) definition of at least 25 battle-related deaths per year). In almost all cases, nonviolent and violent protests increased markedly after the end of the conflict. For the two exceptions, Rwanda (2002) and Ivory Coast (2004), the decrease in protests results from peaks of social unrest in the respective conflict's final year. It is also noteworthy that this selection does not include countries that experienced short-lived peace periods precisely because of increased social unrest in the immediate aftermath of conflict termination (as in the case of Libya, for instance).

Figure 1: Change in the average number of protests and riots from three years prior to three years after the end of armed conflict. Data based on ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010).



Given the relevance of protests in post-conflict settings, most studies have sought to address the phenomenon on an aggregate level, relying either on cross-country analyses or comparisons across subnational regions or groups (Davenport et al. 2019). However, we still know little about the central drivers for individual participation in post-conflict protests. In fact, despite the negative consequences on the aggregate level, some microlevel investigations show that the impact of wartime experiences on individual attitudes and behaviour can be quite different. Based on survey evidence from post-conflict contexts, a series of studies has found wartime experiences to

significantly correlate with higher individual levels of interpersonal trust and pro-social behaviour (Koos 2018; Bellows/Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; De Luca/Verpoorten 2015a; Gilligan et al. 2014; Voors/Bulte 2014; Voors et al. 2012). Some investigations have even found these unintended consequences to enhance certain forms of political and community participation, such as voting in elections (Bellows/Miguel 2009), joining political groups (Bellows/Miguel 2009) participating in local assemblies (Bellows/Miguel 2009; De Luca/Verpoorten 2015b) or engaging in community-based associations (Blattman 2009; Koos 2018; Grosjean 2014).

Other investigations, by contrast, have either found no or even a negative relationship between experiences of violence and pro-social behaviour (Kijewski/Freitag 2018; Hager et al. 2019; Muller/Vothknecht 2011; Colletta/Cullen 2000). Some authors point to the differential impact of war on social ties: While mainly affecting solidarity, trust and identification with members of the same ethnic, religious or community group, exposure to wartime violence could thereby be detrimental for attitudes towards out-group members (Bauer et al. 2014; Rohner et al. 2013; Balcells 2012; Cassar et al. 2013).

It is particularly this differential impact – the reinforcement of in-group solidarity and identification coupled with mistrust against out-group members – that can in turn have profound implications on individual behaviour after the end of the conflict. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hadzic et al. (2017) show that vote shares for ethnic parties are significantly higher in war-affected communities. The authors find suggestive evidence that these voting patterns are mediated via increased trust towards co-ethnics and decreased trust towards members of other ethnic groups. In a similar vein, Costalli and Ruggeri (2018) and Beber et al. (2014) find wartime experiences to affect individual political preferences through the reinforcement of ideological or ethnic identification.

Despite this salience of this mechanism, however, few studies have systematically analysed how the reinforcement of group identities in the course of conflict may affect specifically protests in the immediate aftermath of war. While Freitag et al. (2017) identify a positive and significant relationship between wartime victimization and protest participation in post-war Kosovo, their study rather focuses on longer term consequences (eleven years after conflict termination) and does not specifically test the conjectured mechanism.

To sum up, the literature on the effect of wartime exposure on collective action has yielded mixed results: While most studies agree that the development of social ties is instrumental in explaining the relationship, there is no consensus about which *type* of social ties are reinforced through wartime experiences – and by extension, which type of behaviour we expect to prevail as a result. Taking up studies that suggest a differential effect on individuals' in- and out-group attitudes, I will next outline a theoretical argument that explains how wartime exposure leads to an increased likelihood of protest participation through a mechanism of group-based grievance formation.

3. Theoretical argument: Exposure to wartime violence, collective grievances and protest mobilization

Starting from the premise that exposure to violence increases social ties and identification with in-group members – defined in terms of either ethnicity, religion, or location –, we may expect a higher individual protest likelihood to ensue. Group identities provide a network of trust that can serve as the very foundation for collective action (Passy 2003). They enable collective action by facilitating the dissemination of ideas and information, connecting like-minded individuals, and providing channels through which individuals can be mobilized (Edwards/McCarthy 2004; Oberschall 1994; Snow et al. 1980). Yet the mere reinforcement of group identities alone may not suffice to explain the link between exposure of wartime violence and post-conflict protest participation. I argue that a central driver for the latter lies in a) the reinforcement of group-related

grievances through experiences of violence and b) the activation of these collective grievances in periods of increased contention – which is often the case in the immediate post-conflict period.

The argument builds on the assumption that motivational triggers are essential in order to activate existing networks for collective action. This link is perhaps most prominently associated with grievances-based explanations, which argue that perceptions of relative deprivation create individual frustrations and eventually lead to mobilization (Runciman 1966; Gurr 1970). Relative deprivation is thereby understood as the widening gap between value expectations and the capabilities to achieve them – for instance in the course of losses incurred through sudden shocks. It is easy to see how specifically wartime experiences may lead to perceptions of relative deprivation. On the one hand, wars are often accompanied by extensive direct violence against civilians (Eck/Hultman 2007). On the other hand, clashes between the government and rebel forces frequently entail substantial impacts on the civilian population in the form of destruction of livelihoods or even loss of life through indirect killings. When people either witness or personally suffer from violence during civil wars, it can reinforce perceptions of threat and vulnerability that eventually lead to grievances.

These experiences are particularly likely to translate into collective action if they reflect a shared perception of deprivation among members of a social group instead of isolated individual experiences. Group identities are instrumental in shaping individuals' perspectives of common injustice, standpoints on specific political issues and the entailing imperatives of action (Passy 2003). In the context of civil war violence, individual experiences can become embedded into a common narrative of group deprivation; a common understanding about the wartime exposure of the entire social group with which the individual identifies itself (Østby 2013). Against the backdrop that civilian targeting in conflicts, but also the location of battles, are indeed not random but often very explicitly based on group membership, it is plausible to expect that individual experiences easily translate into group-based interpretations of victimization in war contexts (Gurr 1993).

Perceptions of increased deprivation in turn lead to collective action by enhancing frustration – most commonly identified with feelings of injustice. As Pettigrew states, people “must not only perceive difference, but they must also regard these differences as unfair and resent them” (2002, 368). Survey-based empirical studies have specifically identified perceptions of group-based injustices to be a strong predictor for participation in and support for contentious activism, including political violence and protests (Bhavnani/Backer 2007; Kirwin/Cho 2009; Miodownik/Nir 2016; Detges 2017; Dyrstad/Hillesund 2020; Alcorta et al. 2020). Group identities socialize individuals into a specific, common interpretation of social reality, which includes an evaluation about the respective group's position within the broader society (Freeman 1973; McAdam 1982; Passy 2003). As a consequence, collectively shared perceptions of wartime victimization are likewise prone to correlate with feelings of being disadvantaged or even treated unfairly in comparison to other groups. These feelings can, in turn, develop into injustice frames that can constitute a powerful narrative to organize collective action (Benford/Snow 2000). These frames typically include a particular attribution of blame – often targeted at the government. For the context of wartime violence, this may apply regardless of the actual perpetrators of violence. Even if non-state groups are the main actors responsible, individuals may nonetheless hold the government accountable for failing to provide security (De Juan/Pierskalla 2016; Gates/Justesen 2020).

Central to my argument is that these grievances can – once developed – translate to the post-conflict period. Siroky et al. (2020) show that relative deprivation does not necessarily correspond to tangible inequalities (e.g. economic differences). Instead, grievances based on perceptions of relative deprivation are essentially psychological phenomena reflecting the feeling of being disadvantaged – which can include real, subjective but also feared inequalities and injustices. They emphasize “group frustration owing to a gap between what the group has relative to what it feels it deserves – not necessarily to what others *have*” (Siroky et al. 2020, 696). Consequently, perceptions of threat and vulnerability developed through wartime experiences are likely to outlive the war itself as a motivational foundation for mobilization that can constitute a fertile ground for protests during subsequent contentious episodes.

The immediate post-conflict period is a particularly conducive phase for these simmering grievances to erupt. It entails moments and decisions that critically determine the country's further trajectory and that are likely to have differential impacts on individual social groups. Elections (Flores/Nooruddin 2012; Salehyan/Linebarger 2015), power-sharing practices (Krtsch/Vüllers 2019) and decisions on the allocation of aid (De Juan 2020), for example, bear the potential to reinforce inter-group power imbalances and are thus likely to be highly contested. In these situations, increased group-related grievances resulting from experiences of wartime violence can lead individuals to participate in protests. Based on these considerations, I develop the following hypothesis: *Exposure to wartime violence increases the likelihood of protest participation in the post-war period.*

4. The LRA insurgency in northern Uganda

I test the argument for Uganda's immediate post-conflict period following the civil war between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. The conflict's beginning dates back to Yoweri Museveni's takeover of power in 1986, when remnants of the former Acholi-dominated regime rebelled against the new central government. In the early 1990s, the LRA prevailed as the predominant militant organization in Uganda's north with support from the Sudanese government (Van Acker 2004).

Initially, the LRA and its predecessors drew primarily from support by the local Acholi population – an ethnic group that found itself on the losing side of the regime change in 1986. Yet, with the increased reliance on external assistance from Sudan and the neighbouring country's southern region serving as a supply base and sanctuary for retreat, the LRA's dependency on local support waned over time. The group increasingly staged targeted attacks on civilians, many of whom consisted of ethnic Acholi that were accused of collaboration with the central government (Vinci 2007). Since the mid-1990s, the conflict was fought with increased brutality and saw mass atrocities against the civilian population from both the Ugandan government and rebel forces (Dolan 2009). Additionally, the LRA increasingly relied on the abduction of children in order to forcibly recruit them as soldiers or laborers (Dunn 2004). Thus, although the LRA still majorly comprised of ethnic Acholi, members of the ethnic group became at the same time the largest group of victims affected by the conflict.

Violence surged to unprecedented heights between 2002 and 2005. After the Ugandan military sought to destroy LRA-bases in southern Sudan in March 2002, the conflict spread to the hitherto relatively unaffected subregions of Lango and Teso – in addition to the still heavily affected Acholi subregion (Van Acker 2004). With 1,471 violent conflict incidents, roughly 78% of all events took place during this period (see figure 2 below), causing destruction and displacement on a massive scale. By 2006, LRA-related conflict intensity had decreased and remained largely contained to the Acholi subregion (apart from 9 instances according to ACLED). Both conflict parties started negotiations over a peace agreement which resulted in a ceasefire in August of that year. Although the conclusion of a peace agreement eventually failed and the conflict spread to neighbouring countries, fighting between the Ugandan military and the LRA *de facto* came to an end on Ugandan territory after August 2006, barring sporadic incidents. With the local security situation improving, the resettlement process of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their home communities started. Additionally, the government announced a comprehensive economic recovery program for the conflict-affected region (World Bank 2009).


The context of Uganda's conflict makes for a particularly fitting case to test the outlined argument. First, it resembles a most-likely-case for observing the expected relationship due to the conflict's sheer severity. With a total of 8,549 casualties, it is a particularly intensive conflict-dyad, ranking in the top 10% of all entries recorded in UCDP's *Battle-related deaths* data set (based on Pettersson et al. 2019, see Appendix figure A1). Second, the post-conflict phase was characterized by events and developments that would lead us to expect a period of heightened contention – and by extension, that developed group-based grievances may manifest in protest

actions. After two landmark events that were themselves accompanied by social unrest – the referendum in 2005 that lifted the ban on political parties and the subsequent election in early 2006 (Goodfellow 2014; Aljazeera 2005) – the Ugandan government launched a series of controversial reforms addressing sensitive issues related to land use, regional autonomy, or executive power that sparked sometimes violent protests (Goodfellow 2014). In fact, both nonviolent and violent protests have sharply increased after 2006, from a total number of 54 in the years 2001-2005 to 155 in the five subsequent years according to ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010).

Some of the post-war political conflicts had an explicitly ethnic dimension. For instance, several bills introduced after 2005 that were perceived as touching the autonomy and basic rights of the Baganda culminated in large-scale ethnic mobilization (Goodfellow 2014). Moreover, voting in the 2006 elections followed distinctive regional patterns, with the northern region having been the strongest support base for the opposition candidate (Gloppen et al. 2006). Overall, the northern and eastern ethnic groups that were most affected by the war – Langi, Acholi, and Iteso – continued to remain excluded from political power after 2006 (Girardin et al. 2015), which presented a potential source for new conflicts. Particularly policies related to the use and ownership of land became one of the major issues of contention in the northern region immediately after the end of conflict. Conflicts erupted in particular over disputed land ownership between IDPs returning to their home communities on the one side and private companies or government authorities on the other side (World Bank 2009; IDMC 2012).

Third, the 4th *Afrobarometer* round taking place in 2008 makes it possible to specifically investigate the short-term effects of wartime experiences in the early post-conflict period. Uganda has been among the most frequently surveyed countries over the course of several *Afrobarometer* waves. For the purpose of this study, it is not only helpful that the time span between the end of the conflict and the survey is relatively short. It is also useful that the country has been surveyed as well in the first *Afrobarometer* round (2000), which happened to take place shortly before the escalation of violence (the time point of both surveys is marked by the vertical bars in figure 2). Following a similar approach as Rohner et al. (2013), this allows me to control for pre-treatment values of some of the relevant variables, and thus address potential endogeneity concerns.

Figure 2: Number of monthly violent events in Uganda based on ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010). Vertical bars mark the start and end dates of the investigation period (note: the three districts from Karamoja subregion, which are not included in AB round 4, are not considered here).



5. Data and operationalization

I test the hypothesis on the level of the individual respondent using survey data for Uganda from the *Afrobarometer*. I make use of the 4th round, which was implemented in August 2008, shortly after the LRA insurgency *de facto* came to an end on Ugandan soil and shifted its geographic focus to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and later on to the Central African Republic. The survey, which is nationally representative and geographically stratified, covers 2,431 respondents across all Ugandan regions. It includes areas less affected by the insurgency in the central and western regions as well as those which were heavily affected in the north and east. The Karamoja-subregion to the east, which was affected by non-state violence, is not included in the 4th round.

The empirical analysis follows a three-step approach: First, I estimate the correlation between local-level intensity of violence and individual protest propensity. Second, I address the assumed causal mechanism. If exposure to violence affects post-war protest participation through an increase of collective grievances, I expect the relationship to be conditional on another factor: the degree to which the respondent's *own* ethnic group has been exposed to violence. I therefore interact the local-level intensity of violence with a group-specific measure of exposure. Lastly, I test the mechanism with a causal mediation analysis by exploiting specific questions in the *Afrobarometer* pointing to the presence of group-based grievances.

The approach to estimate the effect of exposure to violence on individual protest behaviour rather than on spatial protest occurrence has a distinctive advantage. Post-conflict protest events might not take place in the very same location where previous violence has occurred, but rather cluster in nearby cities. In contrast, individual respondents' locations are more likely to correspond to the location of the assumed cause – in this case, war violence. A possible concern may still arise with regard to the impact of conflict-induced migration. The civil war caused internal displacement on a massive scale amounting to 1.8 million individuals in 2005 (IDMC 2013). However, as Rohner et al. (2013) emphasize, this point may not affect the results in the present case substantively. Most conflict-induced movement took place within individual counties, thus alleviating concerns about distortions stemming from cross-county migration (for a related argument, see De Luca/Verpoorten 2015a). Moreover, the return process to IDPs' home villages has been completed by the time of the survey for most conflict-affected regions. A notable exception are the counties from the Acholi-subregion, in which a total of 24% of the original camp population have returned to their villages of origin and 42% were still residing in transit areas by July 2008 (OCHA 2008). I will implicitly account for this possibility in a later robustness check by testing the model without Acholi-respondents.

Unless stated otherwise, all predictors are aggregated to the county-level (based on the extent of 2002 according to the census), which is the lowest administrative unit for which information is available in the *Afrobarometer* survey round 4. There is a total of 125 counties covered by this survey round (out of a total of 164). Information on some control variables was only available for the next higher administrative unit, the district level (57 districts in total, from which 51 were included in the survey round).

5.1 Dependent variable, mediators and primary controls

The dependent variable is binary, indicating whether an individual has participated at least once in a protest or demonstration during the past year. In particular, I draw from the survey item "Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or protest march?" The variable *protest* takes the value 1 if the respondent reports to have attended a demonstration at least once in the last year and takes the value 0 otherwise. A total of 210 respondents answered positively, which accounts for 8.82%. Compared with other countries surveyed in the same wave, this figure is rather low

(see figure A1 in the appendix for a comparison). Protest propensity is slightly lower in counties without a conflict event in the observed time period (8.5%) as opposed to those that have experienced at least one conflict event (9%), but the difference is insignificant. It should be noted, though, that this distribution is merely a bivariate depiction and also does not account for conflict intensity, but for the fact of whether the county experienced violence at all or not.

I conjecture the relationship between conflict exposure and protest participation to be mediated by the generation of group-based grievances. I use the survey item “How often are [*respondent's ethnic group*] treated unfairly by the government?” to capture this notion empirically. The answer choices are collapsed into a binary mediator variable, with 0 corresponding to the answer choices “Never” and “Sometimes”, while 1 corresponds to “Often” and “Always”.

A major problem in the effort to test the relationship between wartime exposure, grievances, and protest activity concerns endogeneity: grievances may develop in the course of wartime exposure, but it is likewise plausible that war-affected areas may have already shown fairly high levels of discontent before the outbreak of violence. It may even be the case that grievance – and by extent protest-intensive locations were intentionally attacked by the conflict parties, which would mean that the assumed causal direction would in fact be reversed. In order to address this issue, I apply a similar strategy as the one used in Rohner et al. (2013) and take a vector of variables from the *Afrobarometer* round 1 in 2000 as my primary controls. These variables consist of the district-mean values of respondents' answers to survey items that shall capture pre-violence levels of group-based grievances and ethnic identification (the survey questions in both rounds are not identical, the corresponding variables and their generation are discussed in the appendix). Unfortunately, there has been no question on protest participation in the 2000 round of the *Afrobarometer*. However, I will include a control variable on protest locations prior to the investigation period taken from the *Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset* (ACLED, Raleigh et al. 2010) in one of the robustness checks in order to address this issue. Lacking information on pre-war attitudes and behaviour of the individual respondents from the 4th round, I am nonetheless confident that the approximation via the spatial pre-war prevalence of grievances, identity and – in the robustness check – pre-war locations of protests mitigates endogeneity concerns. After all, if protests and grievances determine attacks rather than vice versa, the *location* of the protest events and spatial grievances prevalence may be a more plausible predictor than individual attitudes and behaviour to begin with.

Figure 3: Spatial distribution and local intensity of violent events, 2000-2008. Events clustered within a distance of .25 degrees (ca. 27.75 km.) Shaded counties are not included in the sample.





Figure 4: Buffers 1km (grey circles) and 10km (transparent circles) around conflict events. Shaded counties are not included in the sample.



Figure 5: Violent event locations, 2000-2008, with assigned ethnic groups from SIDE 2011b. Ethnic group names in singular form in accordance with answer categories in Afrobarometer round 4. Shaded counties are not included in the sample.



5.2 Explanatory and interaction variable

The main explanatory variable captures local exposure to violence during the most intense period of fighting between 2000-2008. The data is obtained from ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010), which compiles geo-referenced event data on various forms of political violence for the period of investigation. I include all events between June 2000 (end of *Afrobarometer* round 1, the date of measurement of the prime controls) and July 2008 (first recorded interview date of *Afrobarometer* round 4) that were classified as either *battles*, *violence against civilians* or *remote violence*. I do not explicitly distinguish between LRA-related events and other forms of organized violence like clashes between communal or ethnic militias in the main models.¹

The events are aggregated to the county-level and matched with the reported location of respondents. Events with a geo-precision value of 3 are discarded (i.e., events that were attributed to a larger region). For the investigation period, at least one violent event has been reported for 57% of all counties. However, the distribution is highly skewed, with 64% of all violent events having occurred in one of the 9 counties in Acholi subregion alone (see figure 3 for an overview of the local intensity of conflict throughout Uganda for the observed time period). I take the natural logarithm of conflict events as I assume the marginal effect of each additional violent event to decrease for higher values.

From the same data source, I construct an interaction variable that captures group-level exposure. One way to approximate group-level variation of violence would be to rely on the actor-

¹ The decision follows Kalyvas' (2003) argumentation, who shows that it is often hard if not impossible to discern individual, local-level cleavages from the war's broader conflict process. As a result, I only restrict the inclusion criterion to forms of *organized violence*.

information provided by ACLED itself (see, for instance Rohner et al. 2013). In most cases, however, this essentially only allows us to make inferences on the ethnic affiliation of the *perpetrators* of violence, whereas the victims' ethnic attributes are rarely, if ever, reported. It is yet precisely this information that needs to be obtained if one wants to assess the group-level exposure to violence. I have thus opted for an alternative approach and matched the individual locations of ACLED events to known settlement areas of ethnic groups. Implicitly underlying this approach is the following assumption: if a violent event occurs in a location that is dominated by a certain ethnic group, there is a high likelihood that this particular group has been affected either by direct or indirect violence.

This approach requires very precise data on the location of ethnic groups. I have therefore decided to match the locations of ACLED events to ethnic groups based on the *Spatially Interpolated Data on Ethnicity* (SIDE) data set (Müller-Crepon/Hunziker 2018). SIDE maps religion- and ethnicity-related information from geo-coded *Demographic and Health Surveys* for a range of low- and middle-income countries, including Uganda, and interpolates ethnic compositions in-between individual sampling points. The resulting advantage of SIDE is the possibility to obtain information for local settlement patterns of ethnic groups on an extremely fine-grained resolution of 0.0083 decimal degrees (which corresponds roughly to 1km at the equator). On the downside, the earliest available information is from 2010, which potentially introduces post-treatment bias. Given that ethnic settlement patterns tend to remain relatively stable, however, I am confident that the specific ethnic composition around conflict locations is unlikely to be the immediate consequence of conflict events.²

I chose the most recently available SIDE data from 2011 as it contains the maximum number of ethnic groups that can be assigned to group identities from the *Afrobarometer* round 4 (all but 4 groups were assigned, which sums up to a total drop-out of only 29 respondents as compared to the original analysis). Given the high resolution of the source data, I have created buffers of 0.0083 decimal degrees radius (ca. 1km) around each ACLED event and calculated the relative share of each ethnic group recorded in SIDE. The violent event was then coded as affecting the dominant group located within the buffer area. I have decided to err on the side of caution and only considered a specific ethnic group to be affected by the respective ACLED event if the group's share is at least 50% of all groups in the buffer region. With this restriction in place, roughly 4.3% of all relevant conflict events in the sample dropped out as no single group had an absolute majority. For a later robustness check, I have repeated the procedure using a radius with 0.083 decimal degrees length (ca. 10 km) in order to test whether the arbitrary choice of the buffer radius and the consideration of potential imprecisions with regard to the conflict location impact the eventual results. However, the assignment to the respective majority groups is virtually identical (see figure 4 for an illustration of the buffer areas and figure 5 for the spatial distribution of the assigned ethnic groups).

After assigning the conflict events to individual ethnic groups, I used the LEDA r-package in order to link ethnic groups from SIDE with the response options for ethnic group identity in the *Afrobarometer* (Müller-Crepon et al. 2020). I calculated a variable that captures for each respondent the number of county-level violence affecting her own group divided by the county-level violence affecting any other group (note here that the 4.3% of events that were not assigned to any group are not included here as well). Thus, the interaction variable used in the analysis captures the relative exposure of the respondent's own group in a county. The ratio variable is standardized at 1 for instances where no violence occurs. As with the main explanatory variable, I take the logarithm in order to account for extreme values, which means that for the final variable, 0 corresponds to "no violence".

The log-transformed variable can be interpreted as follows: Values smaller than 0 reflect situations in which the respondent is located in a conflict-affected county – but the majority of

² None of the ethnic groups' settlement patterns in Uganda have changed between 1990 and 2017 in the GeoEPR data (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). This can admittedly only provide suggestive evidence, but it lends principle support to my assumption.

violence likely affected another ethnic group. Conversely, values higher than 0 indicate that most of the violence affected the respondent's own ethnic group. If exposure to violence leads to protest through a reinforcement of group-based perceptions of threat and grievances, I would expect the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variable to be particularly pronounced in the latter case. In 16% of all cases, a group other than the respondent's one was majorly affected by county-level violence, while the respondent's own group was majorly affected in 41% and no violence occurred at all in 43% of all cases.

I include several control variables on the individual- and county-level that may confound the relationship between exposure to violence and protest mobilization. On the individual level, I include a vector of respondent-characteristics taken from the *Afrobarometer*, including dummies on urban location, ownership of television or radio, gender, employment status as well as continuous variables on education, and age. Moreover, I include an additive index capturing the availability of basic services – electricity, water, cell phone coverage, and a sewage system – at the respondent's location to approximate community-level development.

Beyond these personal attributes, location-specific characteristics are likely to have an impact on the conjectured relationship. I therefore include a set of county-level variables including ethnic and religious fragmentation, total population (log-transformed) and an additive index of water and electricity access.³ All county-level information is obtained from Uganda's 2002 population census (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2006). Although the census's timing is after the starting point of the investigation, concerns over post-treatment bias are mitigated by the fact that the variables are still measured before the surge of violence that started in 2002. For later robustness checks, I have also calculated the mean additive index of water/electricity access, religious fragmentation and total population on the level of individual ethnic groups based on the census data. Lastly, I account for differences between broader geographical regions and group-specific factors by including region- and group-fixed effects in the main models.

6. Empirical results

I use linear probability models with robust standard errors clustered at the county-level to estimate the effect of exposure to violence on post-conflict protest participation. Table 1 presents the results, with the first specification (model 1) estimating the model without explicitly considering regional heterogeneity between different parts of the country. We see already a positive and statistically significant relationship between the (log-transformed) number of violent events and protest participation. In substantive terms, moving from 0 to the median value of the independent variable (.7, which corresponds to 1 event) increases the probability of protest participation by 13.5%; moving from 0 to the 90th percentile (3.37, which corresponds to roughly 28 events) even increases the probability by 65.6%. To put it into perspective, this last category of heavily affected counties encompasses all nine counties in the Acholi subregion (the epicentre of the conflict prior to 2002), but also one county in Teso subregion (Amuria), one county in the West Nile subregion (East Moyo) and one county in Lango subregion (Lira Municipality). After including region-fixed effects, the coefficient increases both in magnitude and significance (model 2). Model 3 additionally includes ethnic group-fixed effects to the model. The effect for the main independent variable remains of similar magnitude, though at a lower level of significance.

³ The index shows a strong correlation with other indicators drawn from the census, including mean level of education or unemployment rate, and with other typical operationalizations of socio-economic development such as nighttime lights emissions. In order to avoid multicollinearity, I have only included the additive index of basic services here.

Table 1. Linear regression results for wartime exposure on protest participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Protest	Protest	Protest
Violent events in county (log)	0.0135* (0.0054)	0.0191*** (0.0053)	0.0173* (0.0097)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0022 (0.0218)	-0.0085 (0.0213)	-0.0048 (0.0217)
Female	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0349*** (0.0098)	-0.0364*** (0.0100)
Level of education	0.0103 (0.0139)	0.0100 (0.0137)	0.0110 (0.0141)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0145* (0.0066)	0.0148* (0.0067)	0.0161* (0.0064)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0316* (0.0132)	0.0341* (0.0134)	0.0337* (0.0133)
Employed	0.0014 (0.0125)	-0.0005 (0.0126)	-0.0048 (0.0125)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0245* (0.0117)	-0.0315** (0.0118)	-0.0336* (0.0162)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0860* (0.0364)	0.0713* (0.0349)	0.0818* (0.0398)
Public services (county)	-0.0599 (0.0395)	-0.0639 (0.0410)	-0.0528 (0.0434)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0670 (0.0997)	-0.2503* (0.1045)	-0.3003* (0.1368)
Constant	0.4936* (0.1967)	0.7253*** (0.2036)	0.5794* (0.2386)
Ethnic group-dummies	No	No	Yes
Region-dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2220	2220	2213
R^2	0.027	0.033	0.047

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level

 + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

6.1 Robustness checks

Before turning to the further exploration of the mechanism, a series of robustness checks shall test whether the findings of the main models hold against various model specifications. The results can be obtained from the appendix (tables R1 and R2). Unless otherwise specified, I use model 1 as the baseline for further specifications.

First, I repeat the analysis using a logit (Table R1, model A1) instead of a linear probability model. The table reports average marginal effects, which remain almost identical to the explanatory variable's coefficient in the main analysis. The second specification adds to the model a binary indicator on county-level protest mobilization before 2000 (obtained from ACLED), which could potentially account for post-conflict behaviour. Again, results from model A2 suggest no substantial impact on the main relationship. Third, after changing the explanatory variable's level of aggregation from the county- to the district-level (the first administrative unit), the coefficient becomes insignificant – but only if region-fixed effects are not included (model A3).

Model A4 tests whether the exclusion of Acholi-respondents impacts the overall results. A large share of violent events for the investigation period clusters in Acholi-dominated counties, which means that the results could be significantly driven by the outliers from this group (in fact, the mean number of violent events for Acholi respondents is 97.97, whereas the mean for all respondents lies at 13). Moreover, the Acholi subregion was the only area left for which a substantial amount of wartime IDPs have not returned to their home villages by 2008. If the results hold even after excluding Acholi-respondents from the analysis, it would thus hint also to a decreased salience of the pace of IDP return as an alternative mechanism for post-conflict grievance formation. The coefficient in model A4 yet remains significant (albeit only at a 10% level) and decreases only slightly even after excluding respondents from the analysis that identified themselves as Acholi. The results are significant at a 5% level if region-fixed effects are included.

In the fifth specification, I test how exposure to violence affects protest participation in the subsequent, 5th round of the *Afrobarometer* from 2012 (A5). The coefficient remains insignificant. Although this non-finding is arguably difficult to interpret, it may point to the previously outlined assumption that the effect of wartime experiences on protest likelihood is particularly prevalent in the immediate phase following the end of war.

The last set of robustness checks reported in table R2 tests the impact of modifications to the explanatory variable on the outcome. Using the original count of violent events instead of the log-transformed variant (A6), battle-related fatalities instead of events (A7), specifically violence against civilians (A8), or only LRA-related violent events (A9) all yield results similar to the original model in terms of sign and significance. In a similar vein, substituting the measure of violent events by ACLED with an alternative data source on violent events – the UCDP *Georeferenced Event Data Set* (GED) v.20 (Sundberg/Melander 2013) – does not change the results substantively (A10).⁴

Model A11 concludes by using the maximum number of IDPs per year as the independent variable. As explained earlier, the majority of conflict-induced population movement is assumed to have occurred within individual counties, which means that IDP figures can be regarded a valid alternative proxy for local conflict intensity. Information on such a disaggregated level is yet sparse, so I have relied here on the *Humanitarian Update* reports from UNHCR (e.g., OCHA 2002). As compared to the proxy used in the main analysis, this measure is problematic insofar as it is inconsistent, on a higher level of aggregation (district-level) and only fully available until 2005 – which yet covers the most conflict-intensive periods. Ultimately, these reservations render the measurement of an absolute number of IDPs in a location problematic, but it allows nonetheless to assess a stock figure of the (logged) maximum number of reported IDPs for each district in the time 2000 to 2005. As model A11 shows, this measure shows a positive and statistically significant effect, although the coefficient is considerably smaller as compared to the main analysis.


⁴ The operationalization procedure is outlined in the appendix.

7. Exploring the causal mechanism

The final section addresses the causal mechanism. I argue that wartime violence tends to reinforce perceptions of group-based grievances – which in turn lead to a higher propensity to engage in collective action. From this expectation follow two observable implications: First, the effect of local-level violence on protest behaviour should be particularly strong if the respondent’s own ethnic group has been affected by violence. Second, perceptions of relative deprivation should have a mediating effect on the relationship between wartime violence and protest participation.

Starting with the first conjecture, I have repeated models 1 through 3 with an interaction term. The effect of *Violent events in county (log)* on protest participation is estimated conditional on the ratio of the respondent’s own group’s exposure relative to the exposure of other groups (Models A12 through A14, table R3). Figure 6 visualizes the average marginal effects of wartime violence for different values of the interaction variable using again model 1 as the baseline.⁵ The plot shows that the effect is insignificant for most negative values (up to -.6). This means, an increase of violence is not systematically related to an increase of protest participation if the respondent does not belong to the majorly affected ethnic group. The effect becomes significant only when the ratio narrows down, and the effect increases with higher relative exposure of the respondent’s own group. These results corroborate the idea that one pathway from experiences of wartime violence to protests is tied specifically to group-related exposure.

Figure 6: Average marginal effects of “Violent events in county (log)” for different values of “Ratio of own group violent exposure / Other groups violent exposure in county (log)” with 95% CIs (based on model A12).



⁵ All models additionally include census-based control variables measured on the level of the respondent’s ethnic group in order to account for between-group differences. All models (A12 through A19) can be obtained from the regression tables R3 through R5 in the appendix.

As a robustness check, I first apply a larger, 10 km radius for calculating the ethnic structure around the event location. The results do not change substantively yet (A15 through A17, table R4). Second, I re-run the analysis with a nationwide measure of group-level exposure as the interaction variable. More specifically, I sum up all violent events assigned to the respondent's ethnic group. Models A18 and A19 (table R5 and figure 7 in the appendix) point to a similar direction as the previous analysis. We see that county-level violence has an effect on protest participation only when the respondent's own group has been particularly affected by violence. More specifically, the average marginal effect of county-level violence becomes significant at a 5% level if the value for (log) national group-level violence is 3.8 or higher (applies to 7 ethnic groups). These findings lend support to the results from the main models that protest participation can be explained by a combination of local *and* group exposure to violence.

7.1 Causal mediation analysis

In a final step, I test the conjectured mechanism between exposure to war violence and protest participation with a causal mediation analysis. The goal is to assess to which extent the total effect can be explained by the conjectured mediator variable. Following Imai et al. (2011), this effort consists of first regressing the mediator (collective grievances) on the independent variable (war exposure) and any relevant covariates (the control variables are identical to the ones used in model 1), and second to regress the outcome (protest) on the mediator, the independent variable, and the controls. The user-written Stata package *medeff* allows for the estimation of the average causal mediation effect (ACME), that is, the share of the total effect that can be explained by the assumed mediator variable.

As outlined in the data section, I expect the effect of exposure to violence on protest participation to be mediated through collective grievances. This is approximated here with the mediator variable on the respondent's perception that the own group is treated unfairly by the government. Moreover, I test to which degree identification with the respondent's own ethnic group mediates the conjectured relationship in two separate analyses. If the effect of violence exposure to protest participation is mediated through collective grievances, but not through ethnic identification alone, the initial assumption of the assumed causal mechanism would find support.

Table 2 shows the results for the causal mediation analysis with collective grievances as the mediator. Control variables and model specification remain unchanged from the main analysis, with model 1 constituting the baseline (linear probability model with standard errors clustered at the county-level). Model 3 presents the results, with column 1 showing the correlation between the independent variable and the mediator, and column 2 reporting the result for the relationship between the mediator and independent variable on the outcome (protests). Total, direct effects and the average causal mediation effects (ACME) are displayed in the table's footer.

The results show that the relationship with the mediator is positive and statistically significant for exposure to violence (column 1). Moreover, we find support for the second step in the causal chain, namely that the explanatory variable affects the outcome after controlling for the mediator (column 2). Lastly, we see that the ACME is positive and significant, with 8.8% of the total effect being explained by the mediator. At a first glance, this number may not appear to be a substantive amount. However, it is important to bear in mind that the direct effect (i.e., the remainder of the effect that is not explained through grievances) includes all other possible influences that cannot be considered here. Moreover, the approximation via perceived injustices is arguably a measure that cannot reflect the concept of collective grievances in its full extent.⁶ But the goal is not to confirm that the explanatory variable affects the outcome *solely* based on grievances, but rather to lend evidence whether a grievances mechanism has any explanatory power at all.

⁶ A similar argument is made in De Juan and Koos (2019), who find a comparatively small indirect effect (7%) in their mediation analysis. Their design also aims at disentangling the mechanism for individual behavior in a survey study.

Table 2. Causal mediation analysis

	(3)	Protest	(4)	Protest
	Perception: Group treated unfair		Stronger ethnic identity	
Violent events in county (log)	0.0370** (0.0134)	0.0135* (0.0055)	0.0118 (0.0112)	0.0140* (0.0056)
Perception: Group treated unfair		0.0361* (0.0154)		
Stronger ethnic identity				0.0135 (0.0158)
Constant	-0.4222 (0.2789)	0.4969* (0.2080)	0.1012 (0.2996)	0.4732* (0.1996)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2044	2044	2166	2166
R^2	0.034	0.032	0.016	0.028
ACME (Indirect effect)		0.0013		0.0001
Direct effect		0.0134		0.0138
Total effect		0.0147		0.0140
Percent of total effected mediated		8.8147		1.0263

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

It is furthermore important to note that the effect remains rather sensitive to potentially unobserved confounders (see figure 8 in the appendix). The evidence presented here shall therefore rather serve as supporting evidence for a group-based grievances mechanism as identified in the preceding analysis.

In order to corroborate this finding, I repeat the same analysis with an alternative mediator variable (model 4). I rely here on the question “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being a [*respondent's ethnic group*]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?” The variable *ethnic identification* takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that she identifies more or only with the ethnic group, and 0 if the respondent either feels more or only Ugandan, or if she identifies in equal parts as Ugandan and as a member of her ethnic group. Turning to the results (model 4), we see that there is no significant correlation between the mediator and the outcome (protest), and the indirect effect accordingly remains insignificant.

Thus, increased ethnic identification alone may not suffice for explaining the correlation between exposure to violence and post-conflict protest participation. While wartime violence indeed appears to be somewhat related to a higher likelihood of ethnic identification as opposed to national identification, this phenomenon alone may be insufficient to account for higher protest

likelihood. Instead, the causal mediation analysis suggests that the formation of collective, group-based grievances is related both to exposure to violence and to protest participation.

8. Conclusion

This paper addressed the question how exposure to wartime violence affects protest participation in the immediate aftermath of conflicts. I argued that exposure to violence fosters the development of group-based grievances, which in turn serve as the motivational foundation for later protest behaviour. Relying on survey data in the post-conflict context of Uganda and geo-located data on civil war violence, I showed that experiences of civil war violence increase individuals' propensity to participate in protests and demonstrations after the conflict has ended. The results remained robust against a series of model specifications, including different measurements of the independent variable and alternative samples. Further analyses supported the assumption that collective grievances are a plausible mechanism through which that relationship can be explained.

The findings presented here contribute to a better understanding of contentious politics in post-conflict settings and shed light on a hitherto understudied perspective. While previous studies have recognized the propensity for protests in the early stages of the peace process, the motivations driving individual participation have remained largely unaddressed. Several implications follow from the results presented here: First, they focus the attention on the immediate post-conflict phase. While some studies highlight the mid- to long-term effects of wartime experiences on either political attitudes (e.g. Cassar et al. 2013) or protests (Freitag et al. 2017), I show that the ramifications on contentious activism are already relevant in the early stages when the risk for conflict relapse is comparatively high (Jarland et al. 2020). At least for the specific context analysed here, I found no comparable effect in a longer-term perspective.

Second, they raise the question whether increased protest participation could develop to more severe social conflicts that could jeopardize the peace process as a whole. On the one hand, the fact that individual decisions to join protests are associated with wartime experiences and reinforced group-based perceptions of deprivation and injustice suggests that social cleavages may stem from rather deep-seated causes – and are thus potentially more difficult to resolve. On the other hand, however, it is important to emphasize that my argument rested on the assumption that contentious political developments in the post-conflict period are a necessary condition for collective grievances to result in manifest protest actions. This means that policies aimed at ameliorating existing group-based grievances and perceptions of injustice – e.g. through programs addressing economic horizontal inequalities – could plausibly counteract the direct translation into protest activity.

I would like to close with a few remarks on the applicability to other contexts. Uganda has been selected here as a most-likely case given the severity of the conflict and the presence of contentious political developments in the post-conflict period. Considering the last point in particular, the study's findings are likely to apply in particular to situations in which armed conflict is followed by a period of negative peace – that is, the absence of organized armed violence. Conflicts that are not terminated but rather phase out into a stage of continued, lower scale activity may not see the outlined political and economic developments typical to the aftermath of ceasefires, victories or peace agreements. They may thus also not be subject to similar dynamics with regard to participation in protests. Given the prevalence of low activity as a conflict outcome – roughly half of all conflict episodes in UCDP's *Conflict Termination Dataset* (v. 2/2015) records after the end of the Cold War ended by dropping below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths – the investigation of protest dynamics in these contexts constitutes a relevant avenue for future research.

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
10. Appendix

Table A1: Overview of the most severe (top 10%) conflict-dyads according to UCDP Battle-related deaths dataset (v. 19.1)

Total casualties	Dyad-ID	Location	Side A	Side B
5399	586	DRC (Zaire)	Government of DRC (Zaire)	RCD
5535	459	North Yemen	Government of N. Yemen	AQAP
5561	818	Sierra Leone	Government of Sierra Leone	RUF
5761	584	DRC (Zaire)	Government of DRC (Zaire)	AFDL
5776	747	Somalia	Government of Somalia	USC/SNA
5858	14669	Nigeria	Government of Nigeria	IS
5861	697	El Salvador	Government of El Salvador	FMLN
6012	727	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi of Afghanistan - Khalis faction
6114	830	Algeria	Government of Algeria	AQIM
6193	631	Peru	Government of Peru	Sendero Luminoso
7927	883	Australia, Iraq, United Kingdom, United States of America	Government of Australia, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America	Government of Iraq
7928	842	Tajikistan	Government of Tajikistan	UTO
7970	411	Philippines	Government of Philippines	CPP
8165	775	India	Government of India	Sikh insurgents
8452	14320	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	IS
8549	688	Uganda	Government of Uganda	LRA
9033	734	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
9579	726	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi of Afghanistan
9729	835	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9915	562	Nepal	Government of Nepal	CPN-M
10000	862	Congo	Government of Congo	Cobras

10216	829	Algeria	Government of Algeria	GIA
12211	640	Nigeria	Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
15717	14595	North Yemen	Government of N. Yemen	Forces of Hadi
16854	623	Colombia	Government of Colombia	FARC
18040	792	India	Government of India	Kashmir insurgents
18164	852	Russia (SU)	Government of Russia (SU)	Chechen Rep. of Ichkeria
18554	750	Somalia	Government of Somalia	Al-Shabaab
22848	799	Iraq, Kuwait	Government of Iraq	Government of Kuwait
25785	736	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	UIFSA
27332	857	Pakistan	Government of Pakistan	TTP
30118	781	Turkey	Government of Turkey	PKK
30227	714	Angola	Government of Angola	UNITA
31240	663	Sudan	Government of Sudan	SPLM/A
41269	558	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	EPRDF
41467	14620	Syria	Government of Syria	IS
43470	571	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	EPLF
60674	776	Sri Lanka	Government of Sri Lanka	LTTE
61060	524	Iraq	Government of Iraq	IS
98217	865	Eritrea, Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia
146342	735	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Taleban
242041	11973	Syria	Government of Syria	Syrian insurgents

Figure A1: Protest propensity in comparison to other countries surveyed in Afrobarometer round 4 (mean value: .1290142)



Generation of prime control variables

I include a set of control variables into the models that are based on survey responses from the Afrobarometer round 1 (2000). The creation of the control variables follows the same approach as applied in Rohner et al. (2013): I take the district-mean of each variable in order to capture differences in propensities for grievances and ethnic identification prior to the observation period. Unfortunately, the items are not identical across the survey rounds, but the three questions chosen here should capture both phenomena to a sufficient extent:

In order to capture pre-treatment levels of collective grievances, I rely on the survey question “*In your opinion, how often are (respondent’s identity from q 18) treated unfairly by the government?*”. Note here that the question – unlike in the 4th round – does not explicitly ask for the *ethnic* group. It thus captures the idea of perceptions of collective deprivation, albeit not specifically targeted at ethnic groups. In contrast to the 4th round of the Afrobarometer, there is no corresponding question contrasting ethnic with national identity. However, question 18 asks about the respondent’s self-identification more broadly conceived: “*Besides being Ugandan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?*”. I create a dummy variable here taking the value 1 if the respondent answered with “Ethnic”, and 0 otherwise (see also Rohner et al. 2013). Additionally, I collapse the question “*How much do you trust each of them to do what is right? Someone from your own ethnic group*” into a binary variable in order to approach the concept of in-group social trust more closely.

Table R1: Robustness checks I

	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
	Logit	Protests pre-2000	District-level	Acholi excluded	AB rd. 5
Violent events in county (log)	0.0125*	0.0138*		0.0118*	-0.0087
	(0.0056)	(0.0056)		(0.0068)	(0.0087)

Protest occurrence pre-2000		-0.0148			
		(0.0419)			
Individual controls:					
Urban location	0.0015	-0.0035	-0.0080	0.0038	0.0004
	(0.0200)	(0.0224)	(0.0240)	(0.0232)	(0.0423)
Female	-0.0359***	-0.0353***	-0.0354***	-0.0334***	-0.0500***
	(0.0098)	(0.0098)	(0.0094)	(0.0098)	(0.0134)
Level of education	0.0103	0.0104	0.0102	0.0174	-0.0011
	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.0167)	(0.0143)	(0.0044)
Respondent's age	-0.0014**	-0.0013**	-0.0013*	-0.0009*	-0.0009*
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Public services (ind.)	0.0134*	0.0143*	0.0137*	0.0149*	0.0146*
	(0.0061)	(0.0066)	(0.0070)	(0.0068)	(0.0082)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0380*	0.0317*	0.0306*	0.0351*	0.0073
	(0.0166)	(0.0132)	(0.0122)	(0.0135)	(0.0149)
Employed	0.0002	0.0010	0.0010	0.0087	0.0255
	(0.0122)	(0.0127)	(0.0108)	(0.0131)	(0.0179)
County-level controls:					
Total population (log)	-0.0209*	-0.0219	-0.0182	-0.0223*	0.0209
	(0.0092)	(0.0147)	(0.0122)	(0.0124)	(0.0172)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0815*	0.0867*	0.0908*	0.0940*	0.0051
	(0.0368)	(0.0365)	(0.0358)	(0.0411)	(0.0521)
Public services (county)	-0.0531*	-0.0541	-0.0543	-0.0609	0.0401
	(0.0314)	(0.0461)	(0.0386)	(0.0396)	(0.0666)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0709	-0.0708	-0.1034	-0.0861	0.0557
	(0.0988)	(0.1026)	(0.0879)	(0.1113)	(0.1500)
Violent events in district (log)			0.0094		
			(0.0065)		
Constant		0.4664*	0.4324*	0.4621*	-0.4442*
		(0.2082)	(0.2008)	(0.2005)	(0.2294)
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2220	2220	2220	2045	2070
R^2		0.027	0.026	0.027	0.029

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level (A3: district-level). Results for logit models show average marginal effects

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table R2: Robustness checks II

	(A6)	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)	(A11)
	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest	Protest
Violent events in county	0.0008*** (0.0002)					
Fatalities in county (log)		0.0090* (0.0037)				
Viol. against civilians (log)			0.0154* (0.0069)			
Violent LRA events (log)				0.0157** (0.0055)		
Violent events, GED (log)					0.0178* (0.0068)	
Max. number of IDPs, district, 2000-2005 (log)						0.0029* (0.0013)
Individual controls:						
Urban location	-0.0034 (0.0231)	-0.0043 (0.0220)	-0.0042 (0.0219)	-0.0064 (0.0237)	-0.0052 (0.0230)	-0.0100 (0.0232)
Female	-0.0355*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0351*** (0.0098)	-0.0355*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0097)
Level of education	0.0097 (0.0138)	0.0107 (0.0138)	0.0102 (0.0139)	0.0107 (0.0138)	0.0095 (0.0139)	0.0101 (0.0139)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)
Public services (ind.)	0.0149* (0.0067)	0.0146* (0.0067)	0.0136* (0.0067)	0.0139* (0.0068)	0.0144* (0.0067)	0.0128* (0.0067)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0312* (0.0129)	0.0308* (0.0132)	0.0307* (0.0134)	0.0325* (0.0132)	0.0314* (0.0131)	0.0313* (0.0131)
Employed	0.0013 (0.0124)	0.0014 (0.0125)	0.0017 (0.0124)	0.0003 (0.0125)	0.0013 (0.0125)	0.0016 (0.0124)
County-level controls:						
Total population (log)	-0.0223* (0.0110)	-0.0218* (0.0116)	-0.0228* (0.0118)	-0.0158 (0.0109)	-0.0194* (0.0111)	-0.0121 (0.0112)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0769* (0.0350)	0.0906* (0.0375)	0.0847* (0.0368)	0.0842* (0.0354)	0.0780* (0.0349)	0.0897* (0.0370)
Public services (county)	-0.0521 (0.0399)	-0.0553 (0.0393)	-0.0615 (0.0414)	-0.0396 (0.0392)	-0.0492 (0.0399)	-0.0358 (0.0398)

Religious fractionalization	-0.0444 (0.1005)	-0.0993 (0.0936)	-0.0784 (0.1033)	-0.0801 (0.0931)	-0.0751 (0.1008)	-0.1537 (0.0930)
Constant	0.5074* (0.2015)	0.4854* (0.1979)	0.5062* (0.2002)	0.4558* (0.1995)	0.4793* (0.1996)	0.4182* (0.2006)
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220	2220
R^2	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.026

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Operationalization of the alternative measure for county-level violence in table R2 based on UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013)

The operationalization procedure is equivalent to the one used for the main variables: I focus on all violent events in the respective time period and include all forms of organized violence, that is, state-based violence (battles) between rebels and the government, one-sided violence against civilians, and non-state violence between militant groups.

Table R3: Interaction effects

	(A12) Protest	(A13) Protest	(A14) Protest
Violent events in county (log)	0.0198** (0.0065)	0.0217** (0.0065)	0.0200* (0.0088)
Violent events in county (log) x ratio	0.0096** (0.0032)	0.0081* (0.0034)	0.0087* (0.0039)
Ratio (own group/other group, log)	-0.0436*** (0.0113)	-0.0379** (0.0124)	-0.0379* (0.0146)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0015 (0.0206)	-0.0041 (0.0206)	-0.0021 (0.0219)
Female	-0.0337*** (0.0098)	-0.0335*** (0.0098)	-0.0358*** (0.0101)
Level of education	0.0090 (0.0140)	0.0080 (0.0140)	0.0108 (0.0141)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0169* (0.0068)	0.0162* (0.0068)	0.0179** (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0322* (0.0113)	0.0329* (0.0124)	0.0320* (0.0146)

	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0133)
Employed	-0.0031	-0.0027	-0.0076
	(0.0121)	(0.0122)	(0.0124)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0311**	-0.0317**	-0.0334*
	(0.0117)	(0.0118)	(0.0146)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0410	0.0439	0.0672+
	(0.0365)	(0.0351)	(0.0398)
Public services (county)	-0.0499	-0.0488	-0.0469
	(0.0397)	(0.0411)	(0.0421)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2385*	-0.2894*	-0.3200*
	(0.1061)	(0.1158)	(0.1312)
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0187	-0.0186	-0.2665***
	(0.0141)	(0.0144)	(0.0424)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3029*	0.2470*	0.8972***
	(0.1248)	(0.1286)	(0.1312)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.4405**	0.4294**	-2.0838
	(0.1382)	(0.1552)	(2.2994)
Constant	0.6193*	0.7007*	4.4954***
	(0.2724)	(0.2950)	(0.3229)
Ethnic group-dummies	No	No	Yes
Region-dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2193	2193	2193
R^2	0.040	0.041	0.057

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table R4: Interaction effects (10km radius)

	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)
	Protest	Protest	Protest
Violent events in county (log)	0.0196**	0.0216**	0.0200*
	(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0088)
Violent ev. in county (log) x ratio (10 km rad.)	0.0096**	0.0081*	0.0087*
	(0.0032)	(0.0034)	(0.0039)
Ratio (own/other group, 10 km radius, log)	-0.0430***	-0.0374**	-0.0374*

	(0.0112)	(0.0123)	(0.0145)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0022 (0.0207)	-0.0047 (0.0207)	-0.0025 (0.0219)
Female	-0.0338*** (0.0098)	-0.0336*** (0.0098)	-0.0358*** (0.0101)
Level of education	0.0091 (0.0140)	0.0081 (0.0139)	0.0109 (0.0140)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0168* (0.0068)	0.0161* (0.0068)	0.0178** (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0322* (0.0137)	0.0330* (0.0137)	0.0320* (0.0133)
Employed	-0.0032 (0.0121)	-0.0029 (0.0122)	-0.0077 (0.0124)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0301* (0.0116)	-0.0307** (0.0117)	-0.0326* (0.0146)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0426 (0.0365)	0.0454 (0.0350)	0.0685+ (0.0397)
Public services (county)	-0.0477 (0.0397)	-0.0466 (0.0413)	-0.0451 (0.0423)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2430* (0.1059)	-0.2937* (0.1155)	-0.3231* (0.1311)
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0185 (0.0141)	-0.0184 (0.0144)	-0.2665*** (0.0424)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3077* (0.1252)	0.2509* (0.1288)	0.8977*** (0.1312)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.4387** (0.1380)	0.4288** (0.1552)	-2.0885 (2.3000)
Constant	0.6061* (0.2732)	0.6878* (0.2966)	4.4913*** (0.3233)
Ethnic group-dummies	No	No	Yes
Region-dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2193	2193	2193

R^2	0.040	0.041	0.057
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Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table R5: Interaction effects (national group-level exposure)

	(A18)	(A19)
	Protest	Protest
Violent events in county (log)	-0.0069 (0.0144)	-0.0042 (0.0139)
Violent events in county (log) x nat. group exposure	0.0058* (0.0024)	0.0055* (0.0023)
Nation-wide group exposure (own group , log)	-0.0071 (0.0053)	-0.0044 (0.0054)
Individual controls:		
Urban location	-0.0068 (0.0207)	-0.0107 (0.0208)
Female	-0.0358*** (0.0097)	-0.0356*** (0.0097)
Level of education	0.0108 (0.0137)	0.0095 (0.0137)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)
Public services (individual)	0.0152* (0.0064)	0.0148* (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0336* (0.0134)	0.0339* (0.0135)
Employed	-0.0027 (0.0120)	-0.0018 (0.0122)
County-level controls:		
Total population (log)	-0.0287* (0.0125)	-0.0291* (0.0126)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0864* (0.0348)	0.0824* (0.0353)
Public services (county)	-0.0494 (0.0406)	-0.0494 (0.0423)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2631* (0.0406)	-0.3325** (0.0423)

	(0.1035)	(0.1087)
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0149	-0.0161
	(0.0134)	(0.0137)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3717***	0.3252**
	(0.1055)	(0.1050)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.2987**	0.2521**
	(0.0909)	(0.0904)
Constant	0.6076**	0.6988**
	(0.2182)	(0.2297)
Region-dummies	No	Yes
Controls from AB round 1	Yes	Yes
Observations	2220	2220
R^2	0.036	0.038

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 7: Average marginal effects “Violent events in county (log)” for different values of “Own group violent exposure nationwide (log)” with 95% CIs (based on model A18).





Figure 8: This graph visually depicts the sensitivity of the findings in model 3 (causal mediation analysis) to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption, which is, that the error terms from the mediator and outcome are independent from each other. The sensitivity analysis shows that the mediation effect (ACME) becomes zero once both error terms show a correlation larger than .06.



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